Factual and Procedural Background
This judgment concerned three substantially identical judicial review cases. Applicant 1 and Applicant 2, spouses from Georgia, claimed persecution and serious harm because they were Jehovah’s Witnesses. Applicant 1 described three religion-related assaults. Applicant 3, their daughter, was born in Ireland in August 2025. [1][2][3][4]
The Tribunal accepted the core account, including Applicant 1’s past assaults and the existence of a future risk of persecution or serious harm. It nevertheless refused refugee status and subsidiary protection because it found effective state protection available in Georgia. [5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]
The applicants sought judicial review, principally challenging the Tribunal’s treatment of country-of-origin information and its allegedly inconsistent findings concerning future risk and state protection. [14]
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Tribunal unlawfully failed to consider or explain its treatment of relevant country-of-origin information submitted by the applicants. [15][16][17][18][19]
- Whether it was irrational or inconsistent to find both a risk of future persecution or serious harm and effective state protection in Georgia. [20][21]
- Whether Applicant 3’s claim was required to be considered with Applicant 2’s claim rather than separately. [22][23][24]
Arguments of the Parties
Applicants’ Arguments
- The Tribunal failed adequately or at all to consider relevant country-of-origin information, including European Court of Human Rights decisions and a Brill Nijhoff article. [15][25][26]
- The Tribunal did not explain why it preferred United States Department of State reports over that material, contrary to the requirements of reasoned decision-making. [16][27][28][18][19]
- It was irrational to find a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm while also finding effective state protection. [20][21]
- Applicant 3’s claim should have been considered with Applicant 2’s application. [22]
Respondents’ Arguments
- The legislation permitted, but did not require, a minor’s claim to be considered with a parent’s claim; separate consideration was logical because Applicant 3 was born after the parents’ applications. [23][29]
- The Tribunal was not required to address every individual item of country-of-origin information, provided it dealt clearly and transparently with the core arguments. [30]
- The Tribunal had listed the documents considered, including the applicants’ written submissions, and its statement that all submissions had been considered was sufficient. [31][32]
- The Tribunal reasonably preferred more recent country-of-origin information to older European Court of Human Rights decisions concerning events mainly occurring between 1999 and 2001. [33]
- State protection involved separate questions: whether there was a real risk of persecution or serious harm and, if so, whether effective protection was available. [34][35]
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|
| K (Zimbabwe) v IPAT [2025] 2 ILRM 295 | Relevant country-of-origin information must be considered when assessing an international protection claim. | Cited by the applicants in support of their challenge. [16] |
| Balz v An Bord Pleanála [2020] 3 IR 751 | Relevant submissions should be addressed, with reasons given if they are rejected. | Cited by the applicants concerning the alleged lack of reasons. [27] |
| Rana and Ali v Minister for Justice [2024] IESC 46 | A decision-maker’s statement that all submitted material was considered is presumed accurate unless evidence suggests otherwise. | The Court relied on this principle in rejecting the country-of-origin-information ground. [31][36][37] |
| E.S. v IPAT [2022] IEHC 613 | A tribunal must not selectively use country-of-origin information or ignore conflicting material without explanation; effective protection does not require perfect prevention of harm. | The Court held that the Tribunal had relied on recent and reliable material and applied the correct state-protection test. [35][38][39][40][41] |
| N.G. v IPAT [2023] IEHC 535 | Cited regarding the legal treatment of risk and state protection. | Relied on by the respondents in support of the Tribunal’s approach. [35] |
| G&M v IPAT [2025] IECA 208 | Findings of risk and availability of state protection are not inherently inconsistent. | The Court applied this reasoning in rejecting the irrationality challenge. [35][42][43][44] |
| N v IPAT [2026] IEHC 212 | Cited regarding the state-protection issue. | Relied on by the respondents. [35] |
| O.M.A. (Sierra Leone) v The Refugee Appeals Tribunal & Ors [2018] IEHC 370 | A decision-maker need not list and reject every element of an applicant’s case point by point. | Cited within the Court’s discussion of the extent of the duty to address country-of-origin information. [45][46] |
| Gldani Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses v Georgia (App no. 71156/01) | Concerned an attack on Jehovah’s Witnesses in October 1999. | The Court treated it as older factual country-of-origin information with diminished current utility. [47][48][49] |
| Begheluri & Ors v Georgia (App no. 28490/02) | Concerned attacks occurring between 1999 and 2001. | Considered historical material rather than current evidence of state protection. [48][50] |
| Union of Jehovah’s Witnesses & Ors v Georgia (App no. 72874/01) | Concerned annulment of an organisation’s registration in 2000 and 2001. | Included among the older decisions whose current evidential utility was limited. [48][50] |
| Gabunia & Ors v Georgia (App no. 37276/05) | Concerned violent incidents occurring in 2001. | Considered as historical country-of-origin information. [48][50] |
| Tsartsidze & Ors v Georgia (App no. 18766/04) | Concerned an incident occurring in September 2000. | Considered as historical country-of-origin information. [48][50] |
| Georgia Muslim Relations & Ors v Georgia (App no. 24225/19) | Concerned incidents between July and September 2014 involving a proposed Muslim boarding school. | The Court regarded it as relating to events many years before the Tribunal’s decision. [48][50] |
Court’s Reasoning and Analysis
The Court held that section 28 of the International Protection Act 2015 required consideration of all elements put forward by an applicant, including relevant country-of-origin information. Section 31 required state protection to be effective and non-temporary, assessed by reference to reasonable preventive steps and an effective legal system for detecting, prosecuting and punishing persecutors. [51][52][53]
The objection to separate consideration of Applicant 3’s claim failed. The legislation permitted, but did not require, a child’s claim to be dealt with as part of a parent’s claim. Applicant 3 was born after the parents’ applications, and separate processing made no substantive difference. The objection was also not included in the statement of grounds or the leave granted. [24][54][55]
The country-of-origin-information challenge also failed. The Tribunal had stated that it considered the listed documents, which included the applicants’ submissions referring to the European Court of Human Rights decisions and the Brill Nijhoff article. The Court therefore presumed that the material had been considered. [56][36][37]
The Court further held that the European Court of Human Rights decisions principally concerned events between 1999 and 2001, with one decision concerning events in 2014. Their value as current country-of-origin information was consequently limited. The Tribunal was entitled to rely on the more recent United States Department of State reports, and its failure to mention every older decision did not establish that relevant material had been ignored. [57][48][50][58][49][39]
Finally, the Court rejected the alleged irrationality. The assessment properly proceeded in two stages: first, determining whether there was a risk of persecution or serious harm; and second, determining whether effective state protection was available. Effective protection did not mean perfect prevention. The Tribunal’s findings were therefore legally coherent and open to it on the evidence. [42][40][41][43][59][60][61][44]
Holding and Implications
All relief sought by the applicants was refused. The Court directed that similar orders be made in each of the three cases. [62][63]
The direct effect was that the Tribunal’s refusal of refugee status and subsidiary protection remained undisturbed. The parties were given two weeks to make written submissions on the final order, costs and related matters, with the cases listed for mention on 19 November 2026. [64][65]
No broader implications are identified in the opinion, and no new precedent was set.