PST v OU (Child Abduction: consent; grave risk)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Child was born in Country B in June 2022 and lived there until the events giving rise to the proceedings. The Applicant is a national of Country B and the Respondent is originally from Country A. The Respondent and the Child travelled to Country A in May 2025 with the Applicant’s consent for family-related reasons. The visit was extended following serious illness and bereavement in the Respondent’s family. On or about 7 August 2025, the Respondent informed the Applicant that she would not return to Country B with the Child. [1][2][3]

The Child was habitually resident in Country B, the Applicant held and was exercising rights of custody, and the Article 3 requirements of the Hague Convention were therefore satisfied. Proceedings seeking the Child’s return issued on 30 April 2026 following contact with the relevant Central Authority. [2][4]

The case was heard on affidavit evidence. An expert report concerning the Child’s views was obtained. The Court admitted a late affidavit because of the importance of having relevant evidence in a child-related case, but excluded an exhibited psychological report because of its lateness, hearsay character and apparent fact-finding conclusions. [5][6][7][8]

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Applicant consented to the Child’s permanent or indefinite relocation to Country A, including whether any future consent had become operative before being withdrawn. [9][10][11]
2. Whether return would expose the Child to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the Child in an intolerable situation under Article 13(b). [9][12][13]
3. Whether the Child objected to return and had sufficient age and maturity for her views to be considered under Article 13. [9][14]
4. Whether any alleged acquiescence affected the proceedings. [15][16]

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant’s Arguments

• The Respondent had not proved clear, real and unequivocal consent to permanent removal or retention. Discussions concerning relocation were hypothetical, exploratory and concerned a future family move. [17][18][19]
• Any future consent was conditional on resolving financial difficulties and was insufficiently clear to be ascertainable. Any such consent had been withdrawn before being acted upon. [19][20]
• The evidence concerning relationship difficulties, finances and the Respondent’s circumstances did not establish grave risk. The Respondent could return, the Child would not be separated from her before proceedings in Country B, and undertakings could address short-term needs. [21][22]
• The Child’s evidence did not establish a reasoned objection to return. [23]

Respondent’s Arguments

• The Applicant had repeatedly indicated willingness to relocate to Country A, and the parties had discussed and planned such a move. [24][25][26]
• Consent need not relate to an immediate or permanent removal and could be given for a future event, provided the event was reasonably ascertainable. [27][28][29]
• Return would create grave risk through financial hardship, accommodation and support difficulties, alleged behavioural and mental-health issues, relationship breakdown and the Respondent’s own psychological condition. [30][31][32][12]
• The Child’s views had been obtained through the expert report and should be taken into account. [33]

Table of Precedents Cited

Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

The Court treated the consent defence as requiring proof by the Respondent on the balance of probabilities. Consent had to be clear, cogent, real, positive and unequivocal, although it could be inferred from conduct and could relate to a future event if that event was reasonably ascertainable. [41][42][49][85]

The Court distinguished consent to a temporary visit from consent to permanent or indefinite relocation. The evidence established consent to travel and to extensions connected with family illness and bereavement, but did not establish consent to retain the Child indefinitely in Country A. [10][86]

The parties had discussed a possible future move, but the Court found that the Respondent’s understanding of those discussions was more advanced than the Applicant’s. The discussions remained vague and conditional, involving a future family move, resolution of financial difficulties and greater financial stability. They had not matured into clear and unequivocal consent, and the Respondent did not leave Country B in the execution of an agreed relocation. [50][87][44]

The Court rejected the acquiescence point because the Applicant sought the Child’s return shortly after the alleged wrongful retention; the delay was attributed to unsuccessful mediation rather than acquiescence. [16]

For grave risk, the Court applied the high Article 13(b) threshold. Financial difficulties, accommodation and support concerns, relationship breakdown, alleged anger-management issues and the Respondent’s anxiety and depression did not establish a grave risk. The evidence did not connect the Respondent’s mental-health condition to a grave risk arising specifically from return, and there was no evidence that Country B’s courts or authorities could not provide adequate protection. [12][13][88][78][89]

The Court considered the expert evidence of the Child’s views. The Child had positive views of both parents and both countries, expressed no strong preference and showed no fear of either parent. The Court concluded that she lacked sufficient age or maturity to understand the Convention concept of objection and had not expressed an objection to return. [90][91][14][92]

Because the Convention defences were not established, the Court applied the principle that questions concerning custody, care and welfare should be determined by the courts of the habitual-residence country rather than through the summary return proceedings. [75][93]

Holding and Implications

ORDER FOR RETURN GRANTED. The Court declared as sought and ordered the Child’s return to Country B forthwith. [94]

The Respondent’s consent, grave-risk and child-objection defences failed. The Court retained consideration of undertakings addressing transitional needs and directed that the timing and related matters be addressed at a later hearing. [88][94][95]

The direct consequence is that the Child’s custody and welfare arrangements, including any issues concerning the Respondent’s care of the Child, are to be addressed by the courts of Country B. The opinion applied existing Hague Convention principles and did not state that it created a new precedent. [96]