BURNS v. STATE FARM

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Docket Number

22963.

Advocates

Jonathan R. Hendrix, of Hendrix Steigner, P.A., Lexington, for appellant. William O. Sweeny, III, and Rebecca Laffitte, Nelson, Mullins, Riley Scarborough, Columbia, for respondent.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Appellant Mary Sue Burns, acting individually and as guardian ad litem and natural parent of James W. Burns, a minor, sought coverage under her automobile insurance policy with State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company for injuries sustained by her son in a motorcycle accident on January 8, 1987. Although appellant had additional personal injury protection (APIP) coverage through her policy, the insurer denied coverage based on a policy exclusion for injuries sustained while occupying, using, or maintaining a motorcycle. The trial court upheld the validity of this exclusion, prompting this appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the exclusion of additional personal injury protection (APIP) coverage for injuries sustained while on a motorcycle is valid under South Carolina insurance statutes.
Whether the statutory exclusion for motorcycles in S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-210, which references only the personal injury protection (PIP) statute § 38-77-240, applies to APIP coverage under § 38-77-250.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Appellant contended that the motorcycle exclusion in the statute applies only to PIP coverage under § 38-77-240 and does not extend to APIP coverage under § 38-77-250, since the exclusion statute references only § 38-77-240.

Respondent's Arguments

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Bankers Trust of South Carolina v. Bruce, 275 S.C. 35, 267 S.E.2d 424 (1980)	Cardinal rule of statutory construction: ascertain and effectuate legislative intent.	Used to support the principle that statutes part of the same act must be read together to determine legislative intent.
McDonald v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 287 S.C. 40, 336 S.E.2d 492 (Ct.App. 1985)	Statutory construction principles regarding legislative intent.	Reinforced the approach to reading related statutes concurrently to ascertain intent.
Smalls v. Weed, 293 S.C. 364, 380 S.E.2d 531 (Ct.App. 1987)	Statutes that are part of the same act must be read together.	Supported the concurrent reading of PIP and APIP statutes.
Busby v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 280 S.C. 330, 312 S.E.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1984)	Statutory interpretation of insurance coverage provisions.	Affirmed the approach of reading related insurance statutes together.
Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance v. Parker, 282 S.C. 546, 320 S.E.2d 458 (Ct.App. 1984)	Insurers' right to limit liability provided no statutory or public policy violation.	Supported the validity of statutory exclusions allowing insurers to limit coverage.
Hatchett v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 244 S.C. 425, 137 S.E.2d 608 (1964)	Role of courts in construing statutes without legislating.	Emphasized judicial restraint and deference to legislative intent in statutory construction.
Creech v. South Carolina Public Service Authority, 200 S.C. 127, 20 S.E.2d 645 (1942)	Statutory construction principles.	Reinforced judicial duty to interpret statutes as written.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined three relevant statutes governing personal injury protection coverage: § 38-77-240 (PIP), § 38-77-250 (APIP), and § 38-77-210 (allowing coverage exclusions). The exclusion statute (§ 38-77-210) permits motorcycle exclusions but references only the PIP statute (§ 38-77-240). The appellant argued this exclusion should not apply to APIP coverage under § 38-77-250 because it is not explicitly mentioned. The court rejected this argument, applying the cardinal rule of statutory construction to determine legislative intent by reading related statutes together.

The court noted that § 38-77-250 requires insurers to offer APIP benefits "of the same kind and supplemental to" those described in § 38-77-240 (PIP). Thus, the APIP statute is dependent on and linked to the PIP statute. Because the motorcycle exclusion validly limits PIP coverage, it necessarily extends to APIP coverage, which is supplemental to PIP. The court emphasized that insurers may limit liability within statutory allowances and that it is the court’s role to construe statutes, not to legislate. Accordingly, the court held that the motorcycle exclusion is valid for both PIP and APIP coverage.

Holding and Implications

The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment upholding the validity of the motorcycle exclusion in the appellant’s insurance policy for APIP coverage.

