ORDER
DAVID BURY, District Judge
Standard of Review
The duties of the district court, when reviewing a Report and Recommendation of a Magistrate Judge, are set forth in Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). When the parties object to a Report and Recommendation (R R), "[a] judge of the [district] court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the [R R] to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985). When no objections are filed, the district court does not need to review the R R de novo. Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n. 13 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
Report and Recommendation
On June 29, 2010, the Honorable Glenda E. Edmonds, United States Magistrate Judge, filed a R R in this action. The R R advises the Court to deny the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The Magistrate Judge found the Petitioner failed to present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals, and "[a]ccordingly, they were not properly exhausted. He may not return to state court to exhaust them and is therefore precluded from raising them in state court. "His claims are procedurally defaulted." (R R at 4.)
The parties were sent copies of the R R and instructed that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), they had 10 days to file written objections to the R R. See also, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) (party objecting to the recommended disposition has ten (10) days to file specific, written objections). To date, no objections have been filed.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), this Court makes a de novo determination as to those portions of the R R to which there are objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) ("A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings and recommendations to which objection is made.") To the extent that no objection has been made, arguments to the contrary have been waived. McCall v. Andrus, 628 F.2d 1185, 1187 (9th Cir. 1980) (failure to object to Magistrate's report waives right to do so on appeal); see also, Advisory Committee Notes to Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 (citing Campbell v. United States Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974) (when no timely objection is filed, the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation).
The Court has reviewed the R R and considers it to be thorough and well-reasoned; it is neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law. United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617-618 (9th Cir. 1989). The R R shall, therefore, be accepted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court adopts the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. For the reasons stated in the R R, the Court denies the Petition as procedurally defaulted.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation [Doc. # 28] is adopted as the opinion of the Court. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petition [Doc. # 1] is DENIED; the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly.
uld be covered by principles of academic freedom.
Because any plausible reading of Abcarian's amended complaint indicates that his speech was made pursuant to his official duties, and because Abcarian failed to make any factual allegations indicating otherwise, Garcetti bars his First Amendment retaliation claim. Dismissal of Count I of the amended complaint was proper.
B. Equal Protection Class-of-One Claim
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment most typically reaches state action that treats a person poorly because of the person's race or other suspect classification, such as sex, national origin, religion, political affiliation, among others, or because the person has exercised a "fundamental right," or because the person is a member of a group that is the target of irrational government discrimination. See generally Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, ___, 128 S.Ct. 2146, 2152, 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982); Srail v. Village of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 943 (7th Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court has also recognized the prospect of a so-called "class-of-one" equal protection claim. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000). A class-of-one claim need not allege discrimination based on a suspect classification, but must allege that the plaintiff was singled out arbitrarily, without rational basis, for unfair treatment. E.g., Avila v. Pappas, 591 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir. 2010); see generally Srail, 588 F.3d at 943 (summarizing Seventh Circuit's "divergent class-of-one precedent" regarding whether illegitimate animus can substitute for absence of rational basis for state action).
Abcarian tries to take advantage of this theory in Count VI of the amended complaint, which alleges that defendants violated his equal protection rights by reporting the Behzad settlement but not the settlement of a malpractice claim against another physician. The district court dismissed Count VI and the related claim for equitable relief on the ground that Abcarian's claim was barred by the Supreme Court's decision in Engquist. Abcarian contends that Engquist applies only to class-of-one claims against governmental employers but not to claims against other government employees.
We conclude that the district court correctly dismissed the equal protection claim, but for another reason: under the law, defendants had no discretion in deciding whether to report the Behzad settlement. Engquist held that class-of-one claims cannot be based on the highly discretionary and individualized sorts of decisions that public employers must make about their employees. The Court pointed out that its decision in Olech, which first recognized class-of-one equal protection claims, rested on "the existence of a clear standard against which departures, even for a single plaintiff, could be readily assessed." 553 U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 2153. Some forms of state action "by their nature involve discretionary decisionmaking based on a vast array of subjective, individualized assessments." Id. at 2154. "[A]llowing a challenge based on the arbitrary singling out of a particular person would undermine the very discretion that such state officials are entrusted to exercise." Id. "It is no proper challenge to what in its nature is a subjective, individualized decision that it was subjective and individualized." Id. Accordingly, the class-of-one theory of equal protection is a "poor fit" with employment decisions, which are themselves "often subjective and individualized, resting on a wide array of factors that are difficult to articulate and quantify." Id. at 2154-55. Based on this analysis, the Court held that "a `class-of-one theory of equal protection has no place in the public employment context." Id. at 2148-49.
