TAYLOR v. TAYLOR

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Docket Number

No. 02-09-00255-CV.

Advocates

Bethany F. Lucking, Wichita Falls, TX, for Appellant. Gene Douglass, Wichita Falls, TX, for Appellee.

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Adrianna and Eric Taylor married in 1997 and had one child. Eric filed for divorce in April 2008, followed by Adrianna, whose petition requested child-support payments and temporary child support while the case was pending. The cases were consolidated. [1]

At the parties’ May 2009 prove-up, they announced agreement on all issues except Adrianna’s reserved claim for retroactive child support. Eric objected to evidence on that claim because Adrianna had not specifically pleaded it, and the trial court sustained the objection. [2][3]

The trial court later denied Adrianna’s motion to reconsider, ruled that retroactive support had to be specifically pleaded, and signed the final divorce decree. Adrianna timely appealed. On rehearing, the appellate court denied Eric’s motion for reconsideration, withdrew its prior opinion and judgment, and substituted this opinion. [4][5]

Legal Issues Presented

Whether Adrianna’s pleadings provided Eric fair notice of her request for retroactive child support from the date of separation through judgment, or at least from the date of her original petition through judgment. [6][7]
Whether Eric waived any challenge to the sufficiency of Adrianna’s pleading by failing to specially except. [6][7]

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

Adrianna argued that her pleadings gave Eric fair notice of her request for retroactive child support. [7]
She argued that Eric waived any pleading challenge by failing to specially except. [7]

Appellee’s Position

Eric objected that Adrianna had not specifically pleaded retroactive child support. [3]
He did not dispute that he was the child’s father, lacked custody after the separation, and paid no child support during the divorce proceedings. [8]

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609	Abuse of discretion concerns whether the trial court acted without reference to guiding rules or principles; an appellate court may not reverse merely because it would have ruled differently.	The court used this framework to review the trial court’s ruling, while recognizing that an erroneous legal conclusion constitutes an abuse of discretion. [9]
Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835	Explains the abuse-of-discretion standard.	Cited with Low in defining the applicable standard of review. [9]
E.I. du Pont de Nemours Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549	An appellate court cannot find an abuse of discretion merely because it would have reached a different result.	Cited to limit appellate reweighing of discretionary decisions. [9]
Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239	An erroneous legal conclusion, even in an unsettled area, is an abuse of discretion.	Supported the court’s review of the trial court’s legal conclusion concerning pleading requirements. [9]
Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920	An erroneous legal conclusion constitutes an abuse of discretion.	Cited as additional authority for the standard of review. [9]
Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887	Texas follows a fair-notice pleading standard; pleadings provide fair notice when a reasonably competent attorney can ascertain the nature and basic issues of the controversy and relevant testimony.	The court applied this standard to conclude that Adrianna’s petition gave notice of child support during the case. [10][11]
Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593	In the absence of special exceptions, pleadings should be construed liberally in favor of the pleader.	The court considered the pleading under this liberal-construction principle. [10]
London v. London, 192 S.W.3d 6	Pleadings may be liberally construed to determine whether they raise issues involving child-support modification, offsets, and retroactive support when special exceptions were not sustained.	The court cited this case as supporting liberal construction of pleadings. [10]
Van Buren v. McMillen, No. 14-03-00928-CV, 2004 WL 1898799	A pleading may support retroactive child support when liberally construed absent special exceptions; the court also noted that related sufficiency statements were dicta.	The court distinguished Van Buren because Adrianna’s pleading did not mention support for dates before her original petition. [10][12][13]
In re S.L.M., 97 S.W.3d 224	In the absence of special exceptions, pleadings may sufficiently raise retroactive child support, although an award may still be improper as to the dates covered.	The court cited this decision as further support for liberal construction but determined that Adrianna’s pleading did not cover the earlier period she claimed. [10]
Martinez v. Martinez, 61 S.W.3d 589	Specific notice is required when retroactive child support is sought.	The court found that Eric had specific notice because Adrianna expressly reserved retroactive child support for trial. [11]
In re J.G.Z., 963 S.W.2d 144	Specific notice is required for a request for retroactive child support.	Cited through Martinez in evaluating Eric’s notice. [11]
Haynes v. City of Beaumont, 35 S.W.3d 166	A party sued on specific theories is not required to specially except to ask whether other theories were intended.	The court relied on this principle to hold that Eric did not waive his objection regarding support for the period before Adrianna filed her petition. [11][14]

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court reviewed the trial court’s ruling for abuse of discretion. Although appellate courts may not reverse merely because they would have reached a different result, an erroneous legal conclusion is an abuse of discretion. [9]

Texas applies a fair-notice pleading standard, and pleadings are liberally construed in favor of the pleader when no special exceptions are filed. [10]

Adrianna’s petition requested child-support payments and a temporary order requiring child support while the case was pending. The court held that these requests gave Eric fair notice of child support during the pendency of the divorce. Eric also received specific notice of the retroactive-support issue when the parties announced that Adrianna had reserved it for litigation. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to hear evidence concerning support from the date of Adrianna’s original petition through judgment. [11]

The court reached a different conclusion regarding the period from separation through the filing of Adrianna’s petition. Her pleading did not mention or suggest a request for support for that earlier period. The court rejected reliance on Van Buren because that case involved an express request tied to an earlier date, whereas Adrianna’s pleading contained no comparable language. [12][13]

Because Eric was not required to specially except merely to ask whether Adrianna intended to assert an additional theory not stated in her petition, his failure to specially except did not waive the pleading deficiency concerning the earlier period. [14]

Holding and Implications

REVERSED AND REMANDED. The court sustained Adrianna’s first issue in part, holding that her petition gave Eric fair notice of a retroactive child-support claim from the date of her original petition through judgment. It overruled the remainder of her first issue and all of her second issue. [15]

The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. The decision required the trial court to hear evidence concerning the qualifying period but did not permit the claim for the period before Adrianna filed her original petition. No broader implication was discussed, and no new precedent was set. [11][14][15]

Show full summary ...

Adrianna Ruiz TAYLOR, Appellant, v. Eric Da'Vell TAYLOR, Appellee.

OPINION ON REHEARING

ANNE GARDNER, Justice.

We have considered Appellee's motion for reconsideration en banc of our opinion issued September 16, 2010. We deny the motion, but we withdraw our September 16, 2010 opinion and judgment and substitute the following.

I. Introduction

Appellant Adrianna Ruiz Taylor appeals from a July 1, 2009 final decree of divorce. Adrianna contends in two issues that the trial court erred by refusing to hear evidence concerning retroactive child support because Appellee Eric Da'Vell Taylor had fair notice of her request for retroactive child support and because Eric did not specially except to her failure to specifically plead for retroactive child support. We reverse and remand.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

Adrianna and Eric were married on August 31, 1997, and had one child. Eric filed a petition for divorce on April 10, 2008, and sought "orders for conservatorship and support of the child" in the event that he and Adrianna could not reach an agreement on those matters. Adrianna filed a petition for divorce on April 24, 2008. In her original petition, Adrianna requested that Eric "be ordered to make payments for the support of the child" and that the trial court enter a temporary order requiring Eric to pay "child support . . . while this case is pending." The trial court consolidated the two cases on May 13, 2008.

On May 7, 2009, Eric's counsel announced to the trial court that the parties had "reached an agreement on all issues pertaining to the division of property, assignment of liabilities, current child support, health insurance, conservatorship, rights, duties, and responsibilities." Eric's counsel also stated, "There's an issue that [Adrianna's counsel] reserves to litigate later after we do the prove up." Eric and Adrianna each then testified to their agreement, and Adrianna testified that she was reserving the issue of retroactive child support.

Following the parties' prove-up of their agreement, the trial court stated to Adrianna's counsel, "And you indicated, Ms. Lucking, the remaining issue is retroactive support." Eric's counsel then objected to any evidence concerning retroactive child support because Adrianna did not specifically plead for retroactive child support. After hearing argument, the trial court sustained the objection and stated, "I'm going to overrule the request for retroactive child support. I find that it has to be pled in the face of an objection and it has not been pled."

On May 26, 2009, Adrianna filed a motion to reconsider the trial court's ruling concerning retroactive child support, and the trial court conducted a hearing on July 1, 2009. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated, "The court finds that the request for retroactive support must be specifically pleaded, and that special exception was not required." The trial court then denied the motion to reconsider and signed the final decree of divorce. Adrianna timely filed her notice of this appeal.

III. Standard of Review

To determine whether a trial court abused its discretion, we must decide whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles; in other words, we must decide whether the act was arbitrary or unreasonable. Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007); Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838-39 (Tex. 2004). An appellate court cannot conclude that a trial court abused its discretion merely because the appellate court would have ruled differently in the same circumstances. E.I. du Pont de Nemours Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex. 1995); see Low, 221 S.W.3d at 620. However, a trial court's erroneous legal conclusion, even in an unsettled area of law, is an abuse of discretion. Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239, 257 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding); Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 927-28 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding).

IV. Analysis

Adrianna contends in her first issue that the trial court erred by refusing to hear evidence concerning retroactive child support because her pleadings gave Eric fair notice that she sought retroactive child support from the date of separation through the date of judgment or, alternatively, from the date of her original petition through the date of judgment. In her second issue, Adrianna argues that Eric waived any complaint concerning the sufficiency of her pleading for retroactive child support by failing to specially except.

