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Probert, R. v

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant appealed, with permission, against a discretionary life sentence with a minimum term of four years and two months for wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm under section 18 of the Offences Against the Persons Act 1861. He also received concurrent sentences for strangulation and possession of an offensive weapon. [1]

The offence occurred at Company A, a massage business in The City. The Appellant attacked the victim with a hammer, strangled her, and remained at the premises until police arrived. The victim sustained head, ear, neck, arm, hand and shoulder injuries and required hospital treatment. [2][3][4][5]

The Appellant initially pleaded guilty to a section 20 wounding offence and the related offences, but pleaded guilty to the section 18 offence on the first day of trial. [6]

At sentencing, the Crown Court concluded that the Appellant was dangerous and that neither a determinate nor an extended sentence adequately addressed the risk of serious future harm. The Appellant appealed only against the imposition of the life sentence. [7][8][9][10][11]

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the seriousness of the offence and associated offences justified a discretionary sentence of life imprisonment under section 285 of the Sentencing Act 2020. [12][13]
  2. Whether the life sentence was manifestly excessive in light of the Appellant’s age, previous good character, lack of previous convictions, and the injuries sustained. [12][14][15]

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • The Appellant accepted that he was dangerous and that an extended sentence was appropriate, but argued that a life sentence was not justified under section 285(3) of the Sentencing Act 2020. [12]
  • He submitted that the injuries were relatively minor in the context of a section 18 offence, and relied on his age, lack of previous convictions and the isolated nature of the incident. [12]
  • He argued that he had shown some restraint, including by not using greater force with the hammer and by stopping the attack before the victim’s family arrived. [12][14]
  • He submitted that the duration and level of danger should be assessed from the facts of the offence and were insufficient to justify a sentence of last resort. [14]

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Attorney-General's Reference No 27 of 2013 (R v Burinskas) The approach to discretionary life sentences under the Sentencing Act 2020. The sentencing judge followed the approach in the precedent when assessing dangerousness and whether the seriousness of the offence justified life imprisonment. The Court of Appeal found no error in that approach. [13]

Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

The Court of Appeal considered that the sentencing exercise was difficult but that the judge had given meticulous and detailed reasons. The judge had correctly considered dangerousness and was entitled to proceed to assess whether the seriousness of the offences justified a life sentence. [13]

The court upheld the finding that the attack was premeditated. The evidence included the Appellant’s refusal to provide his name, payment in cash and efforts to keep his hood up within view of the CCTV. [16][17]

The court rejected the submission that the Appellant had voluntarily desisted. The victim had broken free from the stranglehold and had run to the door, while the Appellant continued to hold the hammer. [16]

The sentencing judge had properly considered the Appellant’s young age, lack of previous convictions and positive character evidence. Nevertheless, the bizarre attack, lack of insight and empathy, and inability or unwillingness to explain his conduct created significant difficulty in assessing when the risk of similar offending would reduce. [18]

The psychiatric evidence did not identify the Appellant’s motivation or provide a reliable indication of when the risk would diminish. Although the Appellant was diagnosed with autism, the psychiatrists did not link that diagnosis to the offence and identified no co-existing mental disorder. [19][20]

Because the duration of the risk could not reliably be estimated, the judge was entitled to conclude that a determinate or extended sentence might expire while the Appellant remained a significant danger. The life sentence was therefore not manifestly excessive. [10][21][18][15]

Holding and Implications

Appeal dismissed. The discretionary life sentence was upheld, including the minimum term, which was not challenged. [21][15]

The decision confirms the direct effect of the life sentence on the Appellant. The Court emphasised that such a sentence is exceptionally unusual for a young first-time offender with positive character evidence, and stated that this case turns on its own extraordinary facts. No broader new precedent was set. [9][15]

The court also clarified that the applicable statutory surcharge was £228, rather than the earlier amount announced in court. [22][23][24]

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Probert, R. v

Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Justice Licence v1.0.

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Probert, R. v
(Jul 9, 2026)