| Flanagan v. UCD [1988] I.R. 724 |
Authority on reviewability of university decisions. |
Listed among authorities on amenability; considered in general survey of case law. |
| Rajah v. Royal College of Surgeons [1994] 1 I.R. 384 |
Distinction between private/academic judgment and reviewable functions (discipline may be reviewable). |
Relied on in assessing whether university decisions were public in character or private; informed comparison with other cases. |
| Zhang v. Athlone Institute of Technology [2013] IEHC 390 |
Amenability to review where statutory source or disciplinary function exists. |
Used to illustrate prior findings where disciplinary functions gave rise to reviewability. |
| Fassi v. Dublin City University [2015] IEHC 38 |
University decisions not reviewable where private/academic; exceptions where public element exists. |
Cited as part of the line of authority on amenability and exceptions. |
| Galbraith v. Dublin City University [2022] IEHC 520 |
Decision that academic/degree progression matters were not amenable to judicial review. |
Identified as a closely analogous case supporting non‑amenability; court compared facts and found differences but noted resemblance. |
| Shatter v. Guerin [2021] 2 I.R. 415 |
Consideration of source of power relevant to amenability. |
Not relied on by parties but noted by the court as relevant to the inquiry into source of powers. |
| O'Donnell v. Tipperary South Riding County Council [2005] 2 I.R. 483 |
Public/private distinction; Denham J.'s observations on burden to show a private contract‑derived duty. |
Quoted to explain the approach to whether a function is manifestly private. |
| Beirne (per Finlay C.J.) (cited within O'Donnell) |
Principle that duties manifestly private and deriving solely from contract are outside judicial review. |
Adopted to frame the legal test on source and nature of the power. |
| Quinn v. King's Inns [2004] 4 I.R. 344 |
Examination/academic decision deriving from institute rules may be private/contractual. |
Applied to distinguish disciplinary or statutory functions from private academic decisions. |
| Re Malone's Application [1998] N.I. 67 |
Consideration of nature of power as well as its source. |
Referenced to support analysis that nature of power matters for amenability. |
| Geoghegan v. Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland [1995] 3 I.R. 86 |
Disciplinary functions may be subject to review. |
Distinguished from purely academic/examination functions in the court's analysis. |
| Connelly v. An Bord Pleanála [2021] 2 I.R. 752 |
Requirement for reasoned decisions in administrative law. |
Applied in assessing sufficiency and timeliness of the Visitors' written reasons. |
| Crayden v. Sea Fisheries Protection Authority [2017] 3 I.R. 785 |
Example of a classic multistage decision process. |
Used to contrast the present case's structure (stages were largely self‑standing). |
| Arthropharm (Europe) Limited v. the Health Products Regulatory Authority [2022] IECA 109 |
Principles on alternative remedies, time limits, collateral attack and when internal remedies bar judicial review. |
Invoked to explain the discretionary bar where adequate alternative remedies exist and to frame the court's approach to earlier stages. |
| Finnerty v. Western Health Board [1998] IEHC 143 |
Time begins to run when the final decision is made; reiteration that reiterations are not new decisions. |
Quoted (via Arthropharm) on the point that a reiteration is not a new decision for time running purposes. |
| Independent Newspapers plc v. IA [2020] IECA 19 |
Rule against collateral attack in multi‑stage decision making. |
Applied to support limitation of challenges to later decisions where earlier decisions could have been challenged in time. |
| Sweetman v. An Bord Pleanála [2018] 2 IR 250 |
Principle preventing collateral challenges to earlier decisions after time has expired. |
Reinforced the court's view on collateral attack and finality of earlier stages. |
| Amariei v. The Chief Appeals Officer [2026] IESC 22 |
Comprehensive restatement: applicants must exhaust alternative remedies; only exceptional fundamental denials of justice permit judicial review despite alternatives. |
Applied as binding authority on alternative remedies; led the court to limit review to the Visitors' decision. |
| AB v. Chief International Protection Officer [2026] IESC 23 |
Complementary authority on adequacy of alternative remedies and when judicial review is exceptional. |
Referenced in explaining the standard for when review may be permitted despite alternative remedies. |
| Glencore Energy UK Limited v. Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2017] 4 WLR 213 |
Illustration of refusal of judicial review where statutory alternative remedies exist unless exceptional abuse of power. |
Used to exemplify appellate versus judicial review relationship when alternatives exist. |
| In re Preston [1985] AC 835 |
Authority relied on in the Glencore discussion regarding exceptional circumstances. |
Referred to in the court's consideration of when judicial review may supplant statutory routes. |
| Stefan v. Minister for Justice (dicta cited) |
Earlier dicta about fairness of initial hearing and appeal; discussed and limited by later authorities. |
Noted as potentially misleading if relied upon without the qualification provided by Amariei. |
| The State (Stanbridge) v. Mahon |
Context for limits on using judicial review to cure defective appealable processes. |
Referred to in the discussion of the scope of judicial review versus appeal. |
| Corrigan v. Irish Land Commission [1977] I.R. 317 |
Applicant cannot raise matters in judicial review that were not raised at first instance. |
Applied to confine the court to issues that were presented to the Visitors. |