| Coolglass Wind Farm Ltd v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2026] IESC 5 |
That appellate intervention is limited; decision-takers have a margin of appreciation and an evaluative spectrum in applying s.15 climate duties. |
The Court held Coolglass to be dispositive: the Commission was entitled to consider CPPAs within the evaluative spectrum and this limited the Applicants' grounds for appeal. |
| Doyle v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 1) [2025] IEHC 158 |
Previous High Court Module I judgment dismissing certain grounds (including bat roost issue) as harmless error. |
Referred to as part of the procedural history confirming Module I dismissal. |
| Doyle v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [2025] IEHC 205 |
Costs argument at Module I (applicants sought reservation of costs). |
Noted as part of judgment history; the earlier request on costs was rejected. |
| Doyle v. An Coimisiún Pleanála (No. 3) [2026] IEHC 156 |
Module II dismissal of Applicants' substantive case. |
Recorded as part of the procedural history leading to the leave application. |
| O'Sullivan v. Health Service Executive [2023] IESC 11 |
Limits on draft-judgment engagement and not transforming draft circulation into a new phase of litigation. |
Quoted in relation to the court's draft-judgment procedure and the proper scope of parties' responses. |
| O'Sullivan v. Sea Fisheries Protection Authority [2017] IESC 75 |
On caution against treating draft procedures as full re-argument and on fairness standards. |
Used to justify restricting draft-judgment responses to specific, non-substantive corrections. |
| Attorney General v. Crosland (No. 2) [2021] UKSC 58 |
Why restriction on publication of draft judgments is in the interests of administration of justice. |
Referenced to support confidentiality directions regarding the draft judgment circulation. |
| Baigent v. Random House Group Ltd [2006] EWHC 1131 |
Authority illustrating concerns about draft-material confidentiality and usage. |
Referenced alongside other authorities on draft judgment confidentiality. |
| R. (Counsel General for Wales) v. Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy [2022] EWCA Civ 181 |
Authorities on draft judgments and related procedural safeguards. |
Referenced in the practice-direction discussion on draft judgment confidentiality. |
| Public Institution for Social Security v. Banque Pictet & Cie SA and others [2022] EWCA Civ 368 |
Authorities on confidentiality and circulation of drafts. |
Referenced for the same procedural point on drafts. |
| Itkin v. Wood [2023] JRC 101 |
Authority on draft judgments and procedure (Jersey). |
Referenced in support of draft-judgment confidentiality principles. |
| Concerned Residents of Treascon and Clondoolusk v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors. [2024] IESC 28 |
Point must fall within pleadings for appeal; scope of pleading. |
Used to state that points not falling within pleadings generally are unsuitable for appeal. |
| Leech v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESCDET 106 |
Issues of pleading/misinterpretation are usually case-specific and not questions of public importance. |
Used to underline that misinterpretation or pleading issues typically do not justify leave to appeal. |
| Minister for Justice and Equality v. Andrzejczak (No. 2) [2018] IEHC 11 |
Question must actually arise on the facts and not be abstract. |
Quoted for the principle that leave questions must arise concretely on the facts. |
| GOCE Limited v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 43 |
New issues formulated for appeal are unsuitable where not argued below. |
Adopted to support the proposition that questions must have been argued at trial. |
| S.A. v. Minister for Justice and Equality (No. 2) [2016] IEHC 646 |
Point should be determinative and make a difference to outcome; timeliness of leave applications. |
Used to show leave is inappropriate where the point would not change the result and must be timely. |
| Morehart v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 701 |
Similar principle that a point should make a difference to the outcome to justify appeal. |
Referenced to emphasise that mere interesting points are insufficient for leave. |
| Rooney v. Minister for Agriculture and Food [2016] IESC 1 |
Warning against focusing on isolated debatable rulings rather than the overall case. |
Quoted to caution against appellate tactics that ignore the broader case weaknesses. |
| Monkstown Road Residents Association v. An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 9 |
Questions must accurately reflect the judgment and not be distortions for appeal. |
Used to reject exaggerated or distorted formulations of appeal questions. |
| Stapleton v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 178 |
Point must not invite appellate court into discursive or essayistic exercise; official status of appellant not dispositive. |
Used to reinforce that novel or official-appellant status does not automatically make a point suitable. |
| Cooper v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESCDET 96 |
Applicant's misunderstanding of legal position does not amount to public importance. |
Used to show that mere disagreement with conclusion is insufficient for leave. |
| B.S. v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2017] IESCDET 134 |
Application of law to facts is often a mixed question unsuitable for appeal. |
Referenced to support that application-of-law questions are generally inappropriate for certification. |
| Halpin v. An Bord Pleanála [2020] IEHC 218 |
Mixed questions of law and fact are unsuitable for appeal. |
Used as authority that application of principles to facts is not a pure question of law. |
| Rushe v. An Bord Pleanála [2020] IEHC 429 |
Similar point on mixed questions and finality. |
Referenced in relation to finality and suitability for appeal. |
| Stanley v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IEHC 671 |
