Minister For Justice, Home Affairs and Migration v Voronenko (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application by the Applicant for the surrender of the Respondent to the issuing state pursuant to section 16 of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003, on foot of a European Arrest Warrant dated 19 March 2026 issued by the Deputy Chief Prosecutor of the Department of Criminal Prosecution of the Prosecutor General's Office of the issuing state. The Respondent was arrested on 2 April 2026 on foot of a SIS alert and brought before the High Court; the warrant was produced on 8 April 2026. Identity was not contested. The warrant is an accusation warrant seeking surrender for prosecution for three alleged offences: (1) unlawfully acquiring a bank card in another's name (ticked as "forgery of means of payment"); (2) using that bank card for contactless payments on 27 January 2026 (corresponding to use of a false instrument under section 26 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001); and (3) on 13 March 2024 intentionally pushing and knocking over a mobile speed detection device at an address in The City, causing pecuniary damage recorded in the warrant as 4,2544.21 EUR. Minimum gravity for each offence is met. The Respondent, a national of the issuing state, filed a notice of objection on 18 June 2026 and the matter was heard on 19 June 2026. Two specific points were raised by the Respondent: (a) proof that the Deputy Chief Prosecutor who issued the warrant was competent to do so; and (b) that correspondence with the domestic offence of criminal damage (section 2 of the Criminal Damage Act 1991) is not established in respect of the third offence.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the issuing authority (the Deputy Chief Prosecutor of the Department of Criminal Prosecution of the Prosecutor General's Office of the issuing state) was competent to issue the warrant such that the warrant must be accepted for execution.
2. Whether the particulars in the warrant concerning the third alleged offence (intentional pushing and knocking over of a mobile speed detection device) correspond to an offence in this jurisdiction (criminal damage contrary to section 2 of the Criminal Damage Act 1991).

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

• The warrant was validly issued by a judicial authority in the issuing state and the issuing office shown on the warrant is competent.
• The first offence corresponds to forgery of means of payment; the second corresponds to use of a false instrument under section 26 of the 2001 Act; the third corresponds to criminal damage contrary to section 2 of the 1991 Act because the warrant alleges an intentional push that knocked over and damaged the device and there is no basis from the warrant for a lawful excuse.
• The particulars at Part E satisfy section 11 of the 2003 Act and enable correspondence to be determined and the Respondent to know the case against him.

Respondent's Arguments

• Initially sought proof of competence of the Deputy Chief Prosecutor to issue the warrant, though this point was not pressed at hearing.
• Contended that correspondence is not made out for the third offence because the warrant does not establish that damage was intended (or caused recklessly) and does not exclude a lawful excuse; reliance was placed on Minister for Justice and Equality v. Marjasz to argue that such inferences cannot be drawn from limited particulars.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Judge Gillane accepted the Respondent's identity and that the warrant is an accusation warrant seeking surrender for prosecution on three offences with sufficient maximum penalties to satisfy minimum gravity. The competence objection (that the Deputy Chief Prosecutor lacked authority) was not pressed at hearing; applying the mutual‑trust reasoning in Minister for Justice v. Garbenis and the Court of Appeal's approach in Firantas, the court found no substance to the competence point and was satisfied the warrant had been issued by a judicial authority in the issuing state.

On correspondence for the third offence, the court applied the established test from Dolny: read the warrant as a whole and ask whether the acts alleged would constitute an offence in this jurisdiction. The court distinguished Marjasz because, unlike that case where the warrant merely alleged property was "destroyed", the instant warrant expressly alleges that the Respondent intentionally pushed the device with his hand and thereby knocked it over and damaged it. There was nothing in the warrant suggesting any lawful excuse. Applying the description-objectives articulated in Cahill, the court concluded the particulars in Part E were adequate and that the alleged acts would constitute criminal damage contrary to section 2 of the Criminal Damage Act 1991 if committed here. The court further found that the requirements of section 11 of the 2003 Act were met and that no bars to surrender under sections 22–24 or other Part 3 grounds applied.

Holding and Implications

ORDER FOR SURRENDER

The court rejected the Respondent's objections and ordered that the Respondent be surrendered to such person as is duly authorised to receive him on behalf of the issuing state. The direct effect is that the Respondent will be surrendered for prosecution on the offences specified in the warrant; the judgment does not purport to create a new legal precedent beyond application of existing authorities on correspondence and the competence of issuing prosecutorial authorities.