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Factual and Procedural Background

Testatrix Sally L. Bieley executed a will on June 12, 1986. She made specific bequests and provided in Article FOURTH that her residuary estate, if her mother Fannie Bieley survived her, was to be held in trust for the mother's life with the trustee applying income for the mother's support; upon the mother's death the principal was to be paid in equal shares to Mary M. Schwenk and Doreen Gloria McIntosh (or their descendants per stirpes). The mother predeceased the testatrix (died July 12, 1989). Following the testatrix' death on April 3, 1995, petitioner Maura Dausey (executor) petitioned the Surrogate's Court for probate. The Public Administrator recommended restricting distribution of the residuary estate until construction of Article FOURTH. The Surrogate admitted the will but withheld distribution pending construction. Petitioner sought a judicial determination under SCPA 1420 that the residuary estate should go to the named beneficiaries despite the mother's prior death. Respondent Albert Orans objected, asserting the residuary passed by intestacy to next of kin. The Surrogate (relying in part on extrinsic evidence) and the Appellate Division determined the residuary should pass to the named beneficiaries; respondent obtained leave to appeal and a certified question was presented to the Court of Appeals.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a residuary clause directing a life trust for a named life beneficiary who predeceased the testatrix, with a remainder "upon the death of" that life beneficiary to named persons, can be construed to give effect to a gift to the named remainder beneficiaries despite the life beneficiary's prior death.
  2. Whether the doctrine of gift by implication may be applied to supply an omission in the will so that the residuary estate is disposed of by implication rather than passing by intestacy.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The testatrix intended to create a life trust for her mother only if the mother survived her, and if the mother predeceased the testatrix the principal was intended to be paid over to the named remainder beneficiaries.
  • The will manifests a pattern of selecting particular nonnext-of-kin beneficiaries; the absence of nearer relatives and the testatrix' close ties to the named beneficiaries support the proposed construction.