Texas follows a "fair notice" standard for pleading. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 896 (Tex. 2000); see Tex.R. Civ. P. 45. Generally, a pleading provides fair notice of a claim when an opposing attorney of reasonable competence can examine the pleadings and ascertain the nature and basic issues of the controversy and the relevant testimony. Auld, 34 S.W.3d at 896. In the absence of special exceptions, the petition should be construed liberally in favor of the pleader. Id. at 897; Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 601 (Tex. 1993) (op. on reh'g); see also London v. London, 192 S.W.3d 6, 13 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist] 2005, pet. denied) (reviewing husband's pleadings liberally in his favor in determining sufficiency of pleading relating to modification and offset to child support payments, including retroactive child support payments, in the absence of sustained special exceptions to husband's pleadings); Van Buren v. McMillen, No. 14-03-00928-CV, 2004 WL 1898799, at *2 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 26, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.) (rejecting contention that retroactive child support award was not supported by pleadings and construing pleadings liberally in pleader's favor in absence of special exceptions); In re S.L.M., 97 S.W.3d 224, 232-33 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.) (holding that pleadings, in absence of special exceptions, sufficiently raised retroactive child support but reversing in part because trial court's order awarded retroactive child support for improper dates).

Here, Adrianna's original petition requested that Eric "be ordered to make payments for the support of the child" and further sought a temporary order for "child support . . . while this case is pending." This pleading provided Eric with fair notice of Adrianna's request for child support during the pendency of the case. See Auld, 34 S.W.3d at 896. And there can be no dispute that Eric had specific notice that Adrianna sought retroactive child support. See Martinez v. Martinez, 61 S.W.3d 589, 590-91 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.) ("Specific notice is required when retroactive child support is being sought." (quoting In re J.G.Z., 963 S.W.2d 144, 148 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1998, no pet.))). The parties announced to the trial court that they had agreed to all issues concerning "division of property, assignment of liabilities, current child support, health insurance, conservatorship, rights, duties, and responsibilities" and that Adrianna had reserved the issue of retroactive child support to be litigated after the parties testified about the matters to which they agreed. Although "one who is sued on specific theories of recovery is not required to except to the petition and ask whether there are other theories that the pleader wants to allege," Haynes v. City of Beaumont, 35 S.W.3d 166, 180 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.), Adrianna's petition sought an order for child support and requested a temporary order for child support during the pendency of the case, and Eric had specific notice that Adrianna was reserving the issue of retro-active child support for trial. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to hear evidence concerning child support from the date of Adrianna's original petition through the date of judgment. Therefore, we sustain the part of Adriannas first issue concerning retroactive child support from the date of her original petition through judgment.

Moreover, we note that Eric does not dispute that he is the child's father, that he did not have custody of the child after he and Adrianna separated, or that he did not pay child support pending the outcome of the divorce proceeding.

In the remainder of her first issue, Adrianna contends that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to hear evidence concerning child support from the date of separation through the date of her original petition, but Adrianna's petition does not mention or even refer to a request for child support for that period of time. In her second issue, and relying on Van Buren, 2004 WL 1898799, at *2, Adrianna argues that Eric waived any complaint concerning the sufficiency of her pleading by failing to specially except. In Van Buren, however, the pleading at issue requested "that any increase in [child support] be made retroactive to the earlier of the time of service [of] citation on [Van Buren] on the original motion or the appearance of [Van Buren] in this modification action." Id. The court stated in dicta that this pleading was sufficient to constitute a request for retroactive child support. Id. But Adriannas only relevant requests for child support are that Eric "be ordered to make payments for the support of the child" and that the trial court should make a temporary order requiring Eric to pay "child support, health insurance premiums for coverage on the child, and 50 percent of the child's uninsured medical expenses while this case is pending." Nothing in her pleading even hints that she sought child support for dates prior to the date of her original petition.

The Van Buren court's statements concerning the sufficiency of the pleading are dicta because the court had previously held that Van Buren had waived any complaint concerning the sufficiency of the petition by failing to file special exceptions. Id.

Eric was "not required to except to the petition and ask whether there are other theories that [Adrianna] want[ed] to allege." Haynes, 35 S.W.3d at 180. Thus, while Adrianna's petition provided Eric with fair notice of her request for child support during the pendency of the case, nothing in Adrianna's petition suggests that she sought child support from the date of separation through the date she filed her original petition. Requiring Eric to specially except to Adrianna's petition to determine whether Adrianna sought child support prior to the date of her original petition would be akin to requiring a defendant to specially except to a plaintiffs pleading because other theories or causes of action are available but not included in the plaintiffs pleading. We hold that Adrianna's original petition did not provide Eric with fair notice of her request for retroactive child support from the date of separation through the date of Adrianna's original petition and that Eric did not waive his complaint concerning the sufficiency of Adrianna's pleading for retroactive child support from the date of separation through the date of her original petition by failing to specially except. Therefore, we overrule the remainder of Adrianna's first issue and all of her second issue.

V. Conclusion

Having sustained Adrianna's first issue in part, having overruled the remainder of her first issue, and having overruled her second issue, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.