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ROBERT CISAR and SUZANNE MUNNS, Plaintiffs, v. HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC., Defendant.

ORDER

JOHN A. JARVEY, Magistrate Judge

This matter comes before the court pursuant to motions for a protective orders filed by the State of Iowa (docket number 99) and Allen Memorial Hospital (docket number 107), the defendant's January 3, 2002, motion for extension of time to reply to the motion for a protective order (docket number 101), the defendant's January 7, 2002, motion for extension of time to resist the motion for a protective order (docket number 102), the defendant's January 8, 2002, motion to seal its resistance (docket number 104), and the defendant's January 8, 2002, motion to compel and for costs (docket number 105).

The first two motions seek a protective order prohibiting the production of hospital records that the movants contend are privileged under Iowa Code §§ 147.135 and 272C.6 (2001). The defendant contends that the statutory privilege is limited and the records should be discoverable in this particular case. The plaintiff's peer review medical records are privileged. Furthermore the elements of a consortium claim does not include lost wages of the non-injured spouse so the records are not needed to rebut such a claim. The motions for protective orders are granted.

Loss of Consortium Claim

The plaintiff, Dr. Suzanne Munns, has filed a spousal consortium claim arising from an injury sustained by her husband, Robert Cisar. Dr. Munns claims that the stress of the injury rendered her unable to generate income. She is claiming lost wages as a part of her consortium claim.

Under Iowa law, a claim for consortium is defined as:

Spousal consortium is the fellowship of husband and wife and the right of each to the intangible benefits of company, cooperation, affection, and aid of the other in every marital relationship. Spousal consortium also includes the tangible benefits of general usefulness, industry, and attention within the home and family. It does not include loss of monetary support from the injured spouse.
Gail v. Clark, 410 N.W.2d 662, 667 (Iowa 1987). The court in Gail v. Clark went on to further explain spousal consortium by quotingAcuff v. Schmit:

"Consortium" at common law included not only conjugal fellowship of husband and wife but also service as a prominent, if not dominant, factor; not so much the service resulting in the performance of labor or the earning of wages, as the service which contributed and assisted in all the relations of domestic life. This concept of the term became known as the "material" or "practical" version. As the attitude of the courts toward the status of husband and wife, one to another, changed, a more modern and limited version thereof was adopted by various jurisdictions. Under it the term "consortium" was limited to "the right which husband and wife have to each other's society, comfort, and affection" . . . This Court had defined it as "conjugal fellowship of husband and wife; and the right of each to the company, cooperation, affection and aid of the other in every conjugal relation."
248 Iowa 272, 274, 78 N.W.2d 480, 481-82 (Iowa 1957).

The Iowa Civil Jury instructions contains the elements of a consortium claim. Civil Jury Instruction 200.31 states:

"Spousal consortium" is the fellowship of a husband and wife and the right of each other to the benefits of company, cooperation, affection, the aid of the other in every marital relationship, general usefulness, industry and attention within the home and family. It does not include loss of financial support from the injured spouse, nor mental anguish caused by the spouse's injury or death.

The Iowa Civil Jury Instructions list factors that can be considered in determining the value of a consortium claim. The circumstances of the spouse's life can be considered. The age, health, strength, character, and life expectancy of the spouse at the time of the injury or death can also be considered. The spouse's capabilities and efficiencies in performing the duties of a spouse are factored into the determination of the value of the consortium claim. The spouse's skills and abilities in providing instructions, guidance, advice, and assistance are included. The final considerations are the spouse's respective needs and all other facts and circumstances bearing on the issue.

The definition of consortium does not include a claim for lost wages for the uninjured spouse. The defendant wants to discover hospital records, generated in a peer review of the plaintiff's work, in order to rebut her claim that her husband's injury was the cause of her lost wages. Because the plaintiff cannot include a claim for lost wages in a consortium claim, the defendant does not need the hospital records to rebut the lost wages claim. The simple fact of the plaintiff's suspended medical license, which is known to the defendant, is sufficient for defendant's purposes here.

Statutory Privilege

In addition to the fact that the plaintiff cannot maintain a lost wages claim as part of a spousal consortium claim, there is another reason why this court would not allow the discovery of the hospital records.

