JAMES CARR, District Judge
This is a wrongful death diversity suit arising out of a collision shortly after 4:30 a.m., on July 10, 2000, between a police car driven by Officer William Hetrick of the Clay Township, Ohio, Police Department and a tractor-trailer driven by Gary Oberhaus for defendant NSL, Inc. Pending are defendants' motion for summary judgment and plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. Also pending are defendants' motion in limine to strike the report and testimony of one of plaintiff's expert witnesses and defendant's motion to strike a portion of that witness's deposition testimony.
For the reasons that follow, the defendants' motion for summary judgment shall be granted and the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment shall be denied. The motion in limine shall be granted in part and otherwise overruled as moot in part and the motion to strike shall be overruled as moot.
Background
The collision occurred on Ohio State Route 51, which, in the area of the collision, is straight and generally level and runs northwest to southeast. At a short distance to the east of the point of impact, Reiman Road, running north to south, crosses SR 51.
To the northwest of the point of impact, Hellwig Road, running east to west, crosses SR 51.
Viewed from above, therefore, the roads form a triangle, with SR 51 as the hypotenuse. (See diagrams attached to Doc. 111). A building is located within the north-central area of the triangle; to the southeast of the building, entering on SR 51 just west of Reiman Road, is a parking area. Oberhauser lived nearby, and would park his tractor-trailer overnight in that parking area.
On the night of the accident, another truck, owned by Scott Struffalino, was parked next to Oberhauser's truck. Some lights had been stolen from Struffalino's truck, and Travis McDowell and his wife, Lisa McDowell, had gone sometime between 3:30 and 4:00 a.m., to the parking area to help Struffalino replace the stolen lights.
The police had been notified of the theft around 3:30 a.m. Officer Hetrick arrived around 4:00 a.m., in response to this call. He took a report about the theft and then headed north on Reiman Road, apparently to see if he could find the lights along the roadside. He then returned to SR 51, drove up to Hellwig Road, and turned left onto Hellwig, apparently following a car that had either been speeding or was excessively noisy. Hetrick did not have his flashers on as he drove up SR 51.
Mr. McDowell's wife, Lisa McDowell, was sitting in her Jeep, which was parked about a few feet (about a car length) from the east edge of SR 51, facing northwest. She could see as far as a Harley-Davidson store, which was on the east side of SR 51 beyond Hellwig Road.
Officer Hetrick had spoken with Mrs. McDowell, and they both had seen Oberhaus approach the parking area and his truck. Hetrick, according to Ms. McDowell, said, "Look at this guy. I see this guy every morning going to work. I could set my clock by him. Every morning he comes down here carrying his lunch box and walks around his truck. I know his routine, he does this every morning." (Doc. 77, Exh. B).
After seeing Hetrick leave the parking area, Ms. McDowell saw Oberhaus walking around his tractor-trailer for several minutes. He appeared to be checking his lights and tires.
Oberhaus got into his truck, which he had parked headed north to south, and which was to the right of Ms. McDowell's Jeep and next to Struffalino's truck, which was between Ms. McDowell's vehicle and Oberhaus's tractor-trailer. Her view up SR 51 to the northwest remained unobstructed. until Oberhaus began to pull his truck out of the lot and onto SR 51.
Oberhaus pulled in front of Ms. McDowell. She saw him stop before entering SR 51 and began turning left onto SR 51. Before his truck crossed her view, Ms. McDowll saw nothing coming from either direction on SR 51.
According to a statement Ms. McDowell gave to the Ohio State Highway Patrol, she continued to see no vehicles coming down SR 51 after Oberhaus's truck had passed before her Jeep: "By the time his truck had reached the yellow center line, my view to the right had been cleared. I could now see Rt. 51 northbound and southbound again. There were no cars coming southbound."(Doc. 77, Exh. C, OSHP Report, Statement of Lisa McDowell).