We have interpreted Engquist to stand for the broad proposition that inherently subjective discretionary governmental decisions may be immune from class-of-one claims. See, e.g., Avila, 591 F.3d at 554 (noting in dicta that "class-of-one claims cannot rest on governmental activity that is discretionary by design"); Srail, 588 F.3d at 945 (rejecting class-of-one challenge to village's "subjective and individualized" decision not to extend water services); United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 898-99 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that class-of-one challenges "may be inapplicable to any governmental action that is the product of a highly discretionary decision-making process"). We have also recognized that Engquist has limited applicability when a decisionmaker's discretion is circumscribed by constitutional or statutory provisions. For example, because police discretion is narrowed by objective constitutional limitations such as the Fourth Amendment, not all discretionary police decision-making is immune from class-of-one challenge. See Henes v. Zurich, 578 F.3d 491, 495 (7th Cir. 2009).
We do not read our cases to say, nor do we mean to imply, that: Engquist precludes all class-of-one claims brought in regard to subjective governmental decisions no matter the context in which those decisions were rendered. After all, Engquist rested on two key premises, only one of which involved the subjectivity of employment decisions. See 128 S.Ct. at 2151 ("[T]he core concern of the Equal Protection Clause as a shield against arbitrary classifications, combined with unique considerations applicable when the government acts as employer as opposed to sovereign, lead us to conclude that the class-of-one theory of equal protection does not apply in the public employment context." (emphasis added)); id. at 2151-52 (explaining that, because the government has broader power when it acts as an employer, the validity of a constitutional claim in the government employment context turns on "whether the asserted employee right implicates the basic concerns of the relevant constitutional provision.").
But when the law gives a state actor no discretion, it is hard to see how a person can claim irrational discrimination when the law is applied to him. State and federal law required the defendants to report the settlement of Behzad's malpractice claim to the relevant federal and state authorities — no matter however frivolous or insubstantial that claim may have been. See 42 U.S.C. § 11131(a) (requiring any entity making a payment in settlement of a medical malpractice claim to report certain information to the NPDB); 225 ILCS 60/23(A)(3) (requiring any entity which indemnifies a physician for his professional liability to report the settlement of a claim).
The Illinois Supreme Court recently invalidated Public Act 94-677, which amended certain sections of 225 ILCS 60/23, on nonseverability grounds. Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hosp., 237 U1.2d 217, 341 Ill.Dec. 381, 930 N.E.2d 895 (2010). That decision restored the statute as it existed prior to the enactment of P.A. 94-677. See Village of Chatham v. County of Sangamon, 216 Ill.2d 402, 297 Ill. Dec. 249; 261, 837 N.E.2d 29, 41 (2005) (noting that invalidation of statutory amendment restores previous version of statute). The reporting requirement pre-dated the invalidated amendment, so it is still part of Illinois law.
Abcarian's complaint seeks to assert a claim of selective enforcement — the enforcement of a law against only disfavored individuals — a claim long familiar in equal protection jurisprudence when based on race, national origin, or other suspect classifications. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) (reversing convictions because underlying ordinance was enforced solely against individuals of Chinese ancestry). Notably, such cases are typically brought against police, prosecutors, or other individuals having discretion in the enforcement of the law. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985) (challenge implicating prosecutorial discretion); Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 366, 6 S.Ct. 1064 (challenge to ordinance vesting discretion in decisionmaker so great as to be considered "naked and arbitrary power"). Equal protection claims are allowed in such circumstances not because the particular law at issue is facially invalid or inapplicable to' the plaintiffs conduct, but because of the concern that individuals with discretion in law enforcement will take advantage of that discretion to oppress unpopular groups.
For example, the Joint Committee on Reconstruction recognized that discrimination against freed slaves and Union sympathizers was being effected not by facially discriminatory laws, but by the failure to enforce facially neutral laws in an even-handed way. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 346-47 n. 2, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Keith S. Alexander, Federalism, Abortion, and the Original Meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Power: Can Congress Ban Partial-Birth Abortion After Carhart?, 13 Tex. Rev. L. Pol. 105, 125-26 (2008); see also Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 Vand. L. Rev. 409, 441 (1990) ("The framers of the fourteenth amendment understood from first-hand experience that the states could discriminate invidiously against the beneficiaries of Reconstruction, specifically blacks and those seeking enforcement of a wide variety of fundamental rights, through . . . the discriminatory enforcement of racially neutral laws. . . .").