Iowa Code § 147.135 (2001) states in pertinent part:

Peer review records are privileged and confidential, are not subject to discovery, subpoena, or other means of legal compulsion for release to a person other than an affected licensee or a peer review committee and are not admissible in evidence in a judicial or administrative proceeding other than a proceeding involving licensee discipline or a proceeding brought by a licensee who is the subject of a peer review record and whose competence is at issue. A person present at a meeting of a peer review committee shall not be permitted to testify as to the findings, recommendations, evaluations, or opinions of the peer review committee in any judicial or administrative proceeding other than a proceeding involving licensee discipline or a proceeding brought by a licensee who is the subject of a peer review committee meeting and whose competence is at issue.

The Iowa Supreme Court, in Carolan v. Hill, 553 N.W.2d 882, 886 (Iowa 1996), held that the statutory privilege in Iowa Code § 147.135 is broad. The court cited several policy reasons for adopting the broad privilege:

It allows a physician to consult with peers about his [or her] care and treatment of a particular patient. It also allows critical retrospective analysis of cases to learn better methods of treatment for the future. Similarly, it encourages peers to lodge complaints and initiate disciplinary action against those who are practicing substandard care, without fear of disclosure or retribution.
See id.

Because § 147.135 does not include the investigative and complaint records of examining boards, the State Medical Examiners Board, through the Attorney General's office, argues that Iowa Code § 272C.6 provides a privilege for the information compiled by the board. Iowa Code § 272C.6(4) provides in pertinent part:

In order to assure a free flow of information for accomplishing the purposes of this section, and notwithstanding section 622.10, all complaint files, investigative files, other investigation reports, and other investigative information in the possession of a licensing board or peer review committee acting under authority of a licensing board or its employees or agents which relates to licensee discipline are privileged and confidential, and are not subject to discovery, subpoena, or other means of legal compulsion for their release to a person other than the licensee and the boards, their employees and agents involved in licensee discipline, and are not admissible in evidence in a judicial or administrative proceeding other than a proceeding involving licensee discipline.

The defendant argues that the privileges identified above are limited in two ways. First, the defendant contends that both privileges allow for the licensee at issue in the peer review or board review to have access to the records. The defendant argues that this means the plaintiff could get the records and then turn them over to the defendant. In essence, the defendant wants the plaintiff to waive her privilege. The support for the waiver request comes from the defendant's second argument that the privilege is limited. The defendant contends that the privilege does not apply in actions brought by the licensee. Therefore the records should be discoverable in this case, according to the defendant because the plaintiff put her competence at issue by claiming lost wages based on her spousal consortium claim.

The privilege protecting these records is broad. When a privilege is asserted based on a statute, the terms of the statute define a breach of that privilege. See Carolan, 553 N.W.2d at 886. The fact that Dr. Munz has the ability to secure these records would certainly satisfy the "possession, custody or control" requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(a) if the documents were specifically requested from Dr. Munz. Her access to these documents does not appear to this court to be any more relevant on the issue of the statutory peer review privilege than it would be for any other privilege. That is, the fact of her access to attorney-client privilege documents does not assist in determining issues related to the production of those protected documents. The legislature has determine that proceedings such as those involving Dr. Munz's medical license are best conducted in secret. The Supreme Court of Iowa has held that those proceedings should be examined only in cases of "exceptional necessity."Hutchinson v. Smith Laboratories, Inc., 392 N.W.2d 139 (Iowa 1986). For the reasons set forth above, this court does not believe that there has been a showing of exceptional necessity.

IT IS ORDERED

1. The motions for protective orders (docket numbers 99 and 107) are granted.

2. The defendant's January 3, 2002, motion for extension of time to reply to the motion for a protective order (docket number 101) is granted.

3. The defendant's January 7, 2002, motion for extension of time to resist the motion for a protective order (docket number 102) is granted.

4. The defendant's January 8, 2002, motion to seal its resistance (docket number 104) is granted.

5. The defendant's January 8, 2002, motion to compel and for costs (docket number 105) is denied.

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CISAR v. HOME DEPOT U.S.A., (N.D.Iowa 2003)
(Feb 6, 2003)