Ms. McDowell's affidavit, prepared by defense counsel following an interview of Ms. McDowell and submitted in support of the defense motion for summary judgment, is consistent with her statement to the Highway Patrol:
6. Gary Oberhaus's tractor-trailer was parked to the right of my Jeep and my view to the right was unobstructed until Mr. Oberhaus pulled the tractor-trailer ou onto State Rout 51.
7. Mr. Oberhaus then got into the tractor-trailer and I heard him release the air brakes. The tractor-trailer lurched slightly forward to the east edge of northbound State Route 51 where it stopped for several seconds. . . .
8. I also looked to the left towards Reiman Road and to the right down State Route 51 towards the Harley Davidson business and I saw nothing coming from either direction.
9. Mr. Oberhaus had just about completed his left turn onto State Route 51 and was just starting to head southbound down State Rout 51 when I again had a clear view to the right down State Route 51. At this time I saw no vehicles coming from the right, traveling southbound down State Route 51.
(Doc. 77, Exh. B).
In her deposition Ms. McDowell indicated that she had continued to look at Oberhauser's truck until she heard the sound of the engine of Hetrick's cruiser as it was coming down SR 51 from the northwest. (L. Hartman Dep. 59-60). She also testified at her deposition that:
And when I looked to the right, obviously Mr. Oberhaus's tractor was far enough into the road that I was able to see to the right, because I actually saw the car approaching, and by the time I had looked, it was only seconds — it literally was a white blur.
( Id. at 54-55).
Later, when asked if she would rewrite Paragraph 9 of her affidavit, Ms. McDowell stated:
I still feel that if there would have been another vehicle coming to my right, even before Mr. Hetrick, I would have heard it coming, so I knew by the fact of not being able to hear him that there was no vehicles coming to the right, so I really don't feel that it's inaccurate.
( Id. at 73-74).
Also that morning, at about 4:32, Marty Goon, headed westbound on Hellwig Road, approached SR 51. In an affidavit, likewise prepared by defense counsel after an interview with Mr. Goon, he stated, inter alia, "I had entered approximately 5 feet of the northbound lane of State Route 51 when, suddenly coming from my right, a white vehicle, traveling southbound on State Route 51, moving at a high rate of speed, passed within feet of the front of my vehicle. (Doc.77, Exh. A).
Goon's testimony at his deposition was unclear, somewhat confused, and considerably less precise than his affidavit. He stated, moreover, that he had not been sworn before signing the affidavit. (Goon Dep. 22). He also acknowledged that he had not looked at his affidavit carefully before signing it. ( Id. at 91).
Plaintiff's opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment challenges the admissibility of Goon's affidavit on the ground that, by his admission during his deposition, it was not sworn to, despite the presence of the jurat. As an Ohio appellate court has stated, "In general usage the phrase `under oath' connotes something of the notion that the declarant is first sworn, or at least, that the oath is administered by someone. That an oath is to be administered has been generally assumed." Youngstown Steel Door Co. v. Kosydar, 33 Ohio App.2d 277, 279 (1973).
Generally, a jurat inproper form suffices to establish that the requirement of an oath was satisfied. U.S. v. Abraham, 347 F.2d 395, 397 (7th Cir. 1985) This is, however, conditioned on there being "nothing in the record to indicate to the contrary." Id. Here, there is something to the contrary, and Goon's affidavit, except to the extent adopted during his deposition testimony, is not presently properly before the court in view of his testimony that he was not sworn before he signed it.
Administration of the oath, rather than simply endorsing the jurat, would appear to be particularly important where, as here, the affiant fails to read the affidavit with due care. An oath impresses on the affiant the importance of what he is saying and doing, and thereby encourages not just candor, but caution as well.
This defect could, however, perhaps be cured easily, by submission of a substitute affidavit, with Mr. Goon first having been sworn. Were the defendants' summary judgment motion not being granted, leave would be granted to the defendants to submit such affidavit, if they could and chose to do so.
