P.M. v The Director Of Public Prosecutions (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

The case arose from an alleged group assault on a street in the City on 22 February 2022, after an altercation involving eggs, with the injured party said to have been attacked by a group of young persons. The Applicant was identified early from CCTV, interviewed voluntarily in March 2022, later found unsuitable for youth diversion in April 2024, and was charged only after he had turned 18 with violent disorder and assault causing harm. The Children Court accepted jurisdiction in the cases of younger co-accused arising from the same incident, while the Applicant and other adults were remanded for service of a book of evidence and sent forward for trial. The Applicant then sought judicial review to prohibit the prosecution, and leave and a stay were granted pending determination. [Para 24][Para 25][Para 26][Para 28][Para 29][Para 30][Para 32][Para 33][Para 34]

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the delay in investigating and prosecuting the Applicant was blameworthy, having regard to the heightened duty of expedition in cases involving children and the time taken in the diversion process. [Para 15][Para 16][Para 35][Para 36][Para 63][Para 66]
2. Whether that delay caused prejudice of sufficient gravity—particularly through loss of child-specific protections under the 2001 Act, including summary disposal under s. 75, anonymity, and a lower sentencing ceiling—to justify prohibition of the prosecution. [Para 16][Para 17][Para 40][Para 43][Para 51][Para 73][Para 97][Para 103]

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

• The Applicant submitted that children cases attract a heightened duty of expedition and relied on earlier authorities to argue for a two-stage test: blameworthy delay first, then balancing of prejudice against the public interest in prosecution. [Para 41][Para 42]
• He argued that the delay was unexplained and unjustified, including the lengthy youth-diversion process, and said the relevant investigation had substantially ended in March 2022. [Para 42][Para 37]
• He contended that the loss of s. 75 summary-disposal protection, anonymity, and child-specific sentencing options caused serious prejudice, especially because the Children Court had accepted jurisdiction for younger co-accused from the same incident. [Para 43][Para 45][Para 46][Para 48][Para 51]
• He argued that comparator evidence from those co-accused showed a real prospect that the Children Court would also have accepted jurisdiction in his case, and that the resulting exposure to a higher maximum sentence made prohibition appropriate. [Para 46][Para 47][Para 48][Para 49]

Respondent's Arguments

• The Respondent submitted that delay alone was not enough to justify prohibition and that the remedy is exceptional, requiring serious prejudice and truly exceptional circumstances. [Para 35][Para 36][Para 52]
• It argued that the main alleged prejudice—the loss of a s. 75 hearing and summary disposal—was speculative and not decisive, because the High Court should not guess what the Children Court would have done. [Para 53][Para 54][Para 56][Para 57]
• The Respondent said the Applicant had not shown actual trial prejudice, as no evidence was lost and no witnesses were unavailable, and any sentencing prejudice could be addressed by the Circuit Court taking account of age and maturity. [Para 57][Para 58][Para 101][Para 103]
• It also contended that the loss of anonymity could be addressed by a Gilchrist-type reporting-restriction order. [Para 36][Para 87][Para 99][Para 106]

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first identified the relevant delay period in an aged-out case as the period ending on the Applicant’s eighteenth birthday, because that was when the loss of child-specific protections crystallised. It found the delay blameworthy: the Applicant had been identified and interviewed in March 2022, but the file was not sent to the Respondent until three days before his eighteenth birthday, and the diversion referral period and later inactivity were not satisfactorily explained. [Para 63][Para 64][Para 65][Para 66]

The court then applied the Donoghue/Doe/Brophy line of authority. It accepted that the loss of s. 75 and the resulting increase in sentencing exposure amounted to some prejudice, and it accepted that comparator evidence from younger co-accused gave rise to a reasonable possibility that the Children Court might have taken jurisdiction had the Applicant remained a child. But it stressed that s. 75 decisions are individual, depend on age and maturity, and should not be reconstructed by speculation. [Para 70][Para 71][Para 72][Para 73][Para 78][Para 81][Para 86][Para 88][Para 93]

Balancing that prejudice against the seriousness of the charges, the continuing possibility of a fair trial, the absence of any lost evidence or unavailable witnesses, and the fact that the Circuit Court must impose an individualized and proportionate sentence taking account of the Applicant’s age and culpability, the court held that the prejudice was not grave enough to justify prohibition. The loss of anonymity could also be addressed by an appropriate reporting-restriction order. [Para 87][Para 97][Para 98][Para 99][Para 101][Para 103]

Holding and Implications

Refused. The court refused to restrain the Applicant’s further prosecution, although it accepted that the delay was excessive and blameworthy. The immediate consequence is that the prosecution continues, subject to any later reporting-restriction order and consequential directions on costs. [Para 105][Para 106]