Respondent's Arguments

  • Article FOURTH(a) created a trust only if the mother survived the testatrix, and the remainder in (b) was contingent upon that survival; the mother's death before the testatrix destroyed the remainder interest.
  • Because the residuary estate was not effectively disposed of under the will, it should pass by intestate succession to the testatrix' next of kin (first cousins) under EPTL 4-1.1.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Williams v Jones Testator's intention is the "absolute guide" and will must be read sympathetically as an entirety. Applied to read the will as a whole to discern dominant testamentary purpose and avoid intestacy.
Haug v Schumacher Courts should sustain the will and give effect to the testator's scheme for beneficiaries. Invoked to support giving effect to testatrix' overall disposition scheme.
Matter of Selner Courts should carry out testator's purpose when will manifests a general scheme. Used to justify carrying out the testatrix' apparent comprehensive plan despite omissions.
Matter of Fabbri Intention ascertained from a sympathetic reading of the will as an entirety and surrounding facts. Guided the court's sympathetic reading to find the intent to dispose of the residue.
Matter of Larkin Support for reading will as a whole to ascertain intent. Reinforced approach of construing the instrument in context.
Matter of Thall Court's duty to carry out testator's purpose even if general rules suggest otherwise; doctrine permitting implication to supply omitted contingencies. Relied on as authority for applying gift-by-implication to supply omission.
Matter of Dammann Presumption testator intended to dispose of whole estate by will (presumption against intestacy). Applied to favor construction avoiding intestacy of the residuary estate.
Schult v Moll Support for presumption against partial intestacy. Supported the weighty presumption against intestacy, especially for residuary gifts.
Matter of Gibbons Additional authority for presumption against intestacy. Used as background authority for avoiding intestacy.
Matter of Hayes Presumption against intestacy is particularly strong for residuary estate; avoid interpreting will to create partial intestacy. Central to court's reluctance to construe will as creating intestacy of the residue.
Matter of Nurse Further authority that residuary gifts carry strong presumption against intestacy. Supported the court's application of the presumption to the residuary.
Matter of Birdsell Authority on presumption against intestacy regarding residue. Reinforced the presumption applied here.
Central Union Trust Co. v Trimble Implication must be necessary, not merely possible or probable, to supply omitted testamentary disposition. Set the standard that any gift by implication must be a necessary implication; court found that standard met.
Matter of Winburn Similar requirement that implication be necessary and leave no hesitation. Used to support strictness of implication standard applied by the court.
Masterson v Townsend Implication must leave no hesitation as to testator's dominant purpose. Quoted to require a clear necessary implication from the will.
Bradhurst v Field Support for standard that implication must be so strong the contrary cannot be supposed. Reinforced the threshold for finding an implied gift.
Post v Hover Implication must be decisive to supply omitted disposition. Furthered the court's articulation of the necessary-implication standard.
Matter of Kronen Refusal to apply gift-by-implication where the will itself contains evidence of contrary intent to limit dispositions; residuary lacking and other provisions show contrary intent. Distinguished: court found no comparable contrary expression of intent in this will, so Kronen did not control here.
Matter of Englis Authority cited regarding application of implication doctrine in exceptional cases. Cited as part of background that implication may be applied in rare cases to cure omission.
Matter of Bellows Doctrine allowing courts to give effect to intention indicated by implication where omission occurred. Invoked as supporting precedent for supplying omission by implication.
Matter of Ragone Extrinsic evidence of testamentary intent is inadmissible absent ambiguity in the will. Cited to explain why the court did not rely on extrinsic evidence because it found an omission supplyable from the will itself.
Matter of Walker Authority on limits of extrinsic evidence in will construction. Used to support the court's avoidance of reliance on extrinsic evidence here.
Matter of Cord Further authority that extrinsic evidence is not admissible absent ambiguity. Cited as part of discussion limiting use of extrinsic materials.
Matter of Koellner Refusal to apply implication where will shows contrary intent. Referenced to contrast with the present will, which lacked contrary limiting language.
Matter of Fordham Ulterior limitation "upon" the death of another who is given an estate for life will generally not be defeated by the life tenant's predeceasing the testator; such language may be read as a limitation rather than an indispensable condition. Applied to read "Upon the death of my said mother" as a limitation on the life estate, not as a condition defeating the remainder; supported holding remainder survived.
United States Trust Co. v Hogencamp Authority that a remainder limited "upon" death of life tenant is not necessarily defeated by prior death of life tenant. Used to support interpretation that the remainder accelerates rather than is destroyed.
Norris v Beyea Where a devise is limited to take effect on a condition annexed to any preceding estate, if the preceding estate never arises, the remainder will nevertheless take effect as a preceding limitation, not a condition. Invoked to support treating the phrase as a preceding limitation so the remainder takes effect despite the mother's prior death.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began from the foundational rule that the testator's intent, discovered by a sympathetic reading of the entire will and surrounding circumstances, is the controlling guide. It emphasized the presumption against intestacy—especially strong for residuary gifts—and the doctrine that a court may supply an omitted disposition by implication when the implication is necessary and leaves no hesitation. Applying those principles, the court examined the will's structure and dispositions: specific selective bequests to nonnext-of-kin, an express residuary clause naming a life trust for the mother and a remainder to two named beneficiaries, and the absence of any language evincing a contrary intent to limit those remainders. The court concluded that the testatrix's dominant purpose was a complete disposition of her estate to the named beneficiaries and that the omission (failure to address the contingency of the mother's predeceasing) was supplyable by necessary implication. The court rejected respondent's proposed construction that would produce partial intestacy, noting the testatrix made no later will in the six years between her mother's death and her own and that the will contained no restrictive language analogous to that in Matter of Kronen. Finally, relying on authorities (notably Matter of Fordham and related cases), the court read the phrase "Upon the death of my said mother" as a limitation on the life estate rather than an indispensable condition defeating the remainder, so the remainder vested for distribution to the named beneficiaries despite the mother's prior death.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The order of the Appellate Division is affirmed. The Court held that, by application of the doctrine of gift by implication and by construing the will as a whole, the testatrix intended to devise her residuary estate to the named remainder beneficiaries in Article FOURTH Subpart(b) irrespective of whether her mother survived or predeceased her. The court further held that the phrase "Upon the death of my said mother" functions as a limitation rather than an indispensable condition, so the remainder is not defeated by the mother's prior death.

