MARY THEILER, Magistrate Judge
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that while he was incarcerated at the Monroe Correctional Complex in Monroe, Washington, he received inadequate medical care, in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. Plaintiff and defendants have filed motions for summary judgment. Having considered the briefs, declarations, and exhibits submitted by the parties, the Court concludes that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment should be denied and defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted.
BACKGROUND
The declarations submitted by defendants in support of their motion for summary judgment establish the following facts, which, except as noted below, are uncontroverted by plaintiff:
Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Monroe Correctional Complex ("MCC") on June 8, 2005, when he had surgery to remove four wisdom teeth. (Dkt. No. 35, Ex. 2, Attachment A). After surgery, plaintiff was prescribed pain killer and was discharged. ( Id.) On June 12, 2008, plaintiff complained of swelling, infection, and not having been given antibiotics following his surgery. ( Id., Ex. 3 at 1). Susan Williams, a registered nurse at MCC, examined plaintiff and observed that the right side of his face and neck were swollen. ( Id.) Before she could finish her exam, however, plaintiff apparently got angry and left. ( Id. at 2).
Four hours later, plaintiff returned and Nurse Williams finished her exam. She looked in plaintiff's mouth and saw no signs of infection. ( Id.) She also called in a physician's assistant, Patrick Barnes, to confer about plaintiff's status. ( Id.) She advised Barnes of plaintiff's vital signs, which were within normal limits. Barnes advised plaintiff to continue using the pain medications and to use ice packs if necessary to reduce swelling. ( Id., Ex. 4 at 2). Barnes further advised plaintiff to return the next morning if pain persisted.
That same day, plaintiff submitted an emergency grievance to a corrections officer, Lt. Richard Samp. ( Id., Ex. 8). Lt. Samp contacted Nurse Williams, who informed him that plaintiff had been seen that day and was not in medical danger. Lt. Samp then referred the grievance to the grievance coordinator to be processed as a routine matter. ( Id.)
The next morning, plaintiff was admitted to the inpatient unit of MCC, with a diagnosis of "dry socket," an apparently common condition following tooth extraction. ( Id., Ex. 4 at 2). Plaintiff was administered antibiotics intravenously. ( Id., Ex. 4 at 2). After three days, plaintiff was switched to oral antibiotics. ( Id.) The pain returned, and plaintiff was again placed on I.V. antibiotics. ( Id.)
During this time, plaintiff filed another emergency grievance with Lt. James Asin, a corrections officer at MCC. ( Id., Ex. 6). Lt. Asin contacted medical staff and ascertained that plaintiff was receiving medical care. Lt. Asin then referred the matter to the grievance coordinator to be processed as a routine matter. ( Id.)
On June 18, 2005, plaintiff was sent to Harborview Medical Center to be examined for a possible abscess. ( Id., Ex. 2, Attachment C). Plaintiff was diagnosed with a right submandibular abscess which was drained. ( Id.) Plaintiff returned to the inpatient clinic at MCC on June 22, 2005. ( Id., Ex. 2, Attachment A). He requested to be discharged and was returned to the general population on June 28, 2005. ( Id.)
In his own declaration, which is the only substantive statement by a witness that supports plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff does not dispute the basic chronology of the treatment described above. However, plaintiff's account differs in that he adds to these facts in several ways: Overall, plaintiff describes the medical staff at MCC as being unsympathetic to his condition and skeptical about the veracity of his complaints. In particular, plaintiff states that despite having been told by the doctor who removed his wisdom teeth that antibiotics would be waiting for him back at the prison, none were. (Dkt. No. 24 at 4). Plaintiff further states that physician's assistant Barnes told him that the reason his face was swollen was that the faces of African Americans tended to swell up more than the faces of other races, and African American bones healed more slowly. ( Id.) Barnes denies having made any comments related to race. (Dkt. No. 35, Ex. 4 at 2).
Plaintiff attaches to his declaration a brief statement by an inmate named John Coleman, who states that he (Coleman) received antibiotics after surgery. (Dkt. No. 24, Ex. A). However, the relevance of this statement is questionable, since it does not describe the circumstances under which Coleman received antibiotics. The Court also notes that the statement was not made under penalty of perjury.
