| M. v. M. [2019] IECA 124, [2019] 2 IR 402 |
Judge should not be named in title of judicial review where relief does not allege mala fides; parties to be joined instead. |
Used to justify removing the Circuit Court judge from the title and substituting the Defendant as respondent. |
| Director of Public Prosecutions v. Gordon [2024] IESC 29 |
An appeal from District Court to Circuit Court is a full rehearing; Circuit Court not confined to District Court findings. |
Supported the proposition that the Circuit Court reheard the case afresh and that District Court findings did not bind it. |
| Director of Public Prosecutions v. Pires [2018] IESC 51, [2019] 1 ILRM 248 |
Limits of High Court role on case stated appeals and review of facts. |
Referenced in explaining differences between appeal mechanisms and limits of factual review. |
| Clifford v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2013] IESC 43, [2013] 2 IR 396 |
Distinction between appeal by rehearing and case stated; case stated confined to points of law. |
Explained that rehearing precludes binding effect of first-instance factual findings. |
| D.S. v. Judges of Cork Circuit Court [2008] IESC 37, [2008] 4 IR 379 |
Nature of autrefois convict/acquit and requirement of a prior final verdict. |
Applied to show no prior acquittal or conviction existed in first instance that would bar later proceedings. |
| Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 1254 |
Principles for determining whether later proceedings are the same or substantially the same offence. |
Adopted in assessing whether the later conviction related to the same offence as earlier proceedings. |
| O'Leary v. Cunningham [1980] IR 367 |
Considerations regarding lesser or alternative verdicts and effect on double jeopardy. |
Referenced in discussing the availability of alternative verdicts and limitations on atomising charges. |
| People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. Flynn [2026] IESC 21 |
Restatement of principles concerning identity of offences for double jeopardy purposes. |
Used to reinforce the approach to whether subsequent proceedings concern the same or substantially the same offence. |
| Sweeney v. Brophy [1993] 2 IR 202 |
Adjudication lacking jurisdiction cannot ground double jeopardy. |
Explained that prior adjudication must be by a court of competent jurisdiction to engage double jeopardy. |
| Lynch v. Moran [2006] IESC 31, [2006] 3 IR 389 |
Issue estoppel has no role in Irish criminal law; mutuality requirement; unitary character of criminal trial. |
Applied to reject contention that District Court findings could give rise to issue estoppel bound on appeal. |
| People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. Crawford [2024] IESC 44 |
Section 18 test operates in two stages: subjective honest belief and objective assessment of reasonableness in the believed circumstances. |
Central authority for correct formulation of s.18; used to find the trial judge misdirected himself by treating the inquiry as purely objective. |
| Crawford [2023] IECA 87 |
Formulation of s.18 test approved by Supreme Court; sample jury direction. |
Quoted to demonstrate required emphasis on accused's perspective and honest belief before assessing objective reasonableness. |
| Director of Public Prosecutions v. Doyle [1994] 2 IR 286 |
Disclosure entitles accused to relevant witness statements. |
Referenced to show accused had received witness statements and was on notice of allegations. |
| Director of Public Prosecutions v. P.R. [2020] IECA 68 |
Cross‑examination is fundamental but subject to limits; trial judge may disallow improper or irrelevant questions. |
Used to frame permissible scope of judicial intervention in cross‑examination. |
| People (DPP) v. A.H. [2022] IECA 156 |
Circumstances in which judge may question or intervene; care to avoid impression of partiality. |
Applied to evaluate whether the trial judge's questions exceeded permissible intervention. |
| O'Neill v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2025] IEHC 8 |
Excessive judicial intervention in cross‑examination can render a trial unfair and justify judicial review. |
Used as example where judicial review has succeeded on grounds of unfair trial due to judicial intervention. |
| Lennon v. District Judge Clifford [1996] 2 IR 590 |
Limits on judicial review where complaint is essentially about evidential sufficiency; appeals are the appropriate remedy. |
Referenced to caution against treating judicial review as a disguised appeal on facts. |
| Buckley v. Kirby [2000] 3 IR 431 |
Judicial review inappropriate where appeal is available and complaint concerns insufficiency of evidence. |
Cited in discussion of limits to judicial review in criminal matters. |
| Sweeney v. Fahy [2014] IESC 50 |
Summarises principles limiting judicial review in criminal proceedings; error must be fundamental to be unlawful. |
Applied to distinguish errors of fact from fundamental legal errors amenable to judicial review. |
| Killeen v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1997] 3 IR 218 |
A court may exceed jurisdiction by failing to determine the precise question assigned to it. |
Relied upon to characterise the trial judge's misdirection on s.18 as a jurisdictional error. |
| Donoghue v. Judge O'Donoghue [2018] IECA 26, [2020] 3 IR 399 |
Obiter that a party may seek correction where a lower court applied an incorrect statutory interpretation. |
Supported entitlement to correction and remittal where statutory interpretation is incorrect. |
| McGonagle v. District Court for District No. 1 [2023] IEHC 207 |
Issues concerning availability of remittal to lower court after quashing. |
Noted as authority on potential anterior question whether remittal is available. |
| Dawson v. Irish Brokers Association [2002] IESC 36, [2002] 2 ILRM 210 |
Recoverable costs for a litigant in person exclude value of the litigant's time and labour. |
Applied to limit recoverable costs to outlays, excluding the Plaintiff's own time or labour. |
| Skoczylas v. Minister for Finance [2024] IECA 201 |
Recent authority on recoverable costs principles. |
Referenced to support costs conclusions. |