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Georgia Redd, Plaintiff v. The City Of Odessa, Officer Freddie Nayola, And Officer Ron Martz, Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS FREDDIE NAVOLA AND RON MARTZ'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

ROYAL FURGESON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Officers Freddie Nayola and Ron Martz on August 29, 2000. A response to the Motion for Summary Judgment was filed by the Plaintiff Georgia Redd on October 5, 2000. In addition, a hearing was held on the Motion on November 2, 2000. After due consideration of the arguments and submissions of the parties, the Court is of the opinion that the Motion should be GRANTED.

STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Willis v. Roche Biomedical Lab., Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995). Once the movant carries this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-26 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-87 (1986). All justifiable inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. If the record, viewed in that light, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmovant, summary judgment is proper. Kelley v. Price Macemon, Inc., 992 F.2d 1408, 1413 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1043 (1994) (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 577-78).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The tragic events giving rise to this lawsuit occurred on July 8, 1997. A few minutes before 11:00 a.m. on that day, Officers Pete Marquez and Terry Vanlandingham of the Odessa Police Department (OPD) were dispatched to a house at 411 E. 44th Street in Odessa, Texas. (Marquez Aff. at 1.) The officers were advised that an individual at the residence was threatening to kill his mother and himself. (Marquez Aff. at 1.) They were to meet a case worker from the Mental Health Mental Retardation (MHMR) center in Odessa at the house. (Marquez Aff. at 1.) The officers arrived at the location in separate marked police cars, with Officer Vanlandingham arriving shortly before Officer Marquez. (Marquez Aff. at 1-2.)

When the officers arrived, no one from MHMR was present. (Marquez Aff. at 2.) Vanlandingham and Marquez proceeded to the front door of the house and attempted to speak to the resident, Mr. Randy Redd. (Marquez Aff. at 2.) Mr. Redd would neither let the officers in nor come outside. (Marquez Aff. at 2.) From their conversation with Mr. Redd, Officers Vanlandingham and Marquez learned that Mr. Redd's mother was no longer inside the house. (Marquez Aff. at 2.)

Shortly thereafter, two individuals from MHMR arrived at the house, Ms. Chila Ybarra and Mr. Ervin Fisher. (Marquez Aff. at 2; App. PI.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 8 at 4.) Mr. Redd was not familiar with either of these individuals. (App. Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 3 at 7.) One of the MHMR workers knocked on the front door of the house. (Marquez Aff. at 2.) Officer Marquez heard Mr. Redd walk toward the door and shout something, and he thought he heard a gun being loaded. (Marquez Aff. at 2.) The officers and MHMR workers then rapidly moved off the front porch of the house. (Marquez Aff. at 2.) Officer Marquez took cover near a residence next door, and both officers proceeded to call their supervisor, Sergeant Charles Moad. (Marquez Aff. at 2-3.)

While he was en route to the house at 411 East 44th Street, Sergeant Moad spoke by radio with Officer Vanlandingham and learned that an MHMR patient named Randy Redd was allegedly threatening suicide. (Moad Aff. at 2.) After arriving at the house, Moad set up a perimeter, with officers positioned so as to control traffic around the house and to prevent Mr. Redd from running out of the house and into the neighborhood. (Moad Aff. at 2.) Sergeant Moad then contacted Mr. Fisher, one of the MHMR caseworkers present at the scene. (Moad Aff. at 2.) Mr. Fisher identified the man in the house as Randy Redd, a tall, large man who had been diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic(MoadAff. at2; App. Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. J.Ex. 1 at 2; Shepherd Aff. at 11; App. Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 3 at 5; MartzDep. at 101.) He had also filed his teeth down to points. (App. Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 3 at 6.) Mr. Redd was supporting himself and his mother through social security. (App. PI.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 3 at 2, 5.) Mr. Fisher advised Sergeant Moad that Randy Redd had not been taking his prescribed medication. (Moad Aff. at 2.) Redd was thirty-seven years old on the day in question. (App. Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 1 at 2, Ex. 2 at 1.)

Sergeant Moad managed to obtain the phone number for the house at 411 East 44th Street. (Moad Aff. at 3.) With Mr. Fisher sitting in his police car, Moad then attempted to call Randy Redd using his cell phone. (Moad Aff. at 3.) Mr. Redd answered the phone and spoke with Sergeant Moad for a few minutes. (Moad Aff. at 3.) Mr. Redd stated that he was no longer taking his medications and had given up on them. (Moad Aff. at 3.) Shortly thereafter, he hung up the phone. (Moad Aff. at 3.) Sergeant Moad tried to call back, but it appeared that the phone had been taken off the hook. (Moad Aff. at 3.)