When, however, plaintiff's counsel asked Goon at this deposition whether, when he read that portion of his affidavit about Officer Hetrick's vehicle passing suddenly before him from his right after he had pulled out into the northbound lane of SR 51, Good stated, "That is correct."
In his deposition, Goon stated that he had looked left for about thirty seconds, observing Oberhaus's truck turning onto SR 51; then he looked right for three or four seconds; left for another four or five seconds; and finally right again for three to five seconds.
The speed limit on SR 51 is 55 m.p.h. All witnesses agree that Officer Hetrick was exceeding the speed limit. In a post-accident statement to the OHSP, Goon estimated Hetrick's speed at "over a hundred miles per hour. Let me put it this way, he was flying." Struffolino estimated that he was going "over 80 mph." The OSHP Trooper who investigated the accident concluded that Hetrick's speed was 92 m.p.h. (Doc. 77, Exh. C).
Experts retained by the parties agree that Hetrick was driving considerably in excess of the speed limit when he collided with Oberhaus's truck. The defendants' expert, Richard L. Stanford, states that Hetrick was driving faster than 95 m.p.h. Plaintiff's accident reconstruction expert, Roland Ruhl, estimates his speed at 80.6 m.p.h., as he approached ( See Ruhl Dep. 91-92), and his speed at impact (after applying his brakes) as 63 m.p.h. ( Id. at 79).
The plaintiff suggests that Hetrick may have been pursing a speeder as he headed southbound on SR 51. Lisa McDowell and Marty Goon both stated that there was no traffic immediately before or after Oberhaus began to pull out, aside from Hetrick's vehicle. No other witness mentioned a speeder headed in southeast on SR 51.
There is, accordingly, no evidence that Hetrick was pursuing a speeder as he headed southeast on SR 51 at a speed at least (by the estimate of plaintiff's accident reconstruction expert) twenty-six miles over the posted limit.
All the witnesses agree, moreover, that as Hetrick was driving in that direction and manner, he did not have either his flashers, emergency lights, or siren operating.
None of the eyewitnesses saw anything out of the ordinary in how Oberhaus was operating his vehicle. He testified that he looked "right-left-right-left-right" before pulling onto the highway and saw nothing. He was unaware of Hetrick's vehicle until it hit his truck.
After the collision, the OSHP determined that Hetrick's cruiser left a skid mark of 157 feet. Both plaintiff's expert and defendants' expert agree that, in light of the distance Hetrick traveled during a 1.5 second reaction time preceding his effort to brake and the ensuing 157 feet he skidded, he would, had he not been exceeding the 55 m.p.h., speed limit, have been able to bring his car to a stop without hitting Oberhaus's truck. According to defendants' expert, even if Hetrick had been traveling at 65 m.p.h., he would have been opportunity to stop without striking the truck.
Plaintiff's expert on the standard of care expected of truck drivers, Anita M. Kerezman, attributes various kinds of negligence to Oberhaus, and asserts that his negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident. According to her, Oberhaus:
1) failed to conduct a proper pre-trip inspection, was operating an overweight vehicle, and should not have been operating his vehicle because of a defective brake line;
2) failed to operate in a proper manner, by,
inter alia, not keeping a proper lookout, not making the turn onto SR 51 quickly enough, potentially distracting himself and slowing his vehicle by lowering an axle as he was turning; and
3) did not have proper or adequate reflective material on his trailer.
In addition, plaintiff attributes various management and oversight deficiencies to NSL, for whom Oberhauser was driving at the time of the collision.
Defendants' motion in limine challenges Ms. Kerezman's conclusions and opinions as to both Oberhaus and NSL. I agree with the defendants' contention that her report fails to show a nexus between the accident and either the physical condition of the tractor-trailer or any management deficiencies on the part of NSL. The motion in limine will be granted with regard to those opinions. It likewise will be granted, for reasons expressed infra, with regard to Ms. Kerezman's opinion that negligence on Oberhaus's part (with regard to his operation of the vehicle (i.e., alleged failure to maintain proper lookout, turn properly, and avoid the risk of being distracted)) proximately caused the accident.
