Factual and Procedural Background
The Applicant brought judicial review proceedings challenging proposed removal to the receiving State under Article 17(1) of the Dublin III Regulations. Leave to proceed was granted, and interlocutory relief restraining removal was granted after a contested hearing; the question of costs was reserved. [1][2][3][4]
The proceedings became moot after the Respondent decided that the Applicant would not be transferred and that the protection application would instead be determined in the State. The six-month transfer period had expired or was about to expire, and the Applicant subsequently obtained refugee status. [5][6][7][8]
The application therefore concerned costs only, against the background of related proceedings affected by a preliminary reference concerning the Dublin III transfer time-limit. [9][10][11]
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Applicant should receive costs despite the proceedings having become moot. [1][7]
- Whether the grant of interlocutory relief constituted an “event” such that costs should follow, notwithstanding that a core legal issue was ultimately decided against the Applicant. [12][13][14]
- What proportion of the Applicant’s costs should be awarded, having regard to the related authorities and the circumstances in which the proceedings became moot. [15][16][17]
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant's Arguments
- The grant of interlocutory relief prevented removal within the legally permitted period, and the Applicant therefore obtained the relief sought. [12]
- The injunction, granted on an Okunade basis, caused the proceedings to become moot before the later CJEU judgment; the relevant event was the Respondent’s decision not to transfer the Applicant. [18]
- The Applicant relied on the causative connection between the proceedings, the injunction, the expiry of the transfer period, and the favourable outcome. [19]
Respondent's Arguments
- There should be no order as to costs because the core issue concerning suspensive effect under Article 17 of the Dublin III Regulations was ultimately decided against the Applicant. [13]
- The related decision in A.H.Y. v. Minister for Justice was distinguishable because its applications were highly contested and its costs order separately dealt with the CJEU reference. [20]
- The proceedings became moot through the passage of time rather than unilateral action by either party. [21]
- The Respondent invited the Court to find that the 50% costs approach in A.A., M.I., R.O. v. Minister for Justice was legally wrong and that no costs should be awarded. [22]
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| A.H.Y. v Minister for Justice [2022] IEHC 198 |
Preliminary reference concerning the commencement of the six-month Dublin III transfer period and a related costs ruling. |
Distinguished because the present proceedings became moot through the injunction and expiry of time before the CJEU decision. [9][23][24] |
| A.A., M.I., R.O. v. Minister for Justice |
Applicants in similar moot proceedings received 50% of their costs where injunctive relief secured the benefit sought. |
Adopted as the appropriate and fair approach in the present case. [25][26][17] |
| A.C. v. IPAT & Ors. [2024] IEHC 77 |
Application of Okunade principles to interlocutory relief in Dublin III transfer proceedings. |
Illustrated that the court considers all relevant factors, including delay in deciding an Article 17 application, when granting an injunction. [27] |
| Little v. Chief Appeals Officer & Ors. [2024] IESC 53 |
Recent Supreme Court authority considered in the mootness and costs analysis. |
Identified as part of the jurisprudential basis considered by the related costs decision. [28] |
| Hughes v. The Revenue Commissioners & Ors. [2021] IECA 5 |
Principles governing costs where proceedings become moot, including independent events, unilateral acts, and decisions of statutory bodies. |
The Court applied its requirement that costs be determined by reference to the particular circumstances and cause of mootness. [28][29][30][31][32] |
| Cunningham v The President of Circuit Court [2012] IESC 39, [2012] 3 IR 222 |
Earlier guidance concerning costs in moot proceedings. |
The Court held that such guidance must be applied flexibly and in light of the specific circumstances. [28][32] |
| Godsil v Ireland [2015] IESC 103, [2015] 4 IR 53 |
Earlier mootness authority considered in the related costs analysis. |
Considered as part of the authorities reviewed by the related court. [28] |
| Matta v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2016] IESC 45 |
Earlier authority considered in the mootness caselaw. |
Considered as part of the authorities informing the related costs decision. [28] |
| M.K.I.A. (Palestine) v IPAT [2018] IEHC 134 |
Earlier mootness and costs authority. |
Considered in the related adjudication of costs. [28] |
| F.A. v. IPAT & Ors. [2021] IECA 296 |
Costs discretion in moot cases, particularly where a lead case conclusively determines the underlying issue. |
Distinguished because the present proceedings became moot through the injunction and expiry of time, not because a lead case made them bound to fail. [22][33][34][32] |
| N.V.U. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2020] IESC 46 |
Lead-case decision causing related proceedings to fail in the context of F.A. |
Used to distinguish F.A. from the present proceedings. [33] |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court found that the proceedings became moot because the Respondent abandoned the proposed transfer after the injunction prevented transfer within the six-month period. The injunction was therefore central to securing the Applicant’s entitlement to have the protection claim processed in the State. [35]
The Court considered the related authorities and accepted that a successful injunction may constitute an “event” to which costs should follow, even where the proceedings later become moot. The Applicant obtained the practical benefit sought through the proceedings. [19][26][36]
The Court distinguished cases in which mootness resulted from an independent event or a later lead-case decision. Here, mootness preceded the CJEU judgment and flowed directly from the injunction combined with the expiry of the transfer period. [33][24]
The Court accepted that the Applicant had not established the ultimate merits of the legal arguments advanced, and that a core issue was later decided against him. Nevertheless, those matters did not erase the success achieved through the contested interlocutory application. [37][38][39]
Following the approach in A.A., M.I., R.O. v. Minister for Justice, and relying on judicial consistency and comity, the Court concluded that a 50% costs award fairly balanced the Applicant’s practical success against the absence of ultimate vindication on the legal merits. [16][40][32]
Holding and Implications
The Applicant was awarded 50% of the costs of the leave and interlocutory-relief applications up to the date on which the proceedings became moot. [41]
The Court also expressed the preliminary view that the Applicant should receive the costs of the costs application, subject to any further submissions within the specified period. [42]
The decision applies the existing principles concerning costs in moot proceedings to the particular circumstances of an injunction that secured the practical outcome sought. It does not establish a new precedent; its direct effect is the partial costs award in favour of the Applicant. [32][39]