In addition, plaintiff states that once he was given antibiotics intravenously at MCC, the dosage was insufficient. (Dkt. No. 24 at 7-8). He also states that before arriving at Harborview, he was taken to a clinic named "Valleyview," where he was told by a doctor that due to the "delay in seeking treatment" and the "advanced form of infection," plaintiff would die if he were not transported to Harborview. ( Id. at 9). Plaintiff states that once he arrived at Harborview and was examined by doctors, he was told that if he had waited one more day, he would have died. ( Id.) Plaintiff further states that the doctors at Harborview also told him that "his chances to survive the actual anesthesia and the surgery was very slim." ( Id. at 9-10). Plaintiff chose to undergo the surgery, even though he did so "through anguish and tears." ( Id. at 10).
Finally, plaintiff states that he has needed two additional surgeries since the operation at Harborview "to correct the effects of the Monroe medical staff's refusal to provide some form of post-surgical care for the plaintiff." ( Id. at 11). Plaintiff states that he "continues to suffer to this day by way of peirceing [sic] pain in his throat and jaw if he opens his mouth too wide." ( Id. at 13).
On June 5, 2007, plaintiff filed the instant complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 6). The Court dismissed three defendants and directed the Clerk to serve the complaint on the remaining defendants. (Dkt. No. 7). Defendants filed their answer on August 22, 2007. (Dkt. No. 18).
The Court issued an Order on August 27, 2007, setting deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions. (Dkt. No. 19). The cut-off date for discovery was November 1, 2007; the cut-off for dispositive motions was December 1, 2007. ( Id. at 1). On September 19, 2007, before the close of discovery, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 22). Defendants filed their own motion for summary judgment on November 30, 2007. (Dkt. No. 35). Both motions were subsequently noted for consideration by the Court on December 28, 2007. (Dkt. No. 36).
On December 26, 2007, plaintiff filed a motion for an extension of time to conduct further discovery and to file a response to defendants' motion. (Dkt. No. 37). The Court denied this eleventh-hour motion as being inconsistent with the deadlines previously established by the Court and also not stating good cause for the extension. (Dkt. No. 39). The summary judgment motions are now ready for review.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is proper only where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). The court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See F.D.I.C. v. O'Melveny Meyers, 969 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 512 U.S. 79 (1994). The moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257. Mere disagreement, or the bald assertion that a genuine issue of material fact exists, no longer precludes the use of summary judgment. See California Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc., v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987). In addition, "[w]hen the nonmoving party relies only on its own affidavits to oppose summary judgment, it cannot rely on conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data to create an issue of material fact." Hansen v. United States, 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th Cir. 1993).
Plaintiff's claim of inadequate medical care is governed by the Supreme Court's decisions interpreting the Eighth Amendment in the prison context. These cases establish that denial of medical attention to prisoners constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation only if the denial amounts to deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of the prisoners. See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added). In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), the Supreme Court defined a strict standard which a prisoner must meet in order to establish "deliberate indifference." Mere differences of opinion, negligence or even recklessness concerning the appropriate treatment is insufficient. 511 U.S at 835-37. Rather, a prison official is liable only if he knows that plaintiff faces "a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." Id. at 847. In general, expert opinion is necessary to establish a claim of deliberate indifference. See Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1988)
Here, plaintiff simply has not shown that a triable issue of fact exists that would hold defendants liable under this standard. Defendants have submitted uncontroverted evidence that plaintiff received medical attention during and following the removal of his wisdom teeth. It is, of course, regrettable that plaintiff's mouth became infected after the surgery, and the Court does not doubt that this infection caused plaintiff much discomfort. However, the record clearly shows that plaintiff was treated for this infection by medical staff at MCC and Harborview. Even if the Court were to accept plaintiff's statements that he had to demand this treatment, or that it was given grudgingly by prison staff, such conduct would not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987) (verbal harassment alone does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation); cf. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 ("The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.")
Therefore, the Court concludes that plaintiff has not satisfied his burden of showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding his claim that defendants provided inadequate medical care. Plaintiff's additional claims that various defendants failed to properly respond to his grievances are premised upon an initial finding of inadequate medical care. Because plaintiff fails to meet his burden regarding this initial finding, his remaining claims also fail. Accordingly, the Court recommends that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be denied and that defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be denied, that defendants's motion for summary judgment be granted and that this action be dismissed with prejudice. A proposed Order accompanies this Report and Recommendation.