Sergeant Moad next contacted the dispatcher at the police station and requested that either negotiators or the Crisis Intervention team be notified. (Moad Aff. at 3.) Mr. Fisher advised Moad that one of Mr. Redd' s previous MHMR caseworkers, who was more familiar with his case, might be able to establish communication with Mr. Redd. (Moad Aff. at 3.) A short time later, the prior caseworker, Ms. Carron Shellenberger, arrived at the scene. (Moad Aff. at 3.) Ms. Shellenberger had first started working with Randy Redd through MHMR in January of 1994. (App. PI.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 3 at 1.) At about the same time that she appeared, Sergeant Charles Burns and Sergeant Paul Shepherd, members of the Crisis Intervention team, arrived. (Moad Aff. at 3.) Burns and Shepherd were trained negotiators on the Crisis Intervention team. (Shepherd Aff. at 2; Burns Aff. at 2.) Sergeant Moad briefed Sergeants Burns and Shepherd. (Moad Aff. at 3.) Burns and Shepherd also spoke with Ms. Shellenberger, Mr. Fisher, and Randy Redd's mother, Georgia Redd, who arrived at the house around 12:15 p.m. (Moad Aff. at 3-4; Shepherd Aff. at 3.)

Sergeants Moad, Burns, and Shepherd learned from speaking with Mrs. Redd and the various MHMR caseworkers at the scene that Mr. Redd had been involved in a similar incident in the past in which it took many police officers to subdue him and transport him to the state hospital in Big Spring, Texas. (Moad Aff. at 4; Shepherd Aff. at 3; Tomlinson Dep. at 38.) Moad also understood that Mr. Redd liked knives and that there were a variety of knives available to him in the house, as well as two pistols hidden in the Mrs. Redd's bedroom. (Moad Aff. at 4, 5; Shepherd Aff. at 3.) In addition, Mrs. Redd explained that there was a large bull mastiff dog inside the house who did not like males. (Shepherd Aff. at 3.) Finally, an officer at the police station had run a criminal history check on Mr. Redd and discovered several previous arrests. (Moad Aff. at 4.)

Officers Terry Barnhart and Dean McCann of the SWAT team were the next to arrive, at about 1:00 p.m. (Moad Aff. at 4; Shepherd Aff. at 6.) Barnhart was the most senior of the SWAT team members present and was therefore in charge of the team. (Nayola Dep. at 26.) Sergeant Moad briefed the officers on the situation, giving them all the facts he had up to that point. (Moad Aff. at 4-5.) Shortly after 1:00p.m., members of the SWAT team replaced the officers that Sergeant Moad had positioned along the perimeter of the house. (Moad Aff. at 5.) Sergeants Burns and Shepherd decided to put Ms. Shellenberger in touch with Mr. Redd, and three calls were made to the residence. (Shepherd Aff. at 4.) On the third call, Mr. Redd answered the phone and spoke briefly to Ms. Shellenberger. (Shepherd Aff. at 4-5; Burns Aff. at 5.) Redd's voice was calm, but he hung up after exchanging very few words and would not answer the phone on subsequent attempts to communicate. (Shepherd Aff. at 5; Burns Aff. at 5; App. Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. 3. Ex. 3 at 6.)

Around this time, Mickey Tomlinson, a supervisor with MHMR, arrived at the scene. (App. PI.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. 3. Ex. 8 at 6.) Shortly afterwards, Ervin Fisher returnedwith an emergency apprehension and detention warrant, issued by a justice of the peace for Ector County, ordering Mr. Redd to be transported to the state hospital in Big Spring. (App. Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. 3. Ex. 8 at 6; Bums Aff. at 12-14.) Due to concern about the media finding out about the situation at 411 East 44th Street and thereby further complicating the situation, Mr. Redd's phone number was changed to an unlisted number. (Moad Aff. at 5.) It was also "locked down" to prevent Mr. Redd from making any outgoing calls. (App. Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. 3. Ex. 8 at 6.)

Sometime before 4:00 p.m., Sergeant Burns advised Sergeant Moad that he wanted Moad to use the public address system of his patrol car in an attempt to communicate with Mr. Redd. (Moad Aff. at 5.) Moad and Burns drove to the front of the house, where Moad spoke through the p.a. system in an attempt to get Mr. Redd to replace his phone on the hook. (Moad Aff. at 5.) At first Mr. Redd seemed responsive to Sergeant's Moad's statements; however, he refused to hang up the phone and allow the officers to call him. (Moad Aff. at 6.)

