EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR., United States District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Jerry L. Doyle's Motion to Re-Open Civil Action (Doc. #21). For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted.
I.
The Complaint in this action was filed on February 23, 1999. On October 29, 1999, then counsel for Plaintiff; Christopher King, filed a motion to withdraw as attorney. The Court granted that motion on March 14, 2000. In cause Defendants had failed in their attempts to contact Plaintiff and proceed with discovery, the Court by Order dated September 6, 2000 directed Plaintiff to provide notice within twenty (20) days as to whether he intended to pursue his claims and cautioned him that failure to respond would result in dismissal of the action. On September 20, 2000, Plaintiff filed a brief statement asking for additional time to seek counsel. Again, on April 11, 2001, the Court directed the Plaintiff to advise the Court within ten (10) days of the status of his case and whether he intended to pursue his claims, and again cautioned that failure to respond would result in dismissal. Plaintiff did not respond. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the case for failure to prosecute and entered judgment on September 7, 2001.
On April 2, 2002, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Re-Open Civil Case. In it, Plaintiff avers through his attached affidavit that he never received the Court's April 11, 2001 Order directing him to provide an indication of whether he intended to proceed. Plaintiff also avers that he did not receive a copy of the Court's September 7, 2001. Order dismissing his case and entering judgment. Plaintiff indicates that he did not see the Court's Orders until he independently investigated the status of the case. (Doyle Aff., ¶¶ 4-6.) Plaintiff indicates that he still has not been able to locate his former counsel, Mr. King, to obtain his files regarding this case. (Doyle Aff., ¶ 7.)
As previously mentioned, the Court entered judgment on September 7, 2001. Because Plaintiff seeks to re-open the case following entry of judgment, the Court construes the Motion as a request for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).
II.
As relevant to the facts presented here. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides in relevant part as follows:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. . . .
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b).
The Court also recognizes that, at this juncture, Plaintiff is proceeding without the benefit of an attorney. A pro se litigant's pleadings must be, and in this instance are construed liberally and have been held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Nevertheless, those who proceed without counsel must still comply with the procedural rules that govern civil cases. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); see also Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989) ("Neither [the Supreme Court in Haines v. Kerner] nor other courts, however, have been willing to abrogate basic pleading essentials in pro se suits."). In this context, the Court has thoroughly reviewed the pleadings presented by Plaintiff as well as other documents contained in the record before it as it proceeds to rule on the pending Motion.
III.
Defendants assert that the case should not be reopened because Plaintiff has not demonstrated mistake, surprise or excusable neglect. Further, Defendants assort that Plaintiff has intentionally "sat on his hands" and still has not obtained legal counsel even though over two years has passed since his counsel withdrew.
The Court concludes that Plaintiff has demonstrated a sufficient basis for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) or (6). By his affidavit, Plaintiff has sworn that he did not receive the operative Orders of the Court dated April 11, 2001 and September 7, 2001 directing him to notify the Court if he intended to go forward with the prosecution of the case and entering judgment against him. (Doyle Aff., ¶¶ 4-6.) These averments sufficiently justify a finding of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, or otherwise provide a reasonable basis justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1) and (6).
While Plaintiff indicates that he still has not been able to locate his former counsel, Mr. King, to obtain his files regarding this case, the Court notes that this difficulty will not justify any further delays in this case. Plaintiff should contact another attorney to discuss the merits of his case and proceed as quickly as possible to continue prosecution of this matter, if discussions with an attorney lend themselves to this outcome.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion to Re-Open Civil Case (Doc. #22), construed as a motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), is hereby GRANTED. Once again, Plaintiff is DIRECTED to notify the Court within TWENTY(20) DAYS of the date of this Order whether he intends to prosecute this case alone, without the benefit of an legal counsel, or if he will retain an attorney to make an appearance on his behalf Plaintiff is strongly advised to retain the services of attorney. The Court cautions Plaintiff that failure to prosecute this matter from this point forward will result in dismissal with prejudice.
The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of this Opinion and Order to Plaintiff Jerry L. Doyle at his residence, 229 Barthman Avenue, Columbus, Ohio 43203 (the last-known address provided by Plaintiff on his Motion to Re-Open), in addition to counsel of record for Defendants, Glenn Redick.
IT IS SO ORDERED.