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Earskin Guyton, Jr., Plaintiff, v. City of Toledo, et al, Defendants.

ORDER

JAMES G. CARR, United States District Judge.

In this action, plaintiff Earskin V. Guyton, Jr. ("Guyton") seeks monetary damages for alleged violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983. Jurisdiction arises pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Pending is defendants' motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, the motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

On August 17, 1997, plaintiff was stopped by Toledo, Ohio police officers for allegedly making a turn without signaling. Plaintiff claims he was driving lawfully. Once stopped, defendant officer approached plaintiff and asked to see his driver's license. The officer ran a warrants check, discovered an outstanding warrant for a person with plaintiff's name, and arrested plaintiff.

It was subsequently discovered that the warrant was actually for plaintiff's father, Earskin V. Guyton, Sr. Plaintiff's father purchased property at 619 W. Central Avenue in Toledo in 1976. In 1985, he obtained a building permit to construct an addition on the property. The addition was never built, and a notice that the permit had expired was sent to the property address in 1986, but was returned undeliverable. In January, 1991, the property was declared a public nuisance. An order to abate the nuisance was sent to plaintiff's father at 1355 W. Woodruff Avenue, Toledo, Ohio by certified mail, and was signed for by "E. Guyton". The order was not obeyed and a complaint was filed by the General Inspector in July, 1991, which was also sent to 1355 W. Woodruff Avenue. Plaintiff's father was summoned to appear in Toledo Municipal Court in October, 1991. When he failed to appear a warrant was issued for his arrest.

To prepare the arrest warrant, defendant Thurber's office retrieved information from the Northwest Ohio Regional Information System (NORIS) database. The database had a separate listing for each Guyton. It showed Earskin Vanzell Guyton, Jr. residing at 1353 W. Woodruff Avenue, updated in 1978, and Earskin Guyton residing at 3001 N. Detroit Avenue, updated in 1983. The warrant was issued for "Earskin Vanzell Jr Guyton".

When plaintiff was released after being arrested, he listed his address as 1355 Woodruff Avenue.

Plaintiff brought this action against the Clerk of Courts ("Thurber"), the City of Toledo ("City"), and the police officers who arrested him.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment must be entered "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).

Once the burden of production shifts, the party opposing summary judgment cannot rest on its pleadings or merely reassert its previous allegations. It is insufficient "simply [to] show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the [unverified] pleadings" and present some type of evidentiary material in support of its position. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Summary judgment shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

ANALYSIS I. § 1983 Claims

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights; rather, it is a remedial statute designed to redress the violation of federal and constitutional rights established elsewhere by federal law. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 616-618 (1979); Day v. Wayne County Bd. of Auditors, 749 F.2d 1199, 1202 (6th Cir. 1984). To establish a prima facie § 1983 claim, plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants' conduct violated one of plaintiff's federal, constitutional, or statutory rights. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981).

A. Margaret Thurber, Clerk of Courts

It is well established that a judge is absolutely immune from suits for money damages arising from judicial acts. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-12 (1991). Nonjudicial officers whose official duties are integrally related to the judicial process enjoy similar immunity, which is known as quasi-judicial immunity. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508-517 (1978). Quasi-judicial immunity applies to actions that are judicial functions. Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 417 (6th Cir. 1988). Whether an act qualifies as a judicial function depends on the nature of the activities involved. The appropriate inquiry is "whether the questioned activities are `truly judicial acts' or `acts that simply happen to have been done by judges.'" Sparks v. Character and Fitness Committee of Kentucky, 859 F.2d 428, 432 (6th Cir. 1988). It is well established that "a clerk who issues a warrant at the discretion of a judge is performing a function to which absolute immunity attaches." Foster, 864 F.2d at 417. "The mere fact that an error is made in carrying out the judge's instructions is immaterial." Id.

In light of these doctrines, Thurber is immune from this suit. Therefore, she is entitled to summary judgment as to plaintiff's § 1983 claim.

B. City of Toledo

A local government or municipality may be sued directly under § 1983 for official policies or customs that violate constitutional rights. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). These policies or customs must be the "moving force behind the constitutional violation." Id. at 694. However, a "municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Id. at 691.

Plaintiff has not alleged that any policy or custom of the City caused his constitutional rights to be violated. The only argument plaintiff attempts to make in this regard is that the mistake in identifying him as the person wanted in the warrant was due to inadequate training. Inadequate training can serve as a theory of municipal liability "only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact", and the focus under such a theory should be on the identification of a "particular deficiency" and the demonstration that such deficiency "actually caused" the constitutional injury. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). Plaintiff has not identified any particular deficiency in any training program, and has not demonstrated any causal connection between any such deficiency and his injury.

Therefore, defendant City of Toledo is entitled to summary judgment as to plaintiff's § 1983 claim.

C. Police Officers

It is unclear from the plaintiff's complaint whether the police officers are named in their individual or official capacities. When it is unclear as to which capacity a government official is named, it is assumed they are named in their official capacity. Lovelace v. O'Hara, 985 F.2d 847, 850 (6th Cir. 1993); Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593 (6th Cir. 1989).

A suit against a government official in his official capacity is the equivalent of a suit against the government entity itself, because the real party in interest is the entity, not the official. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Therefore, it follows that if the government entity itself is not liable to suit, a suit against an official in his official capacity must fail.

As previously determined, the City is not liable; therefore, the officers, deemed to have been named in their official capacities, are entitled to summary judgment as to plaintiff's claims under § 1983.

II. § 1981 Claims

To establish a prima facie § 1981 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he is a member of a racial minority, that there was an intent on the part of the defendant to discriminate on the basis of race, and that the discrimination concerned one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute. Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin, and Jeniette Security Corp., 7 F.3d 1085, 1087 (2nd Cir. 1993); Morris v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 1996).

Plaintiff has failed to show that the defendant intended to discriminate against him on the basis of his race. Defendants suggest that any mistake in arresting plaintiff was due to the fact that plaintiff's name was very similar to his father's, who was the person wanted under the warrant. I agree. Plaintiff has not provided any factual basis supporting his allegation that defendants would not have made the same mistake if plaintiff had been white.

Therefore, plaintiff has made his prima facie case for a § 1981 claim, and defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

III. Plaintiff's Request for Leave to Amend Complaint

Plaintiff's opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment requests leave to amend the complaint to name the police officers in their individual capacities. Because the original complaint must be read as naming the police officers in their official capacities, amending the complaint to name them in their individual capacities would be to add new parties.

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an amendment of a pleading to add a party will relate back to the date of the original pleading only when, within 120 days of service of the complaint, the party to be added knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against them had it not been for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(3).

As defendants point out, plaintiff never refers to the officers as "defendants" in the pleadings, but repeatedly refers to "the City" as such. Plaintiff has presented no evidence to suggest that the police officers knew or should have known that they would be subject to personal liability at this late date.

For the reasons stated above, plaintiff's request for leave to amend the complaint to name the police officers individually is hereby denied.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED THAT defendant's motion for summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, granted.

So ordered.

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GUYTON v. CITY OF TOLEDO
(Aug 1, 2001)