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Association Of Optometrists Ireland and Ors v Minister For Social Protection and Ors (Approved)
Smart Summary
Summary of Judgment
Factual and Procedural Background
The proceedings were brought by Company A (a representative association of optometrists) together with individual practitioners (collectively, the Plaintiffs) against Defendant 1 (the Minister responsible for social protection), Defendant 2 (the Minister responsible for health) and Company A (a public health body). The dispute concerned two statutory schemes (the Treatment Benefit Scheme ("TBS") and the Community Optometric Services Scheme ("COSS")) under which optometry services are paid by Defendant 1 by reference to fee scales. The Plaintiffs alleged delay and failure by Defendant 1 to complete a consultation process and make Regulations under section 42 of the Public Service Pay and Pensions Act 2017 ("the 2017 Act"), seeking declarations, an order directing completion of the consultations, and damages (including quantum meruit).
The Plaintiffs issued a motion on the same day as the plenary summons seeking an order directing Defendant 1 and/or Defendant 2 to complete the section 42 consultation forthwith. While the interlocutory motion was pending, Defendant 1 (with the consent of the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform) made Statutory Instrument 24 of 2026 (the 2026 Regulations), resulting in increased TBS fees. The interlocutory motion became moot as a result. The sole issue for decision in this judgment was the allocation of costs of that interlocutory motion.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether and on what basis costs should be awarded in respect of an interlocutory motion that has become moot due to a supervening act (the making of the 2026 Regulations).
- Whether the costs of the interlocutory motion should be awarded to the Plaintiffs, against Defendant 1, reserved to trial, or otherwise disposed of.
- Whether a separate order for costs should be made in favour of Defendant 2 on the basis that she was improperly included in the motion.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiffs' Arguments
- The Plaintiffs contended that the making of the 2026 Regulations achieved the object of their interlocutory application and that an order for costs should be made in their favour.
- The Plaintiffs emphasised delay and a pattern of inaction by the Defendants in relation to the section 42 process, and maintained claims for damages that depend on that alleged delay.
Defendants' Arguments
- The Defendants contended that Defendant 2 (the health minister) had been improperly named as a respondent to the motion and should have her costs.
- As regards Defendant 1, the Defendants argued that no order should be made, or alternatively that costs should be reserved to trial or made costs in the cause, because the consultation process had, they said, concluded earlier and the subsequent Regulations were part of the statutory process rather than a concession.
- The Defendants emphasised that section 42 Regulations require the consent of the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform and that that Minister was not a party to the proceedings.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Hughes v Revenue Commissioners [2023] 3 IR 393 |
Murray J's analysis identifying three broad propositions on mootness and costs (circumstances outside parties' control; unilateral acts of a party; special care for acts of statutory bodies). |
The court adopted and summarised those three propositions as the governing framework for assessing costs where proceedings or motions become moot. |
| Dubcap Ltd v Microchip Ltd (Unreported, Supreme Court, 9 December 1997) |
Principle that costs of interlocutory applications which will be revisited at trial should ordinarily be reserved or made costs in the cause. |
Used with other authorities to support the proposition that interlocutory costs are often best decided at trial rather than at interlocutory stage. |
| AIB v Diamond (Unreported, High Court (Clarke J), 7 November 2011) |
Authority on costs in interlocutory applications being reserved or costs in the cause where the substantive issue remains to be tried. |
Relied upon as part of the line of authority justifying costs in the cause for interlocutory motions which overlap with trial issues. |
| ACC Bank plc v Hanrahan [2014] 1 IR 1 |
Application of the same principles in the context of summary judgment applications. |
Supported the court's view that deciding interlocutory costs before a full trial risks injustice; thus costs should ordinarily be reserved or made costs in the cause. |
| Keogh v AV Pound Co. Ltd [2021] IEHC 640 |
Case addressing an interlocutory injunction that became moot and the appropriateness of making costs in the cause rather than awarding immediate costs. |
The judgment was discussed and followed on principle; Keogh was applied as a comparable instance where costs in the cause were ordered because the substantive dispute remained for trial. |
| Cunningham v. President of the Circuit Court [2012] 3 I.R. 222 |
Example where substantive proceedings were rendered moot (by nolle prosequi) and how that bore on costs. |
Cited in Keogh and considered in distinguishing types of mootness where immediate costs orders may be appropriate. |
| Godsil v. Ireland [2015] 4 I.R. 535 |
Example where repeal of impugned legislation rendered substantive challenge moot and was treated as an acknowledgment of the challenge's validity. |
Used in Keogh to illustrate cases where the change in law may justify a different costs outcome than in interlocutory-only mootness. |
| Naughton v Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland [2025] IEHC 124 |
An interlocutory motion became moot through unilateral acts of defendants; costs were awarded to the plaintiff where the substantive action was also rendered moot and express findings were made. |
Distinguished by the court on the basis that in Naughton the substantive action was also moot and the court had made express findings; the present case was different because substantive claims remained for trial. |
| Hughes v. Revenue Commissioners [2021] IECA 5 |
Authority cited in Keogh concerning dissolution of the legal basis for a claim. |
Referenced in discussion of cases where the substantive legal basis dissolves and different costs consequences may follow. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Judge O'Connell analysed the question of costs against established propositions about mootness (derived from Murray J's analysis in Hughes). The court distinguished between: (a) cases where the substantive action is wholly moot, (b) interlocutory motions that concern issues not revisited at trial, and (c) interlocutory motions raising issues that will be revisited at trial. For the third category the authorities support reserving costs or making them costs in the cause to avoid pre-judging matters that the trial judge will be better placed to assess.
Applying that framework, the court found that the interlocutory motion had become moot because Defendant 1 made the 2026 Regulations, thereby achieving the practical objective of the motion. Crucially, however, the substantive proceedings were not disposed of: the Plaintiffs maintained claims for damages and alleged unlawful delay or failure by Defendant 1 in conducting the section 42 process. That overlapping substantive controversy remained for trial and could not be resolved fairly on the basis of the interlocutory materials.
The court rejected the proposition that the making of the 2026 Regulations should be treated as an admission that the interlocutory motion was well-founded. The competing factual and legal contentions about whether consultations had concluded earlier, and whether the Regulations were merely the exercise of statutory functions, were matters for trial. For those reasons, and to avoid risking injustice by allocating interlocutory costs prematurely, the court concluded that the proper course was to make the costs of the interlocutory motion costs in the cause as between the Plaintiffs and Defendant 1.
As to Defendant 2, the court concluded that no separate costs order should be made in her favour. Although the interlocutory relief could not have been ordered against Defendant 2, she was represented by the same legal team and the issue of her non-involvement did not appreciably add to the costs of the motion.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The costs of the interlocutory motion are ordered to be costs in the cause.
Implications:
- The order preserves the parties' rights to seek costs at the final hearing: if the Plaintiffs ultimately succeed at trial their costs of the interlocutory motion may follow that success; if the Defendants prevail, the converse will apply.
- No separate costs order is made in favour of Defendant 2.
- The decision does not decide the substantive merits and does not purport to create a new legal principle beyond applying established authorities on mootness and interlocutory costs.
Judge: Judge O'Connell
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