RUSSELL LEACH, Judge.
This matter came to be considered upon the applicant's appeal from the April 7, 1993 order issued by the panel of commissioners. The panel's determination affirmed the decision of the single commissioner, denying applicant's claim for an award of reparations finding that the applicant, Irl D. Berresford, was absent from the state of Ohio for a period exceeding thirty days when the criminally injurious conduct occurred.
R.C. 2743.52 places the burden of proof on an applicant to satisfy the Court of Claims Commissioners that the requirements for an award have been met by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Rios (1983), 8 Ohio Misc.2d 4, 8 OBR 63, 455 N.E.2d 1374. The panel found, upon review of the evidence, that the applicant failed to present sufficient evidence to meet his burden.
The single commissioner found, and the panel affirmed, that the statutory construction of R.C. 2743.51(A)(2)(a)(ix) requires that an applicant may not have been absent from the state of Ohio for a period exceeding thirty days or leave the state with the intent of establishing residency in another state. Counsel for the applicant acknowledged that the applicant was absent from the state of Ohio for a period exceeding thirty days, but he had not established residency in another state nor did he intend to become a citizen of another state.
R.C. 2743.51(A)(2)(a)(ix) provides:
"(A) `Claimant' means both of the following categories of persons:
"(2) Any of the following persons who claim an award of reparations under sections 2743.51 to 2743.72 of the Revised Code:
"(a) A victim who had a permanent place of residence within this state at the time of the criminally injurious conduct and who, at the time of the criminally injurious conduct, complied with any one of the following:
"* * *
"(ix) Had not departed the geographical boundaries of this state for a period exceeding thirty days or with the intention of becoming a citizen of another state or establishing a permanent place of residence in another state[.]" (Emphasis added.)
Counsel for the applicant argued that the emphasized "or" in the above section may be read as "and" whenever it is necessary to effectuate the intention of the legislature.
R.C. 1.02, general definitions, provides the following:
"As used in the Revised Code, unless the context otherwise requires:
"* * *
"(F) `And' may be read `or,' and `or' may be read `and' if the sense requires it." (Emphasis added.)
Applying the above rule of construction, R.C. 2743.51(A)(2)(a)(ix) could be interpreted to read as follows:
"Had not departed the geographical boundaries of this state for a period exceeding thirty days [and] with the intention of becoming a citizen of another state or establishing a permanent place of residence in another state."
The single commissioner found that the lack of intent to become a Florida citizen or resident was immaterial because the statutory construction of R.C. 2743.51(A)(2)(a)(ix) provides "* * * that for an applicant to qualify as a claimant he must not be absent from this state for a period exceeding thirty days or leave the state with the intent of establishing residency in another state." A panel of commissioners affirmed the denial decision of the single commissioner without the benefit of any testimony or argument.
The standard for reviewing claims appealed to the court is established by R.C. 2743.61, which provides, in pertinent part, the following:
"If upon hearing and consideration of the record and evidence, the court decides that the decision of the commissioners appealed from is reasonable and lawful, it shall affirm the same, but if the court decides that the decision of the commissioners is unreasonable or unlawful, the court shall reverse and vacate the decision or modify it and enter judgment thereon."
After a thorough review of the file, briefs and supportive documentation, this court finds that the decision of the panel of commissioners was unreasonable and should be reversed.
For the court not to be able to read the pertinent section of R.C. 2743.51(A)(2)(a)(ix) as "exceeding thirty days [and] with the intention * * *" would unjustly penalize those residents of Ohio who may be outside the state boundaries for over thirty days for a purpose not specified in R.C. 2743.51(A)(2)(a)(i) through (viii). This may include, but is not limited to, any individual on an extended vacation in excess of thirty days or any individual who was unemployed but residing within this state and seeking potential employment in another state.
This matter shall be remanded to the single commissioner and referred to the Attorney General for further investigation as to this program being a secondary recovery after the exhaustion of the compensation available from the state of Florida.
Upon review of the evidence, the court finds the order of the panel of commissioners shall be reversed and the applicant's appeal is GRANTED.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. The April 7, 1993 order of the panel of commissioners is REVERSED;
2. This claim is REFERRED to the Attorney General for further investigation and a new finding of fact and recommendation and REMANDED to the single commissioner for determination as to compensable economic loss;
3. The Attorney General shall file his amended finding of fact and recommendation on or before November 26, 1993;
4. The applicant may respond to the new finding of fact and recommendation within twenty-one days after it is filed by the Attorney General;
5. Costs assumed by the Reparations Fund.
So ordered.
RUSSELL LEACH, J., retired, of the Franklin County Municipal Court, sitting by assignment.