Implications: The direct effect is that the residuary estate shall be paid in accordance with Article FOURTH Subpart(b) to Mary M. Schwenk and Doreen Gloria McIntosh (or their descendants per stirpes); costs to parties appearing separately are awarded payable out of the estate. The certified question was not answered as unnecessary. The opinion applied existing doctrine and did not announce a novel rule beyond its application to these facts.

In the Matter of Sally L. Bieley, Deceased. Maura Dausey, Respondent, Albert Orans, Appellant.

LEVINE, J.:

In this proceeding to construe a will, we must decide whether a clause, directing that the testatrix' residuary estate was to be held in trust for the life of her mother, if her mother survived her, and upon her mother's death distributed to two named beneficiaries or their descendants, can be given effect where the life beneficiary predeceased the testatrix and the will contained no express direction for an alternative distribution of the residuary estate.

I.

By will executed on June 12, 1986, the testatrix, Sally L. Bieley, made certain detailed bequests, namely, an original portrait, an automobile, other personal property and a fixed sum of money, to one cousin, Gloria Evans, and several friends. Testatrix' residuary estate was to be placed in trust for the life of her mother and, upon her mother's death, the principal was to be divided equally between two named beneficiaries or to their descendants, in the event either of the named remainder persons predeceased her. Specifically, the residuary clause provided:

"FOURTH: All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, real personal or otherwise and wheresoever situate, including any lapsed legacies or bequests, hereinafter called my residuary estate, shall be disposed of as follows:
"(a) If my mother, Fannie Bieley, shall survive me, I give, devise and bequeath my entire residuary estate to my Executor and Trustee hereinafter named, in trust, to apply so much of the income therefrom to the support and maintenance of my said mother as my Executor and Trustee, in her absolute discretion, deems necessary or advisable, accumulating any balance of the income and adding the same to principal.

* * *

"(b) Upon the death of my said mother, the then principal shall then be paid over absolutely in equal shares to such of Mary M. Schwenk and Doreen Gloria McIntosh as shall survive me and to the descendants of such as them as may predecease me, per stirpes" (emphasis supplied).

Fannie Bieley died on July 12, 1989, predeceasing her daughter. Following the testatrix' death on April 3, 1995, petitioner Dausey, executor and the beneficiary of certain personal property and household effects, applied to Surrogate's Court for the will's probate. In a written report which interposed no opposition to petitioner's application, the Public Administrator of New York County noted, however, that "no disposition of the residuary estate appears to have been provided for in the event that [the testatrix'] mother predeceases, which she in fact did," and recommended that the court "restrict distribution of the residuary estate until a construction of the will, on notice to all parties," had been completed. The Surrogate subsequently admitted the will by decree, but prohibited distribution of the residuary estate pending a determination as to the construction of Article FOURTH.

Petitioner sought such a determination pursuant to SCPA 1420, contending that the testatrix' intent, under Subpart(a), was to create a life estate for her mother, but only if her mother survived her, and that the principal of the testamentary trust was to be paid over to the named beneficiaries upon her own death in the event her mother predeceased her. Petitioner supported this construction by noting that the testatrix, having left behind no spouse, parent, grandparent, sibling or child, had close personal ties with both of the remainder persons named in Article FOURTH Subpart(b): Ms. Schwenk had been Sally Bieley's secretary and confidante during her professional career, and a personal friend thereafter; Ms. McIntosh had cared for the testatrix' mother over a period of many years.

Respondent Orans, a first cousin and intestate distributee, filed an answer to the petition, alleging that Article FOURTH Subpart(a) created a trust if and only if the testatrix' mother survived the testatrix and, thus, any remainder interest in the principal of the trust was contingent upon the mother's survival — the failure of which destroyed that interest. Consequently, respondent asserted that because the residuary estate had not been properly disposed of in the will, it should be distributed according to the law governing intestate succession (see, EPTL 4-1.1) to the testatrix' next of kin, six first cousins — descendants of predeceased uncles or aunts — with whom the testatrix had virtually no contact.

The five remaining intestate distributees executed waiver and consent forms in the construction proceeding, registering no objection to either petitioner's proposed construction of Article FOURTH, or the distribution of the residuary estate in accordance with Subpart(b).

