Ordered that the interlocutory judgment is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and the claim is dismissed.
It is well settled that neither a medical provider, in this case a psychotherapist, nor the State or governmental subdivisions employing the medical provider, may be held liable for a mere error in professional judgment ( see, Darren v. Safier, 207 A.D.2d 473; Davitt v. State of New York, 157 A.D.2d 703; Mohan v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 145 A.D.2d 474; Wilson v. State of New York, 112 A.D.2d 366). For liability to ensue, it must be shown that the medical provider's treatment decision was "`"`something less than a professional medical determination'"'" ( Darren v. Safier, supra, at 474; Davitt v. State of New York, supra). In this case, Dr. Frederick's decision on the evening of January 2, 1989, to allow the decedent to voluntarily enter the hospital the next morning was a professional medical determination. The mere fact that the claimant's expert would have opted for a different treatment, without more, "represents, at most, a difference of opinion among [medical providers], which is not sufficient to sustain a prima facie case of malpractice" ( Darren v. Safier, supra, at 474; see also, Topel v. Long Is. Jewish Med. Ctr., 55 N.Y.2d 682; Krapivka v. Maimonides Med. Ctr., 119 A.D.2d 801).
Thompson, J. P., Sullivan, Joy and Schmidt, JJ., concur.