| O'Malley v National Standards Authority of Ireland [2024] IEHC 500 |
Effect of amendment to Order 19 Rule 28 and erosion of distinction between strike-out jurisdictions. |
Used to explain that amended rule blurs previous distinction between inherent jurisdiction and original rule; guiding principle for strike-out analysis. |
| Beades v KBC Mortgage Finance Company [2025] IEHC 363 |
Overarching principles for strike-out applications (default to trial, sparing exercise, onus on mover, take plaintiff's case at high-water mark, etc.). |
Adopted the listed principles as the framework for assessing whether Plaintiff's pleadings disclose a reasonable cause of action. |
| Tracey v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2018] IESC 45 |
Principle of taking plaintiff's pleaded facts at their high-water mark for strike-out purposes. |
Applied to require assumption that pleaded facts will be proven, while still testing sufficiency of legal cause of action. |
| Desmond v Moriarty [2018] IESC 34 |
Caution that high-water mark approach does not remove need for necessary elements of the cause of action. |
Quoted to temper the high-water mark approach: court may examine whether pleaded inferences can give rise to a cause of action. |
| Fay v. Tegral Pipes Ltd [2005] IESC 34 |
Authority for examining inferences drawn from pleaded facts on strike-out. |
Used as part of the jurisprudential background to assess pleaded inferences. |
| Mohan v Revenue Commissioners, Ireland and the Attorney General [2025] IEHC 63 |
Codification effect of amended Order 19 Rule 28; court may to a limited extent consider merits; adjournment to allow amendment where realistic possibility. |
Relied upon for proposition that court may consider limited merits and for approach to allowing amendments where realistic prospect exists. |
| Jeffrey v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Defence [2022] 2 IR 635 |
Permits resolution of straightforward issues of law on strike-out where no real risk of injustice. |
Referenced to justify limited consideration of legal issues on the motion. |
| Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461 |
Rule that wrongs done to a company are prima facie to be remedied by the company; derivative action exception. |
Applied as central authority showing Company A's pleaded claims were in substance derivative and thus not properly brought as direct personal claims in the Circuit Court. |
| Salomon v A Salomon & Co. Ltd [1897] AC 22 |
Separate legal personality of companies. |
Invoked to reinforce the point that Company B is a separate legal entity and claims against it cannot be converted into direct claims against directors absent appropriate grounds. |
| Moorview Developments Ltd & Ors v First Active Plc & Ors [2018] IESC 33 |
Context for discussions of lifting veil or joining funder for costs liability (not a general authority for piercing veil in this context). |
Distinguished: court held Moorview did not assist Plaintiff's proposition that it could pierce veil to sue directors directly here. |
| Powers v Greymountain Management Ltd (In Liquidation) [2022] IEHC 599 |
Example of veil-piercing where company used as vehicle for fraud and directors/shadow directors were held liable. |
Distinguished: facts of fraud and instrumentality absent here, so doctrine did not assist Plaintiff. |
| Lee Towers Management Company Ltd v Lance Investments Ltd (in liquidation) [2020] 1 IR 260 |
Illustrative of need for remedial orders under MUD Act to be anchored in Act or other rule of law; limits of remedial orders. |
Used to explain that section 24 orders must be anchored in legislation or other rule of law; remedial orders do not create new proprietary rights or priorities. |
| Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v. Newman Industries Ltd (No. 2) [1982] 1 Ch 204 |
Explanation of derivative action principle and rule in Foss v Harbottle. |
Adopted as exposition of why personal actions by shareholders subvert the rule and why derivative route is required for wrongs to the company. |
| O' Neill v Ryan [1993] ILRM 557 |
Confirming Foss v Harbottle theme that company should sue for wrongs done to it; derivative action exception. |
Applied to reinforce that Company A's proper route was a derivative action where appropriate. |
| Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421 |
Authority that directors' duties are owed to the company and not to individual shareholders. |
Relied on to support proposition that directors' duties are owed to Company B and not Company A directly. |
| V.K. v M.W. [2018] IECA 290 |
Discussion whether a court should itself identify amendments to save proceedings in absence of applicant's proposal. |
Used to show limits on court identifying amendments absent an applicant's proposed amendment; supports requirement that plaintiff propose saving amendment. |
| McAndrew v Launceston Property Finance DAC, [2023] IECA 43 |
Principle that court should not invent amendments to save proceedings where no amendment has been proposed by plaintiff. |
Applied to reject Plaintiff's argument that court should of its own motion reconstitute proceedings by joinder of Company B. |
| Fulham v. Chadwicks Limited & Ors [2021] IECA 72 |
Requirement that claimant usually intimate intention to amend or general nature of amendment when seeking to save proceedings. |
Relied upon to support the conclusion that Plaintiff did not meet the low threshold of proposing an amendment to save the action. |