The Surrogate, relying, in part, on extrinsic evidence (i.e., notes and an affidavit submitted by the attorney-draftsperson), concluded that the attempted creation of a testamentary trust under Article FOURTH Subpart(a) did not serve to defeat distribution of the residuary estate to the two named beneficiaries under Subpart(b), since the latter paragraph "clearly express[ed] the intention" that the residuary estate "be distributed * * * upon the death of [the testatrix'] mother * * * whenever that should occur." The Appellate Division affirmed (___ A.D.2d ___, 658 N.Y.S.2d 266 [5-22-97]), and granted respondent-objector leave to appeal, certifying the following question for our review: "Was the order of Surrogate's Court, as affirmed by this Court, properly made?"

Because we conclude unhesitatingly that the will, read as a whole, indicates that the testatrix intended to make a bequest of the residuary estate under existing circumstances to the two beneficiaries named in Article FOURTH Subpart(b) and, thus, that the instrument contains a valid gift thereof by implication, we now affirm.

II.

This Court has long recognized that, in construing a will, the intention of the testator must be our "absolute guide" (Williams v Jones, 166 N.Y. 522, 532; see also, Haug v Schumacher, 166 N.Y. 506, 513 ["It is always the effort of the court to sustain, if possible, the will of the testator and to give force and effect to the scheme that he has devised for the benefit of those depending upon him"]; Matter of Selner, 261 App. Div. 618, 622, affd without opn 287 N.Y. 664). That intent is to be ascertained "not from a single word or phrase but from a sympathetic reading of the will as an entirety and in view of all the facts and circumstances under which the provisions of the will were framed" (Matter of Fabbri, 2 N.Y.2d 236, 240 [emphasis supplied], rearg denied 2 N.Y.2d 979; see also, Matter of Larkin, 9 N.Y.2d 88, 91; Williams v Jones, 166 N.Y., at 532-533, supra). Thus, where the entire will manifests a general testamentary scheme, it is "the duty of the courts to carry out the testator's purpose, notwithstanding that `general rules of interpretation' might point to a different result" (Matter of Thall, 18 N.Y.2d 186, 192).

Equally well established is the axiom of testamentary construction that the testator is presumed to have intended to dispose of the whole estate by will, and did not intend intestacy as to any part of it (see, Matter of Dammann, 12 N.Y.2d 500, 504-505;Schult v Moll, 132 N.Y. 122, 125; see also, Matter of Gibbons, 61 Misc.2d 790). The presumption against intestacy is particularly weighty where the subject of the gift is the residuary estate (Matter of Hayes, 263 N.Y. 219, 224-225, rearg denied 264 N.Y. 459; see also, Matter of Nurse, 35 N.Y.2d 381, 388;Matter of Birdsell, 271 App. Div. 90, 95, affd without opn 296 N.Y. 840). As we made clear in Hayes:

"The idea of anyone deliberately purposing to die testate as to a portion of his estate, and intestate as to another portion, is so unusual, in the history of testamentary dispositions, as to justify almost any construction to escape from it" ( Matter of Hayes, supra, 263 N.Y., at 225, quoting 2 Redfield, Wills, at 235 [3d ed]).

(See also, Matter of Fabbri, 2 N.Y.2d, at 243, supra; Haug v Schumacher, 166 N.Y., at 514-515, supra; Matter of Haber, 281 App. Div. 383, 385-386, affd without opn 306 N.Y. 706).

Since our endeavor, therefore, is to discern and effectuate the intention or purpose of the testatrix, where the express language of the entire will, rather than disjointed parts thereof, reveals such an intention or purpose, the possibility follows that the testatrix may dispose of property by implication as well as through formal disposition. The implication, of course, must be anecessary one, not merely one that it is possible or probable (see, Central Union Trust Co. v Trimble, 255 N.Y. 88, 93; Matter of Winburn, 265 N.Y. 366, 374-375), and it must be such as to "leave no hesitation in the mind of the court" as to what was the testatrix' dominant purpose (Masterson v Townsend, 123 N.Y. 458, 463; see also, Bradhurst v Field, 135 N.Y. 564, 568; Post v Hover, 33 N.Y. 593, 599 [the implication must be "so strong that the contrary cannot be supposed"]).

