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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff Cory R. Kreckler, confined in the Maricopa County Tent City Jail, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Joseph M. Arpaio, the Maricopa County Sheriff. Kreckler alleges violations of his constitutional rights related to conditions of confinement, including inadequate food, overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, and exposure to hazardous substances. The Court granted Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and ordered Defendant Arpaio to answer the Complaint. The procedural history includes statutory screening of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, and the case was referred to a Magistrate Judge for pretrial proceedings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Plaintiff's allegations state a plausible claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for unconstitutional conditions of confinement as a pretrial detainee.
  2. Whether Defendant Arpaio must respond to the Complaint based on the Court’s screening and legal standards under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915A, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) Standard for pleading a claim requiring more than conclusory statements; a complaint must state a plausible claim for relief. The Court applied Iqbal to require that Plaintiff’s Complaint contain sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim under constitutional standards.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) Establishes the plausibility standard for claims in federal pleadings. The Court referenced Twombly to emphasize the need for factual allegations that allow reasonable inference of liability.
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) Pretrial detainees’ conditions of confinement claims arise under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, not the Eighth Amendment. The Court construed Plaintiff’s claims as Fourteenth Amendment claims consistent with Bell v. Wolfish because Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee.
28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A Authority and procedures for screening prisoner complaints and granting in forma pauperis status. The Court granted in forma pauperis status and conducted statutory screening of the Complaint under these provisions.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) Requirement for a short and plain statement showing entitlement to relief. The Court applied Rule 8 to evaluate the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s allegations.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d), 4(e)(2), 12(a), 5(a), 5(d) Rules governing service of process, responses to complaints, and service of filings. The Court ordered service of process on Defendant Arpaio and set deadlines for response and procedural compliance.
Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1992) District courts may dismiss actions for failure to comply with court orders. The Court warned Plaintiff that failure to comply with the Order could result in dismissal under Ferdik.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first granted Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, while requiring payment of the statutory filing fee in installments. It then screened the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which mandates dismissal of frivolous or legally insufficient claims. Applying the pleading standards articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Court determined that Plaintiff’s factual allegations, though pro se and subject to liberal construction, were sufficient to state plausible claims for unconstitutional conditions of confinement.

The Court recognized that as a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff’s claims arise under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment, consistent with Bell v. Wolfish. Accordingly, the Court construed all counts as Fourteenth Amendment claims. The Court found that Plaintiff’s detailed allegations regarding inadequate food, overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, and exposure to hazardous substances raised cognizable claims requiring a response from Defendant Arpaio.

The Court then ordered service of process on Defendant Arpaio, setting forth procedures for waiver or personal service under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It emphasized Plaintiff’s obligations to comply with procedural rules, including service of filings on Defendant, timely responses, and notification of address changes, warning that failure to comply could result in dismissal pursuant to established case law.

Holding and Implications

The Court granted Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and ordered Defendant Joseph M. Arpaio to answer the Complaint.

The direct effect of this decision is that Plaintiff’s civil rights claims alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement will proceed to the next stage of litigation with Defendant required to respond. The Court did not dismiss any claims at this stage, thereby allowing Plaintiff’s allegations to be tested through further proceedings. No new precedent was established; the ruling follows established procedural and substantive standards for prisoner civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ARTIS EARL GORHAM, Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

DAVID CAMPBELL, District Judge

Plaintiff Cory R. Kreckler, who is confined in the Maricopa County Tent City Jail, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1) and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 3). The Court will order Defendant Arpaio to answer the Complaint.

I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee

Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $18.01. The remainder of the fee will be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month's income each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate government agency to collect and forward the fees according to the statutory formula.

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).

A pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, "it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id.

"[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 1950. Thus, although a plaintiff's specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there are other "more likely explanations" for a defendant's conduct. Id. at 1951.

III. Complaint

Named as Defendant in the Complaint is Joseph M. Arpaio, Maricopa County Sheriff. Plaintiff alleges three counts in the Complaint. In Count I, Plaintiff claims that his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by Defendant Arpaio because he sets policy and he feeds Plaintiff only two meals per day. Plaintiff alleges that the "bag (cold) meal is given with often rotten meat and fruit," that the bread is "mostly prepared incorrectly" which causes it to be uncooked, that "several times" the bread has had "visible mold spores," and that "dinner is lacking meat and is unsanitary[,] being served-up at Durango Kitchen" which is "full of unsafe building materials including lead and asbestos." Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Arpaio sets policy and instructs his staff "to search and confiscate any rationed or stored meals," whereas "like food bought in [the] commis[s]ary is not deemed a health risk," thus giving "wealthy inmates preferred treatment."