But Abcarian's claim here has little in common with a typical selective enforcement claim. As we noted above, the defendants were required to report the settlement of Behzad's claim to the authorities. See 42 U.S.C. § 11131(a); 225 ILCS 60/23(A)(3). They had neither "naked and arbitrary" power, Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 366, 6 S.Ct. 1064, nor a broad discretion to act, Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608, 105 S.Ct. 1524. Unlike a police officer or prosecutor having significant discretion as to how or whether to enforce the law, these defendants had no choice as to whether they complied with the law. If they disregarded their reporting obligations, they ran the risk of civil and criminal penalties — penalties certainly not at issue when a police officer chooses not to issue a traffic ticket or when a prosecutor declines to press charges. See 42 U.S.C. § 11131(c) (imposing civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for a failure to report); 225 ILCS 60/23(G) (making a failure to report a misdemeanor). Absent any meaningful discretion on the defendants' part to decide whether to report the settlement of a particular malpractice claim, we see little risk of the kind of discriminatory action addressed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court was correct to dismiss Count VI of Abcarian's amended complaint and the related claim for equitable relief.
C. Procedural Due Process Claims
Abcarian's last constitutional claim is that defendants violated his right to procedural due process by reporting the Behzad settlement to state and national authorities. He now challenges the district court's dismissal of Counts II and IV and his related request for equitable relief.
A procedural due process claim involves a two-step analysis: "First, we determine whether the defendants deprived the plaintiff of a protected liberty or property interest, and if so, then we assess what process was due." Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1020 (7th Cir. 2000), citing Hamlin v. Vaudenberg, 95 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 1996); see Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965) (stating that deprivations of life, liberty, or property must be accompanied by notice and the opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the interest at issue), quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950).
Abcarian claims that the defendants waived any argument regarding the existence of a protected interest by failing to raise that argument before the district court. This contention is absolutely without merit, given that the defendants devoted nearly a page of their Rule 12(b)(6) memorandum to that precise argument.
Abcarian claims that the; defendants defamed him and thereby infringed his liberty to pursue his chosen occupation. The Supreme Court has made it clear that defamation alone, even by a state actor, does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976). To avoid constitution-alizing state defamation law, defamation by a government actor does not implicate the Due Process Clause unless "a right or status previously recognized by state law was distinctly altered or extinguished" as a result. Id. at 711, 96 S.Ct. 1155; Brown v. City of Michigan City, 462 F.3d 720, 730 (7th Cir. 2006). To avoid this problem, a plaintiff must allege that "(1) he was stigmatized by the defendant's conduct, (2) the stigmatizing information was publicly disclosed and (3) he suffered a tangible loss of other employment opportunities as a result of public disclosure." Townsend v. Vallas, 256 F.3d 661, 669-70 (7th Cir. 2001); Johnson v. Martin, 943 F.2d 15, 16 (7th Cir. 1991).
Abcarian's amended complaint shows that he cannot satisfy the third prong of this test. It is true that he has a protected liberty interest in pursuing his chosen profession, of course, but that right is not infringed by ordinary defamation or even by a serious deprivation of one's future employment prospects. Dupuy v. Samuels, 397 F.3d 493, 510 (7th Cir. 2005). To plead a constitutionally relevant tangible loss of his employment opportunities, Abcarian must allege that his "good name, reputation, honor or integrity [was] called into question in a manner that makes it virtually impossible for [him] to find new employment in his chosen field." Townsend, 256 F.3d at 670; Head v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trustees, 225 F.3d 794, 801 (7th Cir. 2000); Olivieri v. Rodriguez, 122 F.3d 406, 408 (7th Cir. 1997).
Abcarian cannot meet this burden for a simple and benign reason: he still has his job in his chosen profession! According to his amended complaint, he remains gainfully employed as a University of Illinois physician and professor. Although he allegedly fears that he will not be employed at additional health care institutions in the future, "[i]t is the liberty to pursue a calling or occupation, and not the right to a specific job, that is secured by the Fourteenth Amendment." Wroblewski v. City of Washburn, 965 F.2d 452, 455 (7th Cir. 1992), citing Lawson v. Sheriff of Tippecanoe County, 725 F.2d 1136, 1138 (7th Cir. 1984). One simply cannot have been denied his liberty to pursue a particular occupation when he admittedly continues to hold a job — the same job — in that very occupation.
We pause to clarify one additional point. We have been focusing on the absence of any infringement of a liberty interest. The district court also addressed Abcarian's property interest theory. In addressing that theory, the district court erroneously concluded that our decision in Fleury v. Clayton, 847 F.2d 1229 (7th Cir. 1988), meant that the mere reporting of the settlement imposed a property deprivation. Abcarian, 2009 WL 596575, at *7. In Fleury, an Illinois physician had consented to a censure by state disciplinary authorities. 847 F.2d at 1230. He then sued to expunge the censure, alleging a deprivation of his right to procedural due process. On appeal, we reversed dismissal of his claim. We noted that Fleury had not been wholly excluded from his chosen profession and therefore had not been denied his liberty of occupational choice. Nevertheless, based on Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972), and its progeny, we concluded that the "criteria for professional discipline" found in Illinois statutes "creates a `property' interest in a blemish-free license to practice medicine" because those criteria gave Fleury a "right to a particular decision reached by applying rules to facts." Id. at 1231-32. Absent the statute's "substantive criteria," however, he would have had no such property interest. Id. at 1232; see Cain v. Larson, 879 F.2d 1424, 1427 (7th Cir. 1989).
