Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The Supreme Court properly granted the motion of the defendant Leake Watts Services, Inc. (hereinafter L W), pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it. In the complaint, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that L W, his former employer, had wrongfully terminated his employment. Absent an agreement fixing a duration of employment, an employment relationship is presumed to be a hiring at-will, terminable at any time for any lawful reason or no reason ( see Rooney v Tyson, 91 NY2d 685, 689; Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 NY2d 293; Devany v Brockway Dev., LLC, 72 AD3d 1008; McGimpsey v J. Robert Folchetti Assoc., LLC, 19 AD3d 658; Wyllie v District Attorney of County of Kings, 2 AD3d 714, 720; Riccardi v Cunningham, 291 AD2d 547; Poplawski v Metropolitan Prop. Cos. Ins. Co., 262 AD2d 543). Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the Supreme Court properly determined that he was an at-will employee ( see Riccardi v Cunningham, 291 AD2d 547; Poplawski v Metropolitan Prop. Cos. Ins. Co., 262 AD2d 543), and also correctly determined that, to the extent that his fifth cause of action could be interpreted to encompass an allegation that L W violated the proscriptions articulated in Executive Law § 296 (16), he did not allege facts sufficient to bring him within the protections of that statute ( see Green v Wells Fargo Alarm Serv., 192 AD2d 463).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court properly dismissed the cause of action sounding in defamation insofar as asserted against L W, since the complaint did not comply with the special pleading requirement that the particular defamatory words be set forth therein ( see CPLR 3016 [a]; Salvatore v Kumar, 45 AD3d 560, 563; Poplawski v Metropolitan Prop. Cos. Ins. Co., 262 AD2d 543).
The plaintiffs remaining contentions are without merit.