Uddin, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

The Applicant was sentenced in the Crown Court to nine years’ imprisonment for causing serious injury by dangerous driving and doing acts tending and intended to pervert the course of public justice. The offences arose after the Applicant drove over the Victim, causing life-threatening injuries, and subsequently made extensive attempts from prison to persuade her to support a false account. [1][2][3][4]

The Applicant pleaded guilty to both offences. The driving offence attracted four-and-a-half years’ imprisonment, and the perverting-the-course-of-justice offence attracted a consecutive sentence of four-and-a-half years. He was also disqualified from driving for four-and-a-half years and until passing an extended re-test. [3]

This was a renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence following refusal by the Single Judge. [1]

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentence imposed for perverting the course of justice was too high. [5]
2. Whether the consecutive sentences failed to take account of the principle of totality, making the overall sentence manifestly excessive. [5]

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant’s Arguments

• The starting point for the perverting-the-course-of-justice offence should have been towards the bottom of the category 1A range. Although level A culpability was accepted, the conduct was said to be unsophisticated and the underlying driving offence not of the utmost seriousness. [6][7]
• The Applicant argued that his communications did not substantially change the Victim’s account, that she willingly participated and at times led the creation of alternative accounts, and that the attempted-murder trial could have proceeded without awaiting the separate investigation. [8][9]
• The increase from the four-year guideline starting point to six years was said to be unjustified and disproportionate. The Applicant also argued that the sentence should bear a reasonable relationship to the seriousness of the underlying offending. [10][11][12][13]
• The Applicant accepted that consecutive sentences were justified in principle but submitted that a further reduction should have been made for totality and explained in the sentencing remarks. [14]

Table of Precedents Cited

Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

The Court accepted that the driving offence merited the statutory maximum sentence of five years before credit for the guilty plea, and noted that this sentence was not challenged. [18]

For the perverting-the-course-of-justice offence, the Court considered the seriousness of the charge originally faced—attempted murder, carrying life imprisonment—rather than focusing solely on the lesser offence to which the Applicant ultimately pleaded guilty. [15]

The conduct was very serious because it continued over a sustained period and concerned a serious underlying offence. The Court also upheld the findings of serious impact on the administration of justice and substantial delay. The Victim’s participation did not reduce the seriousness; her having been persuaded to support the false account, ultimately leading to her arrest, was viewed as aggravating. [19]

The Court held that multiple culpability and harm factors justified increasing the four-year category 1A starting point. The Applicant’s previous extended sentence for serious wounding offences, and the fact that the present offences were committed while he was on licence, were additional serious aggravating factors. [20]

Consecutive sentences were accepted to be appropriate. Applying the principle in R v Bailey, the Court held that the sentencing judge’s indication that totality had been considered was sufficient. [16][17]

Standing back and assessing the overall criminality, the Court concluded that the total sentence of nine years was just and proportionate and was not manifestly excessive or wrong in principle. [21]

Holding and Implications

REFUSED: The renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused. [22]

The nine-year sentence therefore remained in force. The opinion does not state broader implications or establish a new precedent beyond applying the existing sentencing principles identified above. [21][22]