In Count II, Plaintiff claims that his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights were violated by Defendant Arpaio because he sets policy and he "puts [Plaintiff] and all other pre[]trial detainees in hazardous conditions by overcrowding intake/booking cells with 25-35 people when [the] cell is designed and seats clearly 8-10 people," "forcing" those in the cell to sit on an unsanitary floor, "so close as to make contact with each other." Plaintiff alleges that no cleaning was done in the 26 hours he was "in this process, with no op[p]ortunity to sleep for [a] minimum 6 h[ou]rs." Plaintiff further alleges that "this cell" at the Fourth Avenue Jail has vomit and feces on the floor, does not have soap, and does not have toilet paper available. Plaintiff also alleges that in the Madison Avenue Court "holding tanks," he was "put in a cell made for 12 people, with 50 other inmates under [the] same conditions."

In Count III, Plaintiff claims that his Fifth and Eighteenth Amendment rights were violated by Defendant Arpaio, who "is aware of hazardous substances and as policy puts [Plaintiff] and others in [a] condemned facility that has documented violations of health and safety." Plaintiff alleges that his "pod" was overcrowded; did not have enough tables to accommodate the population; had only two showers and two toilets, which were "full of excessive germs," for 64 men; had limited cleaning supples; had leaded paint and substandard leaded pipes; had bats, roaches, and rats; and had "illegal stray cats" roaming around "unchecked." Plaintiff further alleges that there was no "screening or isolation of other inmates" for various contagious diseases.

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, including punitive damages, an apology from Defendant Arpaio, "financial fines," and holds on "federal monies" due to Maricopa County.

IV. Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required

As a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff brings Count I under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments; and Counts II and III under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. Because a pretrial detainee's claims for unconstitutional conditions of confinement arise from the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, while a convicted inmate's claims for unconstitutional conditions arise from the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the Court will construe Plaintiff's Counts I, II, and III as being brought solely under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) ("under the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law").

Liberally construed, Plaintiff's allegations in Counts I, II, and III state a claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court will require Defendant Arpaio to answer the Complaint.

V. Warnings

A. Release

Plaintiff must pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee within 120 days of his release. Also, within 30 days of his release, he must either (1) notify the Court that he intends to pay the balance or (2) show good cause, in writing, why he cannot. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this action.

B. Address Changes

Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this action.

C. Copies

Plaintiff must serve Defendant, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a copy of every document that he files. Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(a). Each filing must include a certificate stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(d). Also, Plaintiff must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 5.4. Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to Plaintiff.

D. Possible Dismissal

If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to comply with any order of the Court).

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 3) is granted.

(2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government agency, Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $18.01.

(3) The Clerk of Court must send to Plaintiff a service packet including the Complaint (Doc. 1), this Order, and both summons and request for waiver forms for Defendant Arpaio.

(4) Plaintiff must complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court within 21 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not provide service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order.

(5) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or complete service of the Summons and Complaint on Defendant within 120 days of the filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, whichever is later, the action may be dismissed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m); LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(i).

(6) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use.

(7) The United States Marshal must notify Defendant Joseph M. Arpaio of the commencement of this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendant must include a copy of this Order. The Marshal must immediately file requests for waivers that were returned as undeliverable and waivers of service of the summons. If a waiver of service of summons is not returned by Defendant within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was sent by the Marshal, the Marshal must:

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, Complaint, and this Order upon Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and
(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of service for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of service of the summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service upon Defendant. The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service form (USM-285) and must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for photocopying additional copies of the Summons, Complaint, or this Order and for preparing new process receipt and return forms (USM-285), if required. Costs of service will be taxed against the personally served Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the Court.

(8) If Defendant agrees to waive service of the Summons and Complaint, he must return the signed waiver forms to the United States Marshal, not the Plaintiff.

(9) Defendant must answer the Complaint or otherwise respond by appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(10) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Lawrence O. Anderson pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).



275 Cal.App.2d at pp. 182-183.) Because Gorham was never served with the complaint and summons, or other documents and notices as required by the statutory procedures used by the DCSS to commence this action against him, the trial court never obtained personal jurisdiction over him (Morgan, supra, 105 Cal.App.2d at pp. 732-733), and the resulting default judgment was, and is, therefore void, not merely voidable, as violating fundamental due process.

Although the trial court correctly declared the default judgment void, it declined to vacate the judgment and dismiss the complaint and summons although they have never been served on Gorham because it construed the law as requiring his motion be brought within certain statutory times, particularly the time limits in Family Code section 3691, or made within a reasonable time to confer it with jurisdiction to act on his motion. However, as already mentioned above, because Gorham established through extrinsic evidence that the default judgment was void for want of personal jurisdiction over him, it had the same effect as if it had been void on its face and the court had the inherent power to set it aside even though any statutory periods had run. (Cook, supra, 20 Cal.2d at p. 569; Munoz, supra, 275 Cal.App.2d at pp. 182-183; Morgan, supra, 105 Cal.App.2d at p. 732.)