At approximately 4:45 p.m., some members of the SWAT team disconnected Mr. Redd's electricity. (Moad Aff. at 6.) Just before 5:00 p.m., Mr. Redd appeared at the living room of the house. (Moad Aff. at 6.) Sergeant Moad again used the p.a. system to ask Mr. Redd to hang up his phone. (Moad Aff. at 6.) When Moad asked if the phone had been replaced on its receiver, Redd nodded his head. (Moad Aff. at 6.) Nevertheless, Mr. Redd refused to answer. (Moad Aff. at 6.)

Slightly after 5:00p.m., Sergeant Burns and Sergeant Moad, who had driven a short distance down the street, were advised that Mr. Redd had emerged from the house and had been standing on the porch for a brief time before he returned inside. (Moad Aff. at 6.) Around 5:30 p.m., Sergeant Moad was informed that Mr. Redd's uncle had arrived on the scene. (Moad Aff. at 6.) At this point, Moad drove his police car to the front of the house and asked Mr. Redd through the p.a. system to pick up his phone so that he could speak with his uncle. (Moad Aff. at 6.) Redd would not speak with either the police or his uncle. (Moad Aff. at 6.)

A command post for the Crisis Intervention team had been set up in a patrol car down the street from the house, and a decision was made there to cut off the water supply to the house. (Moad Aff. at 7; Shepherd Aff. at 2; Burns AIT. at 2.) The water, along with the gas, was turned off just before 6:00 p.m. (App. P1.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. 3. Ex. 5 at 1.) After this had been done, Sergeant Burns continued to dial Mr. Redd's phone number in an effort to make contact with him. (Moad Aff. at 7.) In addition, Sergeant Burns and Sergeant Moad "tweaked" the siren and air horn on Moad's car several times in order to get Mr. Redd's attention. (Moad Aff. at 7.)

At about 6:30 p.m., Commander James Dodson, acting chief of police for the Odessa Police Department, arrived at the command post. (Blanco Aff. at 3-4; App. Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 8 at 8.) Because none of the efforts to communicate had produced results, a brainstorming session was held in which several further options were discussed. (Blanco Aff. at 4; App. Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. 3. Ex. 8 at 8.) One suggestion was for the police to simply withdraw from the area, but Mickey Tomlinson, who was also involved in the discussion, advised that Mr. Redd still posed a threat to himself or to others at that point. (Blanco Aff. at 4; Burns Aff. at 6; Shepherd Aff. at 6; App. Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 8 at 9.) Another option considered was to breach the doors of the house without making an entry, but this possibility was rejected because it was thought it might encourage Redd to further barricade himself by placing furniture against the doors. (Shepherd Aff. at 6.) This rearranging, in turn, could lead to Redd's discovery of the pistols that were kept somewhere in the house. (Shepherd Aff. at 7.)

The officers also ruled out sending a police dog into the house on the belief that Mr. Redd's alleged bull mastiff might distract the canine. (Shepherd Aff. at 7; Blanco Aff. at 4.) The possibility of the SWAT team making a forced entry into the residence was not thought feasible because of the likelihood of a confrontation with Mr. Redd. (Shepherd Aff. at 7; Blanco Aff. at 4.) It was not known what weapons he had either discovered in the house or fashioned himself and Mr. Redd's dog was another potential problem. (Shepherd Aff. at 7; Blanco Aff. at 4.) The use of tear gas was rejected, thought not dismissed entirely, due to a number of uncertainties about the effect it could have on the situation at that point in time. (Shepherd Aff. at 7; Blanco Aff. at 4.)

These options having been eliminated, a decision was made to continue attempts to communicate with Mr. Redd. (Shepherd Aff. at 8; Blanco Aff. at 5.) To this end, it was agreed that a special type of telephone, a "negotiator phone," would be thrown through the front living room window. (Moad Aff. at 7; Blanco Aff. at 5.) Mr. Tomlinson suggested that this might encourage Randy Redd to communicate by disrupting his sense of security. (Shepherd Aff. at 8; Blanco Aff. at 5.) At approximately 8:30 p.m., Officer Nayola (also of the SWAT team) broke out the window and Officer McCann threw the phone into the house. (Nayola Dep. at 16; Marlz Dep. at 54.) Sergeants Burns and Moad then asked Mr. Redd over the p.a. system to pick up the phone. (Moad Aff. at 7; Shepherd Aff. at 8.)

