Connolly and Anor v An Coimisiun Pleanala and Ors (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Applicant sought judicial review of the Respondent's decision of 17 July 2025 granting approval under section 182A/182B of the Planning and Development Act 2000 for a 220 kV electricity substation and associated grid connection intended to serve a proposed solar farm. The application to the Respondent for approval was made by Company A on 18 December 2024. Company A had earlier applied to the local planning authority for the solar farm (ref. 24/5630) and that application proceeded separately; after an initial refusal by the planning authority, Company A appealed and permission for the solar farm was ultimately granted on 19 February 2026. An inspector recommended approval of the substation application, the Respondent adopted that recommendation and made an order granting approval subject to conditions on 17 July 2025. The Applicants filed these proceedings on 9 September 2025 and obtained leave on 29 September 2025. The hearing took place on 27 March 2026 and judgment was delivered by Judge Humphreys on 17 April 2026.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Respondent erred in law in its interpretation and application of the Cork County Development Plan 2022-2028 (zoning), in particular whether the application site was subject to an express "Agriculture (AG)" zoning or to a deemed agricultural zoning and whether any misinterpretation or failure to have regard to the Plan invalidated the decision.
2. Whether the Respondent acted unlawfully by determining the substation and grid-connection application while the associated solar farm application remained pending (prematurity / consent-in-parts), and whether the Respondent failed to give adequate reasons for how it treated the inspector's recommendation to "consider the status" of the solar farm application.
3. Whether the Respondent misapplied specific Development Plan objectives (ET 13-14 and ET 13-21) by treating them as unqualified policy support for the substation despite the conditional nature of those objectives and the absence, at the time, of a consent for the linked solar farm.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' Arguments

• The Respondent misinterpreted the Development Plan by failing to apply Objective ZU 18-4 (deemed zoning) to treat the lands as subject to Agriculture (AG) zoning and thereby failed to have proper regard to Objective ZU 18-19 and section 18.3.45 which protect agricultural land.
• The Respondent failed to address the inspector's recommendation to consider the status of the pending solar farm application and failed to give reasons for proceeding while that application remained undetermined, rendering the decision premature and unlawful.
• The Respondent misapplied ET 13-14 and ET 13-21 by relying on renewable energy policy benefits without properly engaging with the conditionality of those policies and the environmental safeguards required; the substation has no independent planning utility absent the solar farm.

Respondent's Arguments

• The Respondent lawfully interpreted the Development Plan: the site was not covered by a specific labelled land-use zoning objective on the maps; ZU 18-4 establishes residual/deemed zoning distinct from the express Agriculture (AG) zoning and the Respondent had regard to the Plan.
• The Respondent had jurisdiction to determine the s.182A application notwithstanding the pending solar farm application; no legal prohibition required suspension and the inspector's note to "consider the status" did not require deferral.
• The Respondent properly applied and had regard to relevant Development Plