Factual and Procedural Background
The Respondent brought long-running civil proceedings alleging that the Appellant, a former finance director of the Respondent (employed January 2010–July 2017), diverted substantial company funds for his and third parties' benefit. A pre-action freezing injunction was granted on 17 September 2019 by Judge Jacobs and continued by Judge Pepperall on 25 September 2019; that order specifically included a Rolex watch said to be owned by the Appellant. The Appellant served counter-schedules in December 2019 verified by a statement of truth; numerous entries were later shown to be false (one recipient described in the judgment is identified as a Third Party).
Proceedings for contempt arising from the false statements were brought under CPR r.81.18(1)(a). The Appellant admitted the false statements; in October 2020 Judge Griffiths sentenced him to 10 weeks' imprisonment suspended for one year. The main claim was later settled by consent judgment on 23 July 2024 for £500,000 (liability arising from alleged fraud); little of that sum has been paid.
The freezing injunction continued against the Appellant. In April 2025 the Respondent obtained a writ of control to levy execution on the Appellant's specified Rolex. Enforcement officers attended but could not locate the watch; the Appellant did not disclose its location. Before an application to suspend the writ was heard, the Appellant pawned his Rolex and a second Rolex (held in the name of the Second Defendant) to Company A (a pawnbroker). The Appellant later provided an affidavit with an incorrectly exhibited and redacted loan agreement; direct contact with Company A produced the correct loan agreement and disclosed a previously undisclosed Revolut account (referred to below as Company B).
The Respondent applied for delivery up of pawn receipts and for contempt sanctions. After interlocutory proceedings and a proposed consent to admit contempt (including an order for costs that remained unpaid), a sanctions hearing was listed before Judge Jay on 27 March 2026. The Appellant gave oral evidence and disclosed further documents after giving evidence; Judge Jay found multiple deliberate breaches of the freezing order, adverse inferences from redactions, further concealment of assets and that the Appellant had given untrue evidence. On 31 March 2026 Judge Jay sentenced the Appellant to six months' immediate imprisonment. The Appellant appealed; the Court of Appeal (Judge Coulson and Judge Singh) dismissed the appeal on 21 May 2026.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the sentencing judge erred in failing to give appropriate weight to the lack of harm suffered by the Respondent.
- Whether the judge erred by disregarding the Respondent's allegedly low private interest and offers to compromise.
- Whether the judge failed to take account of applicable sentencing guidance (including considerations relevant to suspension of sentence).
- Whether the judge placed undue weight on the Appellant's previous contempt conviction.
- Whether the sentence of six months' immediate imprisonment was manifestly excessive.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Ground 1: The judge failed to give any or appropriate weight to the lack of harm to the Respondent, noting that the contempt was purged promptly.
- Ground 2: The Respondent had a low private interest in pursuing sanctions (it was prepared to compromise), and that should have reduced the sanction.
- Ground 3: The judge misdirected himself by not applying criminal sentencing guidelines on suspension of sentences; if he had, the sentence should have been suspended.
- Ground 4: The judge placed undue weight on the Appellant's previous contempt conviction, which was of a different character.
- Ground 5: The overall sentence was manifestly excessive compared with other contempt cases involving limited harm.
Respondent's Arguments
- The opinion records that the Respondent pursued delivery up and sanctions, considered compromise on costs, and maintained that sanctions were appropriate to secure compliance and vindicate the court's orders.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| JSC BTA Bank v Solodchenko & Others (2) [2011] EWCA Civ 1241 |
That a knowing, deliberate and substantial breach of a freezing order is a serious matter which will "normally attract an immediate custodial sentence, which is measured in months rather than weeks and may well exceed a year". |
The court applied JSC BTA Bank as authority that deliberate substantial breaches normally warrant immediate custody and used it to support the sentencing range and the judge's reliance on an immediate custodial sanction. |
| Crystal Mews Ltd v Metterick [2006] EWHC 3087 (Ch) |
Identified factors relevant to sentencing in contempt cases (listed at [21] in the opinion: prejudice/harm, pressure, deliberateness, culpability, conduct of others, appreciation of seriousness, cooperation). |
The judge applied the Crystal Mews factors to assess culpability and mitigation; the Court of Appeal accepted that application and relied on those factors in reviewing the sentence. |
| Liverpool Victoria Insurance Company Limited v Dr Asef Zafar [2019] EWCA Civ 392 |
Set out the limited circumstances in which an appellate court will interfere with sentencing in committal proceedings (error of principle, taking account of immaterial factors or failing to take account of material factors, or a decision plainly wrong/outside the range of reasonable decisions). |