At about 8:45 p.m., Mr. Redd appeared at the living room window and looked outside. (Moad Aff. at 7.) He appeared to be unhappy. (Moad Aff. at 7.) The phone cord became taut, and Sergeant Shepherd advised Sergeant Moad that the line was dead. (Moad Aff. at 7; Shepherd Aff. at 9.) The officers continued to call the house using Sergeant Moad's cell phone, and Sergeant Burns used the p.a. system to advise Mr. Redd that no one wanted to hurt him and they just wanted to talk to him in order to resolve the situation. (Moad Aff. at 7; Burns Aff. at 7.) These efforts gained no results. (Moad Aff. at 7; Bums Aff. at 7-8.)

Just before 9:00 p.m., Mr. Redd appeared again at the living room window. (Moad Aff. at 7.) He appeared to be agitated and was wielding a club-like instrument with a dark handle and a silver-colored body. (Moad Aff. at 7-8.) Mr. Redd then yelled and struck the window sill several times with the club-like device. (Moad Aff. at 8.) Redd threatened to kill Sergeant Burns, then backed away from the window and stopped talking. (Moad Aff. at 8.)

With darkness descending, the house was illuminated by means of two patrol cars with their lights and spotlights pointing toward the front of the residence. (Moad Aff. at 8.) The officers continued trying to use the cell phone and p.a. system in order to communicate with Mr. Redd. (Moad Aff. at 8.) They heard occasional sounds of ransacking and destructiveness emanating from the house, and were concerned that Mr. Redd might either be searching for the two hidden pistols or further barricading himself (Moad Aff. at 8.)

At about 10:00 p.m., Mr. Redd stepped out onto the front porch. (Moad Aff. at 8.) Sergeant Burns and Sergeant Moad were seated in Moad's patrol car, with Burns still attempting to communicate through the p.a. system. (Moad Aff. at 8.) When they saw Mr. Redd come out of the house, both Moad and Burns exited the vehicle and approached the sidewalk in front of the house. (Moad Aff. at 8; Burns Aff. at 8.) Bums began talking to Redd in an attempt to reason with him. (Moad Aff. at 8; Burns Aff. at 8.) However, Mr. Redd continued to yell at the officers and again threatened to kill Sergeant Burns. (Moad Aff. at 8; Shepherd Aff. at 9; Martz Dep. at 64.) Redd sat down on the front edge of the porch and continued to yell while Burns continued to talk. (MoadAff. at 8.) Redd then began hitting the sidewalk in front of the porch with his club-like instrument. (Moad Aff. at 8; Burns Aff. at 8; Martz Dep. at 100.)

During this time, Officer Barnhart requested permission from the command post to allow the SWAT team to rush Mr. Redd and tackle him. (App. Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. 3. Ex. 8 at 11.) His request was denied. (App. P1.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. 3. Ex. 8 at 11.) In addition, Corporal Robin Smith, who was positioned in front of the house with a "bean bag" shotgun-that is, a shotgun loaded with small canvas bags containing lead shot-announced that he had a clear shot of Mr. Redd, who was standing on the porch. (Moad Aff. at 9; Shepherd Aff. at 10; Martz Dep. at 30; App. PI.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. 3. Ex. 8 at 11.) The bean bag gun was to be used to administer non-lethal force and stun Mr. Redd from a distance. (Smith Dep. at 13, 24; Nayola Dep. at 22; Martz Dep. at 77, 102; App. P1.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. 3. Ex. 7 at 1.) Smith's request to take the shot was denied by Barnhart. (App. Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 8 at 11.)

Redd then stood up and turned around as if he were going back into the house. (Moad Aff. at 8.) Sergeant Moad noticed something shiny in Redd's left rear pocket that could not be identified. (Moad Aff. at 8.) It would later be determined to be a dinner knife that had been altered. (App. P1.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. 3. Ex. 8 at 10.) Before retreating into the house, Mr. Redd turned to face the officers, and he hit the side of the house a few times with the club-like instrument. (Moad Aff. at 9; Martz Dep. at 100.) It was not made of wood and did not break. (Moad Aff at 9.) Redd then went back inside. (Moad Aff. at 9.)