Read in context, the language in Fleury means only that an Illinois physician has a property interest in a medical license free from formal disciplinary sanction imposed without due process. A physician does not have a due process right to be exempt from the formal disciplinary processes themselves. In other words, the relevant "blemishes" are actual formal disciplinary sanctions, not the use of formal processes to resolve mere negations of unprofessional conduct. Key to our analysis in Fleury was the formality of disciplinary sanctions and their possible legal consequences, contrasted with/the lesser, informal consequences of mere defamatory statements. Id. at 1232, This distinction was significant because the defendants were members of the state medical disciplinary board that had censured Fleury. Accordingly, the "blemish-free license" language in Fleury is limited to defendants actually able to impose formal disciplinary sanctions and bound by the relevant substantive decision-making criteria governing the imposition of such sanctions. Only such defendants may actually "blemish" a physician's medical license in a constitutionally relevant way.
Abcarian failed to allege a deprivation of the property interest in his medical license we recognized in Fleury. None of the defendants named in this suit had the ability to impose sanctions. They could only report Abcarian (or, actually, report the group settlement of the malpractice claim) to the authorities, as required by law. Standing alone, such a report has no formal effect on Abcarian's license to practice medicine. Even if we suppose that the report defamed him, which is a very long stretch, mere defamation is insufficient to create a constitutionally actionable "blemish." The district court did not err by dismissing Counts II and IV of the amended complaint and the related claim for equitable relief.
II. The Rule 59(e) Motion and the Second Amended Complaint
Abcarian also asserts that the district court should have granted his motion to amend or alter its judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). He argues in the alternative that he did not need to bring a Rule 59(e) motion before requesting leave to amend his complaint because the district court had dismissed only his amended complaint but never entered final judgment disposing of the entire civil action.
As to Abcarian's first argument, a Rule 59(e) motion will be granted only in the case of a manifest error of law or fact, or newly discovered evidence. Bordelon v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 233 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 2000). Abcarian claims no newly-discovered evidence, and the district court committed no error of law calling its judgment into question, let alone any manifest error of law justifying relief under Rule 59(e).
As to his second argument, a plaintiff may amend his pleading once as a matter of course, but any additional amendments may be made only with the opposing party's consent or by leave of court. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). If the plaintiff wants to amend his complaint following the entry of judgment, however, he may do so only after a motion under Rule 59(e) or 60(b) has been granted. Sparrow v. Heller, 116 F.3d 204, 205 (7th Cir. 1997), quoting Figgie Int'l Inc. v. Miller, 966 F.2d 1178, 1179 (7th Cir. 1992). Having failed to bring a successful motion under Rule 59(e), Abcarian can amend his complaint only if he is correct that no final judgment had been entered in this matter.
We have often held that the "simple dismissal of a complaint does not. terminate the litigation." E.g., Benjamin v. United States, 833 F.2d 669, 671 (7th Cir. 1987), citing Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1111 (7th Cir. 1984). Importantly, however, Benjamin itself addressed a specific situation in which the scope of the district court's order was unclear. See 833 F.2d at 671-72 (noting that the court used both the words "complaint" and "action"). If the district court clearly intended its order of dismissal to dispose of the entire action, not merely the complaint itself, there exists a final and appealable judgment and the Benjamin rule is inapplicable. Rothner v. City of Chicago, 929 F.2d 297, 300 (7th Cir. 1991).
Here, the district court's intent was obvious. When the court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, a separate entry was immediately made in the court docket on Form AO 450, the form specifically used for entry of a separate final judgment under Rule 58. See Martinez v. City of Chicago, 499 F.3d 721, 724 (7th Cir. 2007). In denying Abcarian's Rule 59(e) motion, the court stated that its previous order meant to make "abundantly clear" that the court "dismissed the action, not the amended complaint." Abcarian, 2009 WL 2448044, at *2 (emphasis added). A court's interpretation of its own orders can be rejected for an abuse of discretion. In re Chicago, Rock Island Pac. R.R. Co., 860 F.2d 267, 272 (7th Cir. 1988), but Abcarian draws our attention to nothing in the record that would persuade us not to take the district court at its word. Final judgment was entered in this matter before Abcarian attempted to amend his complaint a second time. Accordingly, the district court did not err when it denied Abcarian leave to file his second amended complaint. Sparrow, 116 F.3d at 205.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.