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Hussain, R. v
Smart Summary
Summary of Judgment
Factual and Procedural Background
On 20 May 2025, after a seven-day jury trial at the Crown Court in The City before Judge Kay, the Appellant was convicted of murder (count 1) and acquitted on count 2 (possession of an article with a blade or point). On 23 May 2025 the Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 21 years (less time on remand). With leave of a single judge, the Appellant appealed against conviction; there was no appeal against sentence.
The offence related to the stabbing death on 15 August 2024 of the Victim at the communal area of [Number] Main Street in The City. CCTV showed the Appellant arriving on an e-scooter and interacting with the Victim shortly before they both entered the building. Shortly thereafter the Appellant was seen running out while the Victim, carrying a walking stick, was bleeding heavily and later died from a single stab wound to the neck. No weapon was recovered. The Appellant denied stabbing the Victim, gave an account involving being struck by the Victim in the communal hallway and seeing an unknown third party, and then fleeing. The Appellant took steps to evade arrest and was arrested on 20 August 2024. Post-mortem evidence described a single deep stab wound severing the left jugular vein; no defensive injuries consistent with a struggle were identified.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial judge should have directed the jury on the law of self-defence and therefore left self-defence as a possible basis for acquittal.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The evidence disclosed a prima facie case of self-defence which should have been left to the jury, citing authority that self-defence must be left if evidence that, if accepted, raises such a case.
- The Appellant's account of being struck by the Victim, the observed aggressiveness by the Victim on CCTV, the Appellant's injuries, and the single limited stab wound were said to support a possible spontaneous defensive reaction.
- It was submitted that unlawfulness was an element for the prosecution to prove and that the prosecution therefore had to disprove self-defence once a prima facie case arose.
Crown's Arguments
- The trial judge was entitled to conclude that the evidence did not raise a prima facie case of self-defence; the judge, being better placed to assess the evidence, had discretion to refuse a self-defence direction.
- The Appellant's account, even if accepted, did not support a reasonable or proportionate response of stabbing with a blade; the only reasonable response on the evidence was to withdraw, which the Appellant was able to do.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| R v Bonnick (1978) 66 Cr App R 266 |
Self-defence should be left to the jury when there is evidence sufficiently strong to raise a prima facie case if accepted; trial judge must apply common sense to evidence. |
The court accepted the Bonnick test as authoritative but held that, applying it to the evidence in this case, a prima facie case of self-defence was not raised. |
| DPP (Jamaica) v Bailey [1995] 1 Cr App R 257, PC |
If the accused's account includes matters which, if accepted, could raise a prima facie case of self-defence this should be left to the jury even if self-defence is not formally relied upon. |
The court relied on Bailey to confirm that formal reliance is unnecessary, but concluded Bailey's test was not met on the facts here. |
| R v Mula [2013] EWCA Crim 1293 |
Example where evidence (from complainant) was consistent with the defendant believing he was about to be struck and therefore supported leaving self-defence to the jury. |
The court noted Mula as illustrative; contrasted its facts with the present case and found the present evidence did not supply comparable support for self-defence. |
| R v Harewood and Rehman [2021] EWCA Crim 1936 |
Appeal court recognition that trial judge is often better placed to assess whether prima facie case is raised, especially where the appeal court lacks full transcript. |
The court applied this principle to defer to the trial judge's assessment of the evidence and to accept that the judge was entitled to his conclusion. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court recognised the established authorities that self-defence must be left to the jury if evidence, if accepted, raises a prima facie case. It reviewed the factual evidence: CCTV showing interactions before entry to the building; the Appellant's account of being struck by the Victim inside the communal corridor; the single fatal stab wound described by the pathologist; absence of the weapon; the Appellant's subsequent conduct in fleeing and evading arrest; and the Appellant's injuries.
The court accepted that the Appellant need not have expressly given evidence that he believed force was necessary, but concluded the Appellant's evidence was insufficient to support a conclusion that he perceived an actual or imminent threat which made stabbing with a blade a reasonable and proportionate response. Objectively, the Appellant could and did withdraw; the Victim was an older man who used a walking stick. Leaving self-defence to the jury would, in the court's view, have required speculative inferences about what the Appellant believed. The trial judge's assessment that a prima facie case of self-defence was not raised was within his discretion and justified on the evidence.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED
Direct effect: The Appellant's conviction is upheld as safe and the appeal against conviction is dismissed. The court did not establish a new legal principle; it applied existing authorities to the facts and concluded no prima facie case of self-defence arose on the evidence before the trial judge.
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