Family Code section 3691 provides: "The grounds and time limits for an action or motion to set aside a support order, or any part or parts thereof, are governed by this section and shall be one of the following: [¶] (a) Actual fraud. Where the defrauded party was kept in ignorance or in some other manner, other than his or her own lack of care or attention, was fraudulently prevented from fully participating in the proceeding. An action or motion based on fraud shall be brought within six months after the date on which the complaining party discovered or reasonably should have discovered the fraud. [¶] (b) Perjury. An action or motion based on perjury shall be brought within six months after the date on which the complaining party discovered or reasonably should have discovered the perjury. [¶] (c) Lack of Notice. [¶] (1) When service of a summons has not resulted in notice to a party in time to defend the action for support and a default or default judgment has been entered against him or her in the action, he or she may serve and file a notice of motion to set aside the default and for leave to defend the action. The notice of motion shall be served and filed within a reasonable time, but in no event later than six months after the party obtains or reasonably should have obtained notice (A) of the support order, or (B) that the party's income and assets are subject to attachment pursuant to the order, [¶] (2) A notice of motion to set aside a support order pursuant to this subdivision shall be accompanied by an affidavit showing, under oath, that the party's lack of notice in time to defend the action was not caused by his or her avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect. The party shall serve and file with the notice a copy of the answer, motion, or other pleading proposed to be filed in the action. [¶] (3) The court may not set aside or otherwise relieve a party from a support order pursuant to this subdivision if service of the summons was accomplished in accordance with existing requirements of law regarding service of process."

The court disagreed with this conclusion because it found no evidence in the record that the false proof of service had been willfully or intentionally filed by the process server. However, in light of this record, we cannot accept the court's finding as supported by the evidence. The record shows the parties and court were well aware of problems with the validity of proofs of service filed by Lopez in DCSS cases and the facts Lopez had declared under penalty of perjury that he had served Gorham at an address where Gorham proved he had not lived for almost a year and had made the false declaration at a time Gorham was in custody in jail. That Lopez then filed the proof of service, which was based on his own perjury, in the absence of evidence showing any mistake or excuse in doing so, constitutes evidence of an intentional false act that was used to obtain fundamental jurisdiction over Gorham.

Moreover, contrary to the trial court's determination, we decline to interpret Family Code section 3691 as preempting a trial court's traditional or inherent equitable power to set aside a child support order or judgment like the one in this case that concerns both paternity and child support obtained by a local DCSS that is entered against a party over whom the court has not acquired personal jurisdiction because no notice was given as required under the pertinent statute. The legislative history regarding Family Code section 3691 reveals it was enacted as part of the Child Support Enforcement Fairness Act of 2000 (Fairness Act) with the purpose of expanding, not limiting, avenues of relief from child support orders obtained by default judgments for obligors who have not received notice of the order or who have been mistakenly identified as an obligor, to prevent the accumulated amount of arrearages, which discourage timely compliance with child support orders, particularly for low-wage earners. (Stats. 1999, ch. 653, § 1, p. 4708.) The Legislature specifically declared "[t]he efficient and fair enforcement of child support orders is essential to ensuring compliance with those orders and respect for the administration of justice." (Ibid.) Thus to construe Family Code section 3691 as foreclosing a party from seeking equity where the party's "jurisdiction" in a paternity/support case filed by a local child support agency has been obtained by a false proof of service, which essentially perpetrates a fraud on the court would, we believe, be unfair, against the above intent of the Legislature, and a violation of fundamental due process.

In addition, subdivision (c) of section 3690 of the Family Code, enacted as part of the Fairness Act, provides that nothing in that article, which includes Family Code section 3691, "shall limit or modify the provisions of [Family Code] Section 17432 or 17433," also enacted as part of the Fairness Act, which outline additional grounds and other time limits for setting aside defaults entered in actions filed by a local child support agency under Family Code section 17400, 17402, or 17404. (12) Although Family Code section 17432, which is relevant to this case, only provides for relief from the child support order portion of the default judgment if certain time limits are met, such section also places a duty on the agency to determine within three months of receiving the first collection for any child support order based on presumed income under those Family Code sections to "check all appropriate sources for income information, and if income information exists, the local child support agency shall make a determination whether the order qualifies for set aside under this section. If the order qualifies for set aside, the local child support agency shall bring a motion for relief under this section." (Fam. Code, § 17432, subd. (g), italics added.)