Sergeant Shepherd suggested that they coax Mr. Redd out of the house one more time, so that members of the SWAT team could try to tackle him and take him into custody. (Moad Aff. at 9; Burns Aff. at 9; Martz Dep. at 72.) The hope was that Mr. Redd would once again come out of the house and sit down on his porch, thereby allowing the SWAT team to rush him and safely apprehend him. (Nayola Dep. at 42.) In accordance with the plan, a bullet-proof vest was placed on Sergeant Burns. (MoadAff. at 9; Burns Aff. at 9.) Bums and Moad got back into the patrol car and drove it up to the curb facing the house. (Moad Aff. at 9.) Officers Freddie Martz and Ronald Nayola, members of the SWAT team, were stationed at the east side of the house. (Moad Aff. at 9.) Other members of the SWAT team-Officers Barnhart, McCann, and Chavez-were supposed to respond as needed by coming from the west side of the house. (App. Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. 3. Ex. 5 at 1; App. Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 8 at 12.)

At about 10:30 p.m., Sergeant Burns once again began using the p.a. system in an attempt to get Randy Redd out of the house. (Moad Aff. at 9; Shepherd Aff. at 10.) In particular, Burns made comments to Mr. Redd that John Wayne would not hide in the house but would come outside and talk, while Jerry Lewis might stay inside the house and hide. (Moad Aff. at 9; Burns Aff. at 9; Shepherd Aff. at 10-1 1.) The officers had learned that Mr. Redd was a fan of John Wayne through their conversations with Ms. Shellenberger. (Shepherd Aff. at 4; Burns Aff. at 5; Tomlinson Dep. at 25-26.) Mr. Tomlinson apprised the officers that such a statement could likely make Mr. Redd angry and bring him out of the house in an aggressive manner. (App. Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. 3. Ex. 3 at 8; Tomlinson Dep. at 25-26.)

Shortly after this comment was made, Mr. Redd emerged from the house and moved quickly toward Sergeant Burns. (MoadAff. at 9; Burns Aff. at 9; Smith Dep. at 24.) He had the same club or pipe in his hands. (Moad Aff. at 9; Burns Aff. at 9.) Sergeant Moad and Sergeant Burns proceeded to quickly back up in the patrol car to the curb on the opposite side of the street, farther away from the house. (Moad Aff. at 9; Shepherd Aff. at 11.) As they backed up, Corporal Smith stepped forward to prevent Mr. Redd from leaving the front yard of the house. (Moad Aff. at 9.) Smith shouted, "Police. Get down," but did not fire the bean bag gun because Redd's close proximity created the risk of inflicting a fatal injury. (Smith Dep. at 12-13; Shepherd Aff. at 11; Burns Aff. at 9; Martz Dep. at 75, 77, 102-03.)

At about the same time that Mr. Redd came out of the house, Captain Terry Lange of the Odessa Police Department gave the "go" signal to the SWAT team over the radio. (Nayola Dep. at 18-19; Martz Dep. at 88.) Even though he did not recognize the voice on the radio as that of Officer Terry Barnhart, the man in charge of the SWAT team, Officer Nayola decided to proceed towards Mr. Redd. (Nayola Dep. at 42.) Mr. Redd, still standing, looked at Corporal Smith but did not swing the pipe he was carrying. (Smith Dep. at 13, 25-26.) Redd then noticed Officers Martz and Nayola slowly approaching him from the east side of the house. (Moad Aff. at 9; Burns Aff. at 9-10; Nayola Dep. at 20, 22.) Nayola and Martz continued to advance towards Redd even though the rest of the SWAT team had not yet responded from the west side of the house. (Nayola Dep. at 20; Martz Dep. at 72.) The west team was apparently delayed in getting past a door on the west side that posed a danger of allowing Mr. Redd to sneak up on that part of the SWAT team from behind. (Nayola Dep. at 30; App. Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. 3. Ex. 8 at 12.) Redd moved quickly toward Martz and Nayola and swung at them with the club but missed. (Moad Aff. at 10; Shepherd Aff. at 11; Burns Aff. at 10; Martz Dep. at 79, 103.) As they retreated, Officers Nayola and Martz both ordered Redd to get on the ground. (PI.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. 3. Ex. 8 at 14.) In spite of their commands, Mr. Redd continued to advance towards them. (Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. 3. Ex. 8 at 14.) Officer Nayola then sprayed Mr. Redd's face using a large canister of pepper spray. (Nayola Aff. at 2; Moad Aff. at 10; Shepherd Aff. at 11; Burns Aff. at 10.) This had no visible effect on Redd, but it did affect other police officers in the vicinity, including Sergeant Moad. (Nayola Aff. at 2; MoadAff. at 10; Shepherd Aff. at 11; Burns Aff. at 10; MartzDep. at 79.) Mr. Redd kept advancing towards Officers Martz and Nayola, and they rapidly retreated backwards across the yard. (Nayola Aff. at 2; Martz Dep. at 80; Moad Aff. at 10; Shepherd Aff. at 11; Burns Aff. at 10.) At this point, Sergeant Moad got out of his patrol car and started to move towards Officers Martz and Nayola. (Moad Aff. at 10.) When they had retreated all the way to the fence, Martz fired a shot that struck Mr. Redd in the upper abdomen. (MartzAff. at2; App. Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Summ.J. Ex. 8 at 14.) Mr. Redd kept advancing towards Officers Martz and Nayola. (Martz Aff. at 2; Nayola Aff. at 2.) Just after firing the shot, Officer Martz tripped on the edge of a flower bed located next to the fence and fell backwards. (Martz Aff. at 2; Martz Dep. at 82-84.) A few seconds later, Nayola fired a shot that struck Mr. Redd in the right dorsal shoulder area. (Nayola Aff. at 2; Martz Dep. at 85; App. Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. 3. Ex. 8 at 14.) Mr. Redd fell to the ground face-first. (Moad Aff. at 10; Shepherd Aff. at 11.) Officer Nayola then approached Mr. Redd, rolled him over onto his back, handcuffed him, and rolled him back over. (Nayola Dep. at 34.) He was immediately taken to the hospital and was pronounced dead a short while later.