Thus, where the entire will unquestionably reveals a conscientious effort to provide for a complete disposition of decedent's property, but the testator has inadvertently failed to foresee every eventuality, the presumption against intestacy may be applied and a gift by implication found. This principle still obtains although a contingency has occurred that is not expressly provided for under the will (see, Matter of Thall, 18 N.Y.2d 186, 192, supra [corollary to the broader principles of testamentary construction "is the doctrine that a court may `give effect to an intention or purpose, indicated by implication, where the express language of the entire will manifests such an intention or purpose' and the testator has simply neglected to provide for the exact contingency which occurred"] [emphasis supplied]; Matter of Bellows, 103 A.D.2d 594, affd for the reasons stated 65 N.Y.2d 906;Matter of Selner, 261 App. Div., at 621-623, supra; see also, 11 Warren's Heaton, Surrogates' Courts § 187.04[9], at 187-161, § 188.05[2], at 188-21 [6th ed rev 1998]).

We have no difficulty in concluding that the matter before us is one of those rare and exceptional cases where common sense and justice compel the reasoned application of the doctrine of gift by implication to redress a situation arising from obvious omission (cf., Matter of Kronen, 67 N.Y.2d 587; Matter of Englis, 2 N.Y.2d 395). Although Article FOURTH of the will, undisputedly, omitted to provide for the exact contingency which has occurred, the testatrix' dominant purpose and design to distribute her estate, thoroughly and completely, is apparent from the face of the instrument.

Our holding, based on a "sympathetic reading" of the entire will and in view of the surrounding "facts and circumstances" (Matter of Fabbri, 2 N.Y.2d, at 240, supra) must be distinguished from the use of extrinsic evidence as to testamentary intent which is inadmissible in the absence of an ambiguity in the will (see,Matter of Ragone, 58 N.Y.2d 865, revg 87 A.D.2d 457, revd for reasons stated by Surrogate's Court 116 Misc.2d 993; see also, Matter of Walker, 64 N.Y.2d 354, 358; Matter of Cord, 58 N.Y.2d 539, 544, rearg denied 60 N.Y.2d 586). Because we conclude that there is anomission, which the court may supply if a basis is found in the will itself clearly indicating testamentary intention to make the disposition omitted but necessarily implied therefrom, we do not reach the question of whether the lower courts properly utilized extrinsic evidence in construing the language of the will.

After directing payment of all her outstanding debts and administrative expenses, the testatrix made four specific bequests in Articles SECOND and THIRD. The first of those, an original portrait of her grandmother, went, notably, to one of her cousins, indicating that the testatrix neither forgot nor ignored her immediate next of kin, but was purposely selective in making one of them the object of her bounty. She next bequeathed her automobile "to my friend Mary M. Schwenk," the balance of her personal property "to my friend Maura Dausey," and the sum of five thousand dollars "to my friend Carol McFall." Thereafter, the testatrix affirmatively revealed a desire not to die intestate as to any of her property by directing, in Article FOURTH, that "all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate" (emphasis supplied), including any lapsed devises or legacies, be held in trust for the life of her mother and, upon her mother's death, the trust corpus was to be paid over "absolutely in equal shares" to Ms. Schwenk and Ms. McIntosh or their descendants per stirpes.

Thus, as manifested in her will, the testatrix' dominant purpose is more than sufficiently clear: in the event that her mother survived her, the trust corpus was to remain intact and the executor and trustee directed, "in [her] mother's best interest," to apply the income and, occasionally, discretionary sums out of the principal, for her mother's support and maintenance. The gift of the residue in Subpart(b) to Ms. Schwenk and Ms. McIntosh is distinctly independent of the testatrix' desire, under Subpart(a), to ensure adequate comfort and assistance for her mother, throughout her mother's life. Fulfillment of the latter objective (or the failure thereof by virtue of her mother predeceasing her) in no way affected the testatrix' parallel aspiration of dividing any remaining balance of her estate between her secretary-confidante and her mother's caregiver in recompense for their years of diligent and devoted service.