Otherwise, the opinions expressed by Ms. Kerezman will be deemed, arguendo, admissible (i.e., with regard to Oberhaus's alleged failure to meet the standard of care before and while turning onto SR 51 and have reflective tape, instead of reflectors, on his trailer).Inview of the result reached on defendants' motion for summary judgment, even assuming without deciding the admissibility of those opinions, the motion in limine shall be overruled as moot as to those opinions, without prejudice.
Discussion
When headed toward Oberhaus's truck, Hetrick was violating at least two Ohio traffic laws.
First, he failed to maintain an "assured clear distance," as required by O.R.C. § 4511.21(A) ("No person shall drive any motor vehicle . . . upon any street or highway at a greater speed than will permit him to bring it to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead."). Failure to comply with the assured clear distance statute is negligence per se. Spalding v. Waxler, 2 Ohio St. 2d 1 (1965) (Syllabus, ¶ 1); see also Smiddy v. The Wedding Party, Inc., 30 Ohio St. 3d 35, 39 (1987).
Second, Hetrick was violating O.R.C. § 4511.21(D), which states, in pertinent part, "no person shall operate a motor vehicle . . . upon the street or highway as follows: (1) at a speed exceeding fifty-five miles per hour."
For the reasons discussed infra I conclude that there is no genuine dispute of material fact with regard to whether Hetrick violated these provisions of Ohio's traffic laws. Consequently, the determinative issues in this case are not, as plaintiff contends, whether Oberhaus: 1) saw or, in the exercise of reasonable care, could have seen Hetrick's cruiser; 2) executed his turn onto SR 51 properly; or 3) should have had reflective tape on his trailer.
The dispositive issue is, rather whether Hetrick's indisputable violation of Ohio traffic laws was the sole proximate cause of the collision and his death.
A. Assured Clear Distance
A driver violates the assured clear distance statute if "there is evidence that the driver collided with an object which (1) was ahead of him in his path of travel, (2) was stationary or moving in the same direction as the driver, (3) did not suddenly appear in the driver's path, and (4) was reasonably discernible." Blair v. Goff-Kirby Co., 49 Ohio St.2d 5, 7 (1976) (citing McFadden v. Elmer C. Breuer Transp. Co., 156 Ohio St. 430 (1952) (Syllabus ¶ 1).
A driver, as the court also stated in Blair, "violates the statute as a matter of law if the party invoking the statute presents uncontroverted evidence establishing all of the elements necessary to constitute a statutory violation." 49 Ohio St. 2d at 7.
No rational jury could find that Hetrick did not violate the assured clear distance statute.
With regard to the first two elements of the Blair test, it is indisputable that Oberhaus was ahead of Hetrick, in his line of travel, and moving in the same direction. Nor can it reasonably be argued (and plaintiff does not attempt to argue) that Oberhaus suddenly appeared in Hetrick's path.
This leaves the issue of whether Oberhaus's truck was reasonably discernible.
The accident happened when it was dark, when there may have been, according to some of the witnesses, some ground fog in the area. Normally, these conditions might give rise to a jury question as to discernability. See, e.g., Pond v. Leslein, 72 Ohio St.3d 50, 52 (1995) ("in numerous cases in which a collision occurred at night or during extraordinary weather conditions that reduced visibility, we have held that a jury question existed as to whether the object that the driver hit was `reasonably discernible.'") (citations omitted).
Here, however, any question as to whether Oberhaus's tractor-trailer was "reasonably discernible," is mooted by the indisputable physical evidence of 157 feet of skid marks left by Hetrick's vehicle. That physical evidence makes clear that Hetrick saw the truck "a fair distance ahead of him before the collision." Id. That distance, as even the plaintiff's expert agrees, gave Hetrick sufficient opportunity to stop after seeing the truck without hitting it if he had not been traveling at more than the posted speed limit of 55 m.p.h.