Application-of-law-to-facts unsuitable for appellate leave. |
Used to reinforce the general rule about mixed questions. |
| Eco Advocacy CLG v. An Bord Pleanála, Keegan Land Holdings Limited, An Taisce - The National Trust for Ireland and Client Earth AISBL [2024] IESCDET 62 |
On the limits of appellate review and when appeals may be necessary to resolve doubt. |
Referenced in discussing when appeals are appropriate to resolve legal doubt. |
| Patrick McCaffrey & Sons Limited v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESCDET 145 |
Analogy on fact-specific points not raising wider public importance. |
Used to illustrate that fact-specific points will not usually warrant leave. |
| Nagle View Turbine Aware Group v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [2025] IEHC 3 |
Where law is not uncertain, public interest suggests no appeal is warranted. |
Adopted to argue that absence of legal uncertainty makes certification inappropriate. |
| Callaghan v. An Bord Pleanála [2015] IEHC 493 |
Novelty alone does not make a point suitable for appeal. |
Referenced to reject novelty as sufficient for leave. |
| Maguire T/A Frank Pratt & Sons (No. 2) [2023] IEHC 209 |
Disagreement with judgment does not equate to uncertainty in law. |
Used to support that mere disagreement is insufficient for certification. |
| Carrownagowan Concern Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESCDET 8 and [2025] IESCDET 9 |
Reference that CJEU reference requests do not rescue otherwise unsuitable appeal points. |
Used to show that asking for CJEU reference does not convert an unsuitable point into a suitable one. |
| R.A. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2015] IEHC 830 |
Examples where solid cases for leave were granted; general guidance on when leave is granted. |
Quoted to note that strong leave applications are granted but superfluous certifications are discouraged. |
| B.W. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2015] IEHC 833 |
Same contextual examples as above. |
Referred to illustrate when leave may be granted. |
| K.R.A. v. Minister for Justice and Equality (No. 2) [2016] IEHC 421 |
Procedural examples of leave being granted in other contexts. |
Referenced among illustrative authorities on leave. |
| S.T.E. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2016] IEHC 544 |
Same as above. |
Used as example in the survey of authorities. |
| R.A. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal (No. 3) [2016] IEHC 671 |
Examples of leave practice. |
Included in the list of illustrative authorities. |
| B.S. (India) & Anor. v. Minister for Justice and Equality & Ors. (No. 3) [2020] IEHC 485 |
Examples of leave practice in immigration contexts. |
Included as part of illustrative authorities. |
| Dublin City Council v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [2021] IEHC 34 |
Example of leave practice in planning cases. |
Listed among illustrative authorities. |
| Waltham Abbey Residents Association v. An Bord Pleanála [2021] IEHC 597 |
Example of leave practice. |
Listed among illustrative authorities. |
| Sweetman v. An Bord Pleanála (Sweetman XVII) (No. 2) [2021] IEHC 662 |
Example of leave practice. |
Listed among illustrative authorities. |
| Save Roscam Peninsula CLG v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [2022] IEHC 328 |
Example of leave practice. |
Listed among illustrative authorities. |
| Joyce-Kemper v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 5) [2022] IEHC 349 |
Example of leave practice. |
Listed amongst illustrative authorities. |
| Kerins v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 5) [2023] IEHC 280 |
Example of leave practice. |
Referenced in the survey of authorities. |
| Coolglass Wind Farm Ltd v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 1 |
High Court decision earlier referenced concerning s.15 and climate evaluation. |
Listed as prior authority in the High Court jurisprudence and contextual background. |
| Heavey v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [2025] IEHC 311 (as cited) |
Illustrative planning leave jurisprudence. |
Included in the list of authorities relevant to leave practice. |
| Bank of Ireland Mortgage Bank U.C. v. Murray & Anor [2026] IESC 30 |
Failure to raise points at the appropriate time is unhelpful; procedural obligation to flag errors in draft judgments. |
Applied to criticize Applicants for not raising alleged draft-judgment ambiguities in the draft-circulation process. |
| Ryanair v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [2025] IEHC 194 |
Illustration of opportunistic appellate tactics and their futility. |
Quoted by analogy to show how a trivial textual point would change nothing practically. |
| Fahy Beg |
Referenced in relation to treatment of CPPAs and offsets in prior jurisprudence. |
Used by the Court to show relevant prior line of authority considered in the judgment (as relied on in reasoning). |
| Friends of Killymooney Lough (No.2) |
On prejudice from further delay in planning litigation. |
Used by analogy to show prejudice to notice party from further delay. |
| Shamsa Doyle v. An Coimisiún Pleanála (No.2) [2026] IEHC 207 |
On prejudice and costs in planning judicial review context. |
Referenced as analogous authority on prejudice from delay. |
| Condon (No.2) [2026] IEHC 136 |
Refusal of leave where misunderstanding spreads confusion; public interest limb. |
Adopted to show that appeals based on misunderstanding are not in the public interest. |
| Hellfire Massy Residents Association v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IESC 38 |
Warning against spreading maximum confusion in appellate formulations. |
Quoted to criticise Applicants' tactic of decontextualising phrases to generate confusion. |
| The People (D.P.P.) v. Rattigan [2013] IECCA 13 |
Principle of delayed eloquence (raising better points after getting judgment). |
Used to caution against launching new points for the first time on appeal. |