DISCUSSION

The Plaintiff alleges two causes of action against the Defendants. The first is a wrongful death cause of action under Texas law; the second is a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the use of excessive and unreasonable force in attempting to apprehend Mr. Redd. See Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. J. at 6-12. The Court first addresses Plaintiffs section 1983 claim and then deals with the wrongful death cause of action.

A. Section 1983 Claim

The Plaintiff alleges that Officers Nayola and Martz used excessive and unreasonable force in attempting to apprehend Mr. Redd, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Title 42 of the United States Code, section 1983 provides a vehicle for redressing a violation of federal law by those acting under color of state law. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 19 (1981); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980). To prevail on a section 1983 claim, the plaintiff must prove that a person acting under the color of state law deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986). A section 1983 complainant must support his claim with specific facts demonstrating a constitutional deprivation and may not simply rely on conclusory allegations. See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir. 1995).

As public officials performing discretionary tasks, individual officers are entitled to assert the protection of qualified immunity. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, police officers are immune from civil damages liability "if their actions were objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law." Colston v. Barnhart, 130 F.3d 96, 99 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1273 (5th Cir. 1992)). In other words, "[s]ubstantively, qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions `from civil damages liability as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.'" Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1273 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987)). The Fifth Circuit has further explained that, "[i]f reasonable public officials could differ on the lawfulness of the defendant's actions, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Thus, even when a defendant's conduct actually violates a plaintiffs constitutional rights, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity if the conduct was objectively reasonable." Id. (citations omitted).

The evaluation of a qualified immunity claim involves a two-step process. Colston, 130 F.3d at 99. The first step consists of determining whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional fight. Id. In this case, the Defendants' conduct occurred in 1997. At that time, clearly established law dictated that the use of excessive force to apprehend a subject implicates the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable seizures. See id. (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)). In addition, the Defendants do not dispute that the Plaintiff has met this burden. See Mot. Summ. 3. at 18. The Court accordingly finds that the Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a violation of clearly established law by the Defendants.

The second step in the analysis requires the Court to consider whether the Defendants' conduct was objectively reasonable under existing clearly established law. Id. Once a plaintiff invokes a clearly established right, the relevant inquiry becomes whether the "contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates the fight." Fraire, 957 F.2d at 1273 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). To make this determination, a court must be cognizant of the fact that "police officers are often forced to make split second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." Colston, 130 F.3d at 99 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989)). Moreover, the Court is not to employ the "20/20 vision of hindsight" in assessing the reasonableness of the officers' actions. Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Instead, the proper frame of reference for assessing the use of force is the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.

With this background in mind, the Court now turns to the question whether it was objectively reasonable for Officers Nayola and Martz to use deadly force against Mr. Redd, given the totality of the circumstances they were confronted with. At the time that Officers Nayola and Martz each fired their weapons once at Randy Redd, the undisputed summary judgment evidence establishes the following: Mr. Redd had refused to obey Corporal Smith's order to get on the ground; when Mr. Redd saw Officers Nayola and Martz, he had turned and approached them rapidly; Officers Nayola and Martz's order to get on the ground had gone unheeded as well; Officers Nayola and Martz's attempt to subdue Mr. Redd with non-deadly force, using a large amount of pepper spray delivered directly to Mr. Redd's face, had failed; Mr. Redd brandished a three-foot long metal pipe, which he swung at Officers Nayola and Martz; Officers Nayola and Martz were aware that Mr. Redd was a large man with a history of mental disease, and that a twelve-hour effort to communicate with him had proven fruitless; Mr. Redd kept advancing towards Officers Nayola and Martz even after Officer Martz fired a shot that struck Redd in the abdomen.