The DCSS acknowledged in its opposition to Gorham's motion below that it had proceeded against him under Family Code section 17400 et seq. to determine paternity and support because Crystal's mother was receiving public assistance for the minor child born out of wedlock and that the default judgment set amounts for child support for Crystal based on a presumed income for Gorham. Had the DCSS fulfilled its mandated duty to check into the matter when it first received a payment from Gorham's attached unemployment wages in July 2002, it would have discovered that Gorham had been sent back to prison that same month and that there was something very wrong with the proof of service filed in this case to obtain jurisdiction for the child support order in the first instance because its records showed that Gorham had also been in custody from "2/1/98-10/31/98." The DCSS would have then been required to file a motion for relief from the default judgment or to at least modify the child support portion of the judgment. Had it done so, it would have discovered the false proof of service and the matter could have been timely resolved consistent with the intent of the Fairness Act.

Clearly, the trial court was troubled with the fact of Gorham's lengthy periods of incarceration, the false proof of service, and whether it could sit in equity in this case in light of Family Code section 3691. Unfortunately, based on its unsupported finding that the perjury of the proof of service and its filing were not shown to be intentional, the court proceeded down an analytical path requiring Gorham to show due diligence within a statutory time or a reasonable time to respond to a default judgment he never received and in a case never served on him. As already discussed, such analysis was unwarranted in this case where fundamental jurisdiction was obtained through an intentional fraud on the court.

Additionally, we find no evidence in the record to support the court's finding that Gorham acquiesced to the July 2002 payment collected by the DCSS and thereby "apparently treat[ed] the [default] judgment as enforceable." Even accepting that Gorham had actual notice of the default judgment involving Crystal through his March 2002 meeting at the DCSS office with a caseworker, the fact that his income from unemployment benefits was attached in July 2002 by the DCSS, which then credited part to this default judgment and part to another default judgment, does not show a manifestation of an intent on Gorham's part to treat this judgment as valid. Rather, because the notes of that meeting show that Gorham was told the caseworker could not discuss this default judgment due to the aid to Crystal having been "closed" in 2000, that Gorham was advised to talk to a family law facilitator when he said he was going to challenge the judgment, and that the DCSS worker only discussed and reached an agreement with Gorham for the amount of support due under another default judgment involving his son, we believe Gorham most likely thought the attached payment was for his other default judgment. Under such circumstances, although there might be evidence of the DCSS's intent to treat the judgment as enforceable in this case, we cannot find the evidence shows Gorham manifested any intent to treat this judgment as valid.

Nor is the court's legal finding that a request for dismissal under Code of Civil Procedure section 583.210 is untimely because it was not brought within six months supported by the law. That section provides a statutory obligation to return the summons to an issuing court within three years 60 days after the action was commenced as determined by the date the complaint was filed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 583.210; see Biss v. Bohr (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1250-1251 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 692].) Because the trial court specifically found that Gorham had never been served with the summons and complaint filed October 15, 1997, and that the default judgment had been obtained by a false proof of service, the dismissal requested was mandatory. (See Dale v. ITT Life Ins. Corp. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 495, 500-503 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 8].)

Although we are mindful of the strong policy favoring finality of judgments, and the strong public interest "in making certain that those parents who are able to support their children do so, thus freeing the government from shouldering that burden" (Savedra, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1325), we will not compound the miscarriage of justice in this case created by the lack of fundamental due process stemming from the false proof of service filed by the DCSS that essentially deprived Gorham "the opportunity to be heard `at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'" (Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 333 [ 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 96 S.Ct. 893].)

Ironically, the DCSS contends that should this court find grounds to reverse the trial court's denial to vacate the default judgment entered against Gorham and to dismiss this action, we cannot do so without first giving Crystal notice to be heard in opposition because she is now an adult and an indispensible party regarding not only the child support order but also the paternity finding. For this issue raised for the first time on appeal, the DCSS relies on authority concerning an independent action to declare paternity under the Uniform Parentage Act (Fam. Code, § 7600 et seq.) and not for actions filed by the DCSS to determine paternity as necessary to establishing child support obligations of a noncustodial parent for a child bom out of wedlock who had been receiving public assistance as in this case. (See Fam. Code, §§ 17304, 17400, 17402, 17404.) Such derivative action does not preclude the child from bringing her own action for paternity. (See Fam. Code, § 7635; County of Shasta v. Caruthers (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1838 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 181.)

In sum, under the unique facts of this case, we conclude that once the court determined the default judgment was void as a matter of law based on the lack of personal jurisdiction, it was required to dismiss this action. By not doing so, the court abused its discretion.

DISPOSITION

The order denying Gorham's motions is reversed. On remand, the trial court is directed to dismiss this action in accordance with this opinion. Each side to bear its own costs on appeal.

Benke, Acting P. J., and Nares, J., concurred.

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COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. GORHAM
(Jul 21, 2010)