PER CURIAM.
Caroline M. Zuschek, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.
Lauren Amrein, legal intern, Jodi Litfin, assistant district attorney, Chadwick J. Taylor, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Patrick A. Meeks appeals the Shawnee County District Court's order that he pay about $14,350 in restitution for a car he admitted stealing. He contends the award resulted in an “unworkable” restitution plan given his financial circumstances and, therefore, did not conform to K.S.A.2014 Supp. 21–6604(b)(1). Although the restitution burden might be characterized as stiff or even harsh, the district court did not deviate from the appropriate legal framework or otherwise rule in a way that amounted to an abuse of discretion. We, therefore, affirm.
Meeks pleaded guilty to felony theft for stealing a late model sedan. Meeks asserted the car was then stolen from him. The vehicle was never recovered and represented a total loss to the owner. The district court sentenced Meeks to serve 11 months in prison followed by 12 months of postrelease supervision, a guidelines punishment based on his criminal history. In addition, as provided in K.S.A.2014 Supp. 21–6604(b), the district court required he pay restitution and determined the fair value of the car to be just over $14,000, reflecting the loss paid by the owner's insurance carrier plus the policy deductible. Meeks doesn't dispute the accuracy of that valuation.
At the sentencing hearing, Meeks said he had a GED and had been unemployed for the preceding 5 years. Meeks told the district court he had been employed as a factory production worker and had made up to $15 an hour, although he thought he averaged about $11 an hour. He described financial obligations including significant college loans, unpaid hospital bills, and a child support arrearage of $14,000 with ongoing support payments of $168 a month. Although Meeks said he had back problems that limited his physical capacity, he told the district court he believed he would have a factory job waiting for him when he completed his prison sentence. Based on the information presented at sentencing, the district court ordered Meeks to pay $300 a month in restitution after his release from prison. Meeks has appealed the restitution order.
Setting both the amount of restitution and the manner in which it is to be paid rests in the district court's sound discretion, and those determinations are reviewed on appeal for an abuse of that discretion. State v. Hunziker, 274 Kan. 655, Syl. ¶ 2, 56 P.3d 202 (2002). A district court exceeds such discretion if it rules in a way no reasonable judicial officer would under the circumstances, if it ignores controlling facts or relies on unproved factual representations, or if it acts outside the legal framework appropriate to the issue. See Northern Natural Gas Co. v. ONEOK Field Services Co., 296 Kan. 906, 935, 296 P.3d 1106, cert. denied 134 S.Ct. 162 (2013); State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 3, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S.Ct. 1594 (2012).
As required under K.S.A.2014 Supp. 21–6604(b)(1), a district court is to order restitution as part of a criminal sentence unless “compelling circumstances” make “a plan of restitution unworkable .” As public policy, restitution serves to compensate crime victims and to impress upon criminal defendants both rehabilitative and deterrent lessons. Ultimately, unpaid restitution becomes a judgment against a defendant and may be collected in the same manner as a civil judgment. K.S.A.2014 Supp. 21–6604(b)(2); K.S.A.2014 Supp. 60–4301. Meeks contends his situation reflects an exceptional circumstance in which those policy objectives would best be served with a markedly reduced award of restitution and asks for remand so the district court can fashion a less onerous plan.
Meeks cites this court's recent decision in
State v. Herron, 50 Kan.App.2d 1058,
335 P.3d 1211 (2014), as supportive of his argument. We disagree and see
Herron as factually distinguishable. There, this court found that the restitution plan either would allow Herron insufficient net income on which to live or would require she pay restitution for more than 50 years. Neither of those alternatives conformed to the statutory requirement that a plan be workable. Nor would they particularly well serve the public policy objectives of restitution. Although Herron owed less in restitution than Meeks, she also had an exceptionally limited income (and earning capacity) that barely permitted her to meet basic needs for food and shelter, let alone to pay for other items, such as clothing, commonly considered necessary for even a minimal standard of living.
50 Kan.App.2d at 1060. Any sort of schedule requiring substantial payments would have left Herron destitute, and the State's suggested monthly installments likely would have required her to pay for the rest of her life. That fell short of workability.
50 Kan.App.2d at 1065–66.
Based on the evidence presented at sentencing, Meeks neither falls into that decidedly extreme predicament nor an analogous one that fairly could be characterized as a compelling circumstance contemplated in K.S.A.2014 Supp. 21–6604(b)(1). As we have said, the restitution imposed on Meeks may be substantial and may reflect a significant economic burden, but it does not approach the burden the district court visited on Herron.
In this case, there was no abuse of discretion. The district court understood the pertinent facts. It did not step outside the governing legal principles. And its decision was hardly so far afield that we could say no other district court would have done the same thing in a comparable situation.
Affirmed.