B. Excessive Speed
No rational juror could find that Hetrick was complying with the 55 m.p.h., speed limit imposed by § 4511.21(D)(1): even plaintiff's own expert estimated that he was traveling more than twenty-five miles over the limit.
Regardless of whether Hetrick's excessive speed constituted, as defendants argue, negligence per se for purposes of assessing his fault, I conclude that no rational juror could find that he was operating with due regard for his own safety and that of others. There is no evidence that he was speeding in response to an emergency, or that the performance of a lawful police duty required him to drive above the speed limit.
Cf. Thompson v. Ford, 164 Ohio St. 74, 80 (1955) (dictum) ("if a statute should be enacted making it illegal to drive at a speed in excess of so many miles per hour, a violation of that statute would constitute negligence per se. . . ."). Section 4511.21(D)(1), enacted after the dictum pronounced in Thompson is the sort of statute envisioned by the Ohio Supreme Court in that case.
In any event, even if he were responding to an emergency, and thereby could be found to have been exceeding the speed limit lawfully, he failed to comply with the provisions of O.R.C. § 4511.24. That statute states that speed limitations otherwise applicable under § 4511.21 do not apply to police vehicles responding to emergency calls if they are displaying at least one flashing, rotating, or oscillating light and sounding an audible siren. Officer Hetrick was neither sounding his siren nor using his flashers or emergency lights. Thus, even if there were some reason to believe that an emergency justified his speeding, he still was violating the requirements of Ohio law.
Ordinary care is the duty of care an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person exercises, or is accustomed to exercising, under the same or similar circumstances. Mussivand v. David, 45 Ohio St.3d 314, 318 (1989). No reasonable motorist, attentive to his safety and that of others, would operate at a speed in excess of eighty miles an hour during the nighttime hours on a two-lane rural highway. No reasonable police officer would operate at such speed under those conditions without activating warning devices. No rational jury could find otherwise.
C. Proximate Cause
The only remaining issue is proximate cause. I conclude that, even assuming that Oberhaus was negligent, as plaintiff's expert alleges, no rational trier of fact could find that any negligence on his part played a role in the collision. This is so in light of the agreement on the part of both defendants' and plaintiff's accident reconstructionists that Hetrick had ample time to stop once he saw the vehicle, had he been driving within the speed limit.
Hetrick's speed and his failure to use his warning devices were the sole cause of the accident and his death. Had he not been speeding, he would not have run into Oberhaus's truck, regardless of how and why it was in his lane of travel, and regardless of what negligence on Oberhaus's part might have brought it there.
This is so, despite the opinion to the contrary on the part of the plaintiff's expert as to the proximate cause for the collision. That portion of Ms. Kerezman's report fails entirely to take into consideration the physical evidence that conclusively shows that Hetrick, had he been driving within the speed limit, had ample time to stop before hitting the truck. Even if one accepts everything else she says about Oberhaus, his vehicle, and his operation of that vehicle, the indisputable physical evidence of skid marks and speed makes the expert's opinion regarding proximate cause insufficiently reliable to be admissible.
All the undisputed facts support the conclusion, and only the conclusion, that Hetrick's negligence proximately caused the collision. What Oberhaus did that he should not have done, or did not do that he should have done, is immaterial on the determinative issue of proximate cause. This is so because Hetrick's negligence superceded any negligence on Oberhaus's part: had he not been driving as he was, the accident, as even his own expert acknowledges, would not have occurred.
Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, it is not necessary to consider or resolve the parties' other contentions.
It is, accordingly,
ORDERED THAT
1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment be, and it hereby is granted;
2. Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment be, and the same hereby is denied;
3. Defendants' motion in limine be, and the same hereby is granted in part and overruled in part as moot, without prejudice; and
4. Defendants' motion to strike be overruled as moot, without prejudice.
So ordered.