Further, assuming that the Plaintiffs version of the disputed facts is time, as the Court must assume when considering the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, those facts do not suffice to establish an excessive force claim under the circumstances of this case. For example, even if it is true, as the Plaintiff contends, that Mr. Redd swung the pipe at waist level in a "shooing" fashion, with no intent to inflict serious bodily injury or death to Officers Nayola or Martz, the Court has difficulty in concluding that the Defendants were not objectively reasonable in their actions. As explained by the Supreme Court, the totality of the circumstances must be considered, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). Here, while Mr. Redd had committed no crime, he was actively resisting arrest when he disobeyed the various officers' repeated commands to get on the ground.

Moreover, regardless of the manner in which Redd may have been swinging his weapon, it was reasonable for Officers Nayola and Martz to believe that Mr. Redd posed an immediate threat to their safety when he continued to approach them with the weapon in hand A reasonable officer at the scene could certainly believe, based on Mr. Redd's actions, that his safety was in danger. Thus, it was objectively reasonable for Officers Nayola and Martz to use pepper spray on Mr. Redd. See Baldwin v. Stalder, 137 F.3d 836, 840-41 (5th Cir. 1998) (upholding use of chemical spray). When the pepper spray was wholly ineffectual, as is undisputed, and Officer Martz could retreat no further, as is also undisputed, it was objectively reasonable for him to fire a single shot from his sidearm in order to protect himself and Officer Nayola. And when Mr. Redd continued to advance even after this shot had been fired, as is undisputed by the summary judgment evidence, it was objectively reasonable for Officer Nayola to protect himself and Officer Martz, who had tripped and fallen down after firing, by delivering a single shot from his sidearm. In sum, all of the officers' actions were objectively reasonable in the context of the dangerous situation Mr. Redd created. Even accepting all of the Plaintiffs pleaded facts as true, there is no issue of material fact on the qualified immunity defense. Cf Wagner v. Bay City, Texas, 227 F.3d 316, 324 (holding that officers' use of chemical spray and choke-hold to subdue a suspect who eventually died in police custody was objectively reasonable in the context of the dangerous situation created by the suspect).

Fifth Circuit case law also supports a finding that the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in this instance. In Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1991), it was held that a police officer was justified in using deadly force to defend himself and other officers around him when a robbery suspect who was sitting in a car repeatedly reached down below the officer's line of sight. The officer had given the suspect repeated orders to raise his hands. Id. at 496. The suspect and the other occupants of the vehicle understood the officer's commands and initially complied with them. Id. at 500. Nevertheless, the suspect continued to raise and lower his hands, and consequently the officer shot and killed him from a ten-foot distance. Id. at 496.

The court in Reese concluded that it was reasonable for the defendant police officer to believe that the suspect had retrieved a gun and was about to shoot, even though it was later determined that he was unarmed. Id. at 497, 501. In reaching its decision, the court (citing both Graham and Garner, supra) reasoned that "[u]nder these circumstances, a reasonable officer could well fear for his safety and that of others nearby . . . . That is, an officer would have probable cause to believe that `the suspect pose[d] a threat of serious physical harm.'" Id. at 501 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985)). While it is true that Reese (and Garner) may be distinguishable from the case at bar on the grounds that it involved a fleeing suspect situation, the Court finds the opinion persuasive because it deals with precisely the same scenario that occurred in this case: "The sad truth is that Crawford's [the suspect's] actions alone could cause a reasonable officer to fear imminent and serious physical harm." Id. Even though Mr. Redd was not a fleeing suspect, his actions alone, tragically, were enough to cause a reasonable police officer to fear imminent and serious physical harm. Furthermore, in Reese it was irrelevant that the suspect was in fact unarmed. Id. Similarly, it is irrelevant that Mr. Redd may have been carrying a very ineffective weapon to use against the police. The fact remains that the three-foot long pipe was capable of inflicting serious bodily harm to either Officer Martz or Officer Nayola, and they were reasonable in believing so when they fired their weapons as a last resort.

