Summary of Opinion by Judge [Last Name]

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff brought a petition for judicial review against two public bodies (referred to below as Company A and Company B). The Lord Ordinary delivered an ex tempore decision on 27 April 2026, holding that the petition was time-barred under section 27A(1)(a) of the Court of Session Act 1988 and declining to extend time under section 27A(1)(b) in relation to Company A; permission to proceed was granted in part against Company B. The interlocutor embodying the decision, with an appended note of reasons, was not signed and issued until 6 May 2026. The Plaintiff intimated a reclaiming motion on 11 May 2026 and lodged it on 13 May 2026. The respondents opposed reception of the reclaiming motion on the preliminary ground that it was late. The court determined whether the 7-day time limit in section 27D commenced on the date of the ex tempore decision or on the date the interlocutor was signed and issued, and whether the reclaiming motion should be received.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the 7-day period in section 27D of the Court of Session Act 1988 begins on the date of the ex tempore decision or on the date when the interlocutor is signed and issued.
2. Whether the court may permit reception of a reclaiming motion lodged after the 7-day statutory period, including by application of the Rules of the Court of Session (dispensing powers).
3. Whether section 27D applies where the Lord Ordinary has held that the petition is time-barred under section 27A.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

• The Plaintiff could not validly reclaim until the interlocutor was received; court staff had indicated the interlocutor would be issued and the Plaintiff awaited that document.
• Administrative delay (including communications about fixing hearing dates) caused the lateness; the delay was not the Plaintiff's fault.
• The Plaintiff suffers from health issues including dyslexia, which affected her ability to process the procedure and the requirement to include the interlocutor in the reclaiming print.
• The Plaintiff asserted she followed the procedural guidance provided by court staff and therefore the reclaiming motion should be received.

Respondents' Arguments

• The 7-day period under section 27D began on 27 April 2026, the date of the ex tempore decision, which also became the interlocutor date.
• The statutory provision prescribes a strict 7-day limit and the court cannot use the Rules of the Court of Session (such as RCS 2.1) to extend or dispense with that statutory period.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first considered whether the 7-day period in section 27D begins on the date of an ex tempore decision or on the date the interlocutor is signed and issued. The court observed statutory wording that the period begins "on the day on which the Court makes its decision," which could point to the ex tempore date, but recognised modern practice sometimes results in interlocutors being signed and issued later. The Rules of the Court of Session (Chapter 38) refer repeatedly to reclaiming against an interlocutor and require a reclaiming print containing the interlocutor, which can make timely lodging impossible if the interlocutor is not yet issued.

The court reviewed authorities showing two analytical routes: (a) treating the statutory time limit as immune from rules-based dispensing powers (as in Case G), and (b) treating the statutory limit as subject to the court's general dispensing power in RCS 2.1 in appropriate cases, subject to a high "all reasonably could" test (as in Case H and Case I). The court noted a potential anomaly if Chapter 38 did not clearly deal with statutory time limits and observed that RCS 38.10 might arguably be read to cover statutory reclaiming days, but declined to resolve that broader issue in this case.

On the facts, the interlocutor was signed and issued on 6 May 2026, nine days after the ex tempore decision. The administrative delay in issuing the interlocutor, caused by fixing hearing dates, meant the Plaintiff could not practically comply with a 7-day deadline measured from 27 April. Applying a fair and pragmatic interpretation of section 27D in these exceptional circumstances, the court held the time limit should be treated as running from the date the interlocutor was signed and issued. The court therefore received the reclaiming motion as lodged on 13 May 2026. The court also refused the Plaintiff's request for urgent disposal, finding no exceptional reason to grant urgency.

Holding and Implications

RECLAIMING MOTION RECEIVED

Holding: The court granted the Plaintiff's motion that the reclaiming motion be received, treating the 7-day period in section 27D as commencing from the date the interlocutor was signed and issued in the exceptional circumstances of this case. The Plaintiff's request for urgent disposal was refused. The respondents were ordered liable in the expenses of this motion.

Implications: The direct effect is that the Plaintiff's reclaiming motion will proceed; the decision turned on the particular procedural delay in issuing the interlocutor and the court's pragmatic interpretation of section 27D in these circumstances. The court did not definitively resolve the broader question whether Chapter 38 or RCS 38.10 generally permits relief for failure to comply with statutory reclaiming periods; the opinion noted that the Inner House could clarify that point in a future case.