The grant of NYCHA's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it was error, since the conflicting evidence as to the visibility of the alleged hazard, i.e. a defective step, and the length of time the purported hazard existed prior to plaintiff's accident, was sufficient to raise a triable issue as to whether NYCHA had constructive notice of the claimed defect (see, Knightner v. Custom Window Door Prods., 289 A.D.2d 455, 735 N.Y.S.2d 576). Plaintiff, in her supplemental bill of particulars and deposition, specified the size and location of the allegedly offending gash on the top step. Since each notice deponent stated that she was familiar with a defective condition that plaintiff had "indicated to" her on a specific staircase that consisted of only 3 steps, the witnesses' affidavits sufficiently identified the particular hazard that they purportedly had observed for some time prior to the accident. The veracity or reliability of their assertions, set forth about 3½ years after the accident, is not appropriately resolved on a motion for summary judgment (see, David v. New York City Hous. Auth., 284 A.D.2d 169, 171).
The court properly concluded, however, that NYCHA had made a sufficient prima facie showing that it had not created the alleged defect, and that plaintiff's speculative claims to the contrary were insufficient to warrant a trial on the issue (see, Perrone v. Waldbaum, Inc., 252 A.D.2d 517; Lewis v. Guy Pratt, Inc., 264 A.D.2d 383).
Although plaintiff's direct claims against defendant Blueprint have been dismissed, NYCHA may still maintain its claims against Blueprint for indemnification and contribution. Accordingly, NYCHA's cross claims are deemed converted to third-party claims (see, Wayburn v. Madison Land Ltd. Partnership, 282 A.D.2d 301, 305).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.