As a direct consequence, the appellant is not entitled to recover APIP benefits for injuries sustained while occupying a motorcycle under the policy exclusion. The decision clarifies that statutory motorcycle exclusions apply to both PIP and APIP coverage under South Carolina law. No new precedent beyond this interpretation was established.

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Mary Sue BURNS, Indi v. dually and as G.A.L. and natural parent of James W.Burns, a minor o

Heard Nov. 2, 1988.

Decided Feb. 21, 1989.

HARWELL, Justice:

This case involves an insurance policy exclusion of additional personal injury protection (APIP) coverage to a person injured while on a motorcycle. We hold that such an exclusion is valid.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Appellant Mary Sue Burns is the natural mother and guardian ad litem of James William ("J.W.") Burns. On January 8, 1987, J.W. was injured in a motorcycle accident. J.W.'s motorcycle policy did not include APIP coverage. His mother, appellant Burns, had APIP coverage of $5000.00 through auto insurance with respondent State Farm Mutual Insurance Company. Appellant Burns attempted to recover under this policy for her son's injuries. The insurance company refused coverage, citing an exclusion in appellant's policy which reads:

What is not covered under Coverage P (No Fault) THERE IS NO COVERAGE FOR BODILY INJURY:

1. To any person:

e. Occupying, Using or Maintaining A Motorcycle.

The trial judge held the exclusion valid. This appeal follows.

DISCUSSION

There are three statutes which must be examined to determine the validity of the above exclusion. S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-240 (Cum. Supp. 1987) sets forth minimum personal injury protection (PIP) coverage which an insurance company is required to offer an insured as an option under a policy. S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-250 (Cum. Supp. 1987) sets forth additional personal injury protection (APIP) benefits which the insurance company is also required to offer to the insured as an option. The legislature has, however, provided that certain exceptions may be made from these coverage requirements. S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-210 (Cum. Supp. 1987) allows insurance companies to make certain coverage exclusions, including an exclusion for motorcycles. The pertinent portion reads:

"With respect to motorcycles, economic loss benefits required under § 38-77-240 may be excluded. . . ."

Appellant argues that because the statute regarding exclusions refers only § 38-77-240 (PIP), and not to § 38-77-250 (APIP), the motorcycle exclusion is not valid for APIP. We disagree.

The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that we are to ascertain and effectuate the actual intent of the legislature. Bankers Trust of South Carolina v. Bruce, 275 S.C. 35, 267 S.E.2d 424 (1980); McDonald v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 287 S.C. 40, 336 S.E.2d 492 (Ct.App. 1985). In ascertaining this intent, statutes which are part of the same Act must be read together. Smalls v. Weed, 293 S.C. 364, 380 S.E.2d 531 (Ct.App. 1987); Busby v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 280 S.C. 330, 312 S.E.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1984). The PIP and APIP statutes must therefore be read concurrently.

The APIP statute reads that insurance companies must offer "benefits of the same kind and supplemental to those described in § 38-77-240 ..." [emphasis added]. In order to give meaning to § 38-77-250, we must refer to § 38-77-240 to find out exactly which type of benefits § 38-77-250 is of the "same kind and supplemental to." Section 38-77-240 is the PIP statute. An exclusion which affects PIP benefits necessarily includes APIP, because these are benefits "of the same kind" as PIP.

Insurers have the right to limit their liability provided they do not contravene a statutory provision or public policy. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance v. Parker, 282 S.C. 546, 320 S.E.2d 458 (Ct.App. 1984). By enacting § 38-77-210, the legislature has allowed a limit on liability with regard to motorcycles. It is the responsibility of this Court to construe statutes; we have no power to legislate. Hatchett v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 244 S.C. 425, 137 S.E.2d 608 (1964); Creech v. South Carolina Public Service Authority, 200 S.C. 127, 20 S.E.2d 645 (1942). A reasonable construction of the statutes involved is that motorcycles may be validly excluded from both PIP and APIP coverage. The judgment of the trial court is

Affirmed.

GREGORY, C.J., and CHANDLER, FINNEY and TOAL, JJ., concur.