Respondent's suggested alternative construction is untenable. Essentially, he argues that the testatrix intended to reserve to herself an alternate disposition of the residuary estate in the event her mother predeceased her. The limited bequests made to certain designated beneficiaries belie this construction, as does the fact that in the six years between her mother's death and her own, the testatrix failed to execute a new will or codicil that would have implemented such an intent if it had existed.

Equally unpersuasive is respondent's reliance on Matter of Kronen ( 67 N.Y.2d 587, supra). In that case, the will contained a provision under which the estate would pass to the surviving son and daughter in the event that the testator and his wife died simultaneously. The will, however, also contained a clause which gave the testator's son and daughter "each the sum of one dollar" and specifically restricted any further devise to the surviving children by declaring "I make no other provision for them for reasons best known to me" ( 67 N.Y.2d, at 588, supra [emphasis supplied]). Reading this restrictive provision "as an expression of desire to limit the children's participation in the estate" (id., at 589 [emphasis supplied]), we held that the residual property should pass by intestacy where the wife predeceased the testator and the contingency of simultaneous death did not occur. We emphasized in Kronen that where the will itself, devoid of a residuary clause, contained evidence of contrary intent to refute the disposition advanced at the construction proceeding, the doctrine of gift by implication should not be applied (see, id.;see also, Matter of Koellner, 121 A.D.2d 838, 839). No similar expression of contrary intent is inferable here.

Manifestly, the testatrix expected that she would die first, with full knowledge that her will would take effect upon her own death, and not before. Having failed to anticipate in the will what actually came to pass, there is a necessary implication that the testatrix intended her residuary estate to go, upon her death, to the two beneficiaries named in Subpart(b) despite the contingent nature of the trust created in Article FOURTH Subpart(a) (see, Matter of Thall, 18 N.Y.2d, at 192-193, supra;Matter of Bellows, 103 A.D.2d, at 604, supra; Matter of Selner, 261 App. Div., at 622, supra). Invoking that doctrine here, we give effect to the testatrix' dominant testamentary plan and purpose, plainly discernible, though incompletely expressed, within the four corners of the will.

III.

We thus conclude, through application of the doctrine of gift by implication, that the testatrix intended to devise her residuary estate to the remainder persons named in Article FOURTH irrespective of whether her mother survived or predeceased her. Furthermore, the gift of the remainder over to the named beneficiaries is not defeated because it appears to be expressly predicated on the phrase "[u]pon the death of [the testatrix'] mother" contained in Subpart(b) of the residuary clause. In this regard, the instant matter is controlled by Matter of Fordham ( 235 N.Y. 384), wherein we stated:

"[a]n ulterior limitation `upon' the death of another who is given an estate for life, will not, in general, be defeated by the lapse of the particular estate through the death of the life tenant before the will can take effect. This is so though the language of the gift, if literally construed, may make the remainder contingent upon succession in the order named" ( id., at 387 [Cardozo, J.] [emphasis supplied]).

Here, as in Fordham, we read the phrase "[u]pon the death of my said mother" not as an indispensable condition, but as a limitation on the preceding estate, the failure of which accelerates, rather than destroys, the remainder interest in the residue (id., at 389; see also, United States Trust Co. v Hogencamp, 191 N.Y. 281, 284-285; Williams v Jones, supra, 166 N.Y., at 536-537 ["Where a devise is limited to take effect on a condition annexed to any preceding estate, if the preceding estate should never arise, the remainder over will, nevertheless, take place, the first being considered only as a preceding limitation, and not as a preceding condition, to give effect to the subsequent limitation"]; Norris v Beyea, 13 N.Y. 273, 287).

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs to all parties appearing separately and filing separate briefs payable out of the estate. The certified question should not be answered upon the ground that the Appellate Division order is final and, thus, the certified question is unnecessary.

Order affirmed, with costs to all parties appearing separately and filing separate briefs payable out of the estate. Certified question not answered as unnecessary. Opinion by Judge Levine. Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Titone, Bellacosa, Smith, Ciparick and Wesley concur.

Decided May 12, 1998

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MATTER OF BIELEY
(May 12, 1998)