The court applied the Liverpool Victoria test when considering whether the sentencing judge's decision was "wrong" and whether appellate intervention was justified. |
| Mersey Care NHS Trust v Ackroyd [2007] EWCA Civ 101 |
Principles on appellate review of discretionary decisions (cited for similar principles to Liverpool Victoria). |
Cited as part of the authorities supporting the appellate standard of review. |
| Aldi Stores Ltd v WSP Group PLC [2008] 1 WLR 748 |
Authority on appellate review principles (cited alongside other authorities). |
Relied on as part of the body of authority on the limited scope of appellate intervention. |
| Stuart v Goldberg Linde [2008] 1WLR 823 |
Authority on appellate intervention (cited in support of the standard of review). |
Referenced among authorities describing when an appeal court may interfere with discretionary decisions. |
| Financial Conduct Authority v McKendrick [2019] EWCA Civ 524 |
Further authority on appellate review and sentencing discretion. |
Cited to support the proposition that there will be few cases where contempt sentencing is open to challenge on grounds of undue leniency or severity. |
| Khawaja v Stefanova [2023] EWCA Civ 1201 |
That the seriousness of contempt must be assessed in the context of the specific facts of the case. |
Used to reinforce that sentencing for contempt is fact-specific. |
| Wigan Borough Council v Lovett [2023] EWCA Civ 1631 |
Illustration that sanctions assessment involves considerations of culpability and harm. |
Cited by the Appellant and addressed by the court in relation to the judge's consideration of harm and culpability. |
| Navigator Equities Ltd v Deripaska [2021] EWCA Civ 1799; [2022] 1 WLR 3656 |
Authority that a private interest in contempt proceedings is legitimate; discussed in relation to the Respondent's private interest. |
Applied to reject the argument that the Respondent's private interest was insufficient to justify sanctions. |
| MBN v McGivern [2022] EWHC 2072 |
Referenced by the Appellant in relation to private interest; court noted it addressed a different point. |
Cited to distinguish its relevance; not relied upon to reduce sanction. |
| Amarfio v Abrahams [2018] EWHC 891 (Ch) |
Example of a case where conduct was not deliberate and no previous contempt; used for comparative purposes. |
Referenced to show that lesser sanctions in other cases were fact-specific and not directly comparable. |
| Attorney-General's Reference (no 4 of 1989) [1990] 1 WLR 41 |
Principle that appellate interference is appropriate where a sentence falls outside the range a reasonable judge could consider appropriate. |
Quoted in support of the standard for appellate interference on sentence grounds. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court of Appeal (Judge Coulson, with agreement from Judge Singh) proceeded on the settled standard of appellate review for sentencing in committal proceedings (Liverpool Victoria and related authorities): intervention only for error of principle, failure to take into account material factors or taking into account immaterial factors, or where the decision is plainly wrong/outside the range reasonably open to the trial judge.
The court found no error of principle. It upheld the judge's application of the Crystal Mews factors and his reliance on JSC BTA Bank that deliberate, substantial breaches of freezing orders normally attract immediate custodial sentences measured in months.
On Ground 1 (harm): the court rejected the submission that harm was ignored or minimal, concluding the judge had regard to harm demonstrated by the Appellant's conduct (dissipation efforts, concealment, redactions, enforcement costs and the near‑total non‑payment of the judgment debt) and that questions of weight were for the trial judge.
On Ground 2 (private interest): the court rejected the argument that the Respondent's willingness to compromise showed a low private interest justifying a reduced sanction, holding that the Respondent had a proper private interest in ensuring future compliance and that compromise offers did not negate the need for an appropriate sanction.
On Ground 3 (sentencing guidelines/suspension): the court accepted the guidelines are of assistance but not strictly applicable; it concluded the judge had addressed the relevant considerations and that, on the guideline factors, suspension was not appropriate given the history, high risk of reoffending and lack of realistic prospect of rehabilitation in the community.
On Ground 4 (previous contempt): the court upheld the judge's view that the previous contempt conviction was relevant and properly weighed; it demonstrated an established pattern of non‑compliance and cavalier attitude to court orders.
On Ground 5 (manifest excess): the court concluded the 6‑month immediate sentence (9 months starting point reduced to 6 months for credit) was within the reasonable range, not manifestly excessive, and justified by the seriousness, deliberateness and aggravating features (including giving untrue oral evidence).
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED
Direct effect: The order of Judge Jay imposing six months' immediate imprisonment for contempt of court is upheld. The Appellant's challenge to the weight given to harm, the Respondent's private interest, application of sentencing guidance, the significance of prior contempt, and the overall length of the sentence was rejected.
No broader novel legal principle was established by this decision; the judgment applied and affirmed established authorities on contempt sentencing and appellate review.