Colston v. Barnhart, 130 F.3d 96 (5th Cir. 1997), is also analogous to this case. In Colston, the Fifth Circuit, in granting summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, held that a state trooper's use of deadly force was objectively reasonable against a suspect who had disobeyed the officer's orders to get on the ground. Id. at 100. As the court explained, the summary judgment evidence in the case established the following:

Colston [the suspect] had not answered all of Barnhart's [the defendant state trooper's] questions honestly and he had disobeyed both Barnhart's and Langford's [the deputy sheriffs] orders to get on the ground. Colston, who was much larger than Barnhart, had violently and forcefully resisted the officers' attempts to gain control of him. Colston quickly subdued both officers and knocked them to the ground with some force. Barnhart was dazed and his vision was blurred. Langford, who had a loaded weapon on him, was lying limp and motionless next to Barnhart. Colston was on his feet near the officer's outstretched legs. Barnhart's earlier attempts to control Colston with non-deadly force, including hitting him with a baton, had failed. At the time Barnhart drew his weapon and fired the first shot, Colston was standing between Barnhart and Langford in a position to inflict serious harm on the officers with or without a weapon. When Barnhart fired the two shots that hit Colston, Colston had moved only two steps from Barnhart, toward Barnhart's patrol car, where his shotgun was located.
Id. at 99-100. Despite the Plaintiff Colston's insistence that he was unarmed and trying to flee, the court held that Trooper Barnhart "had no way to know whether Colston intended to flee or inflict further injury or death on the officers." Id. at 100. As such, the court reasoned, a reasonable officer in Barnhart' s place could believe that Colston posed an immediate danger of serious bodily harm or death to either Barnhart or Deputy Langford. Id. It followed, therefore, that Barnhart's decision to use deadly force against Colston was objectively reasonable. Id.

Colston also involved a fleeing suspect situation; as with Reese, however, the Court still finds the case to be persuasive. As stated by the Fifth Circuit in Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1992), "[a]lmost all excessive force cases are fact intensive . . . ." Here, in light of the summary judgment evidence, with all justifiable inferences drawn in favor of the Plaintiff the Court is of the opinion that Officers Nayola and Martz are immune from liability under section 1983 for their actions in the course of trying to apprehend Mr. Redd. The death of Mr. Redd was without question an extreme tragedy. Unfortunately, there is simply no genuine issue of material fact in this case, and no rational jury could find that Officers Nayola and Martz were not objectively reasonable in firing when they did. Consequently, the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiffs section 1983 cause of action.

Finally, in her Response to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff cites Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989), for the proposition that "unreasonableness consists of setting up a situation in a manner likely to cause death." Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. 3. at 12. This principle, the Plaintiff contends, dictates that the Defendants be denied qualified immunity because they allegedly created a situation in which Mr. Redd's death was probable. Plaintiffs reliance on Brower is misplaced. In that case, the Supreme Court only decided the issue whether a police roadblock set up to stop a fleeing suspect constituted a "seizure" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 599-600. After finding that it did, the Court reversed and remanded the case for a determination if the roadblock was an unreasonable seizure. Id. The Ninth Circuit, in turn, reversed and remanded the case to the district court because it could not "be said with certainty that no non-deadly alternative existed." Brower v. County of Inyo, 884 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1989). As previously explained, in this case it is possible to say with certainty that no non-deadly alternative was available to Officers Nayola and Martz at the time each fired his weapon. Moreover, in Brower, the appellate court reversed the district court's grant of a motion for failure to state a claim. Id. at 1318. In contrast, this case is currently at the summary judgment stage, an entirely different procedural posture because substantial discovery has already taken place. As such, there are sufficient facts before the Court that, even drawing all permissible inferences in favor of the nonmovant, it is clear no rational jury could find in favor of the Plaintiff.

B. Wrongful Death Claim

Because the Court is of the opinion that the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted with respect to the Plaintiffs section 1983 claim, the Court is consequently left without an independent basis for jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs cause of action under the Texas Wrongful Death Act. As such, the Court need not decide the merits of the Plaintiffs wrongful death claim. Rather, the Court deems it appropriate to dismiss the cause of action without prejudice to the Plaintiffs re-pleading the wrongful death claim in state court. See, e.g., Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 501 (5th Cir. 1991) (instructing the district court to dismiss without prejudice pendent state law claims against individual defendants, when no federal claims remained after grant of summary judgment on section 1983 claim).

CONCLUSION

For the above-mentioned reasons, it is ORDERED that the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED with respect to the Plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

It is FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiffs state law claim under the Texas Wrongful Death Act is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

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REDD v. CITY OF ODESSA, (W.D.Tex. 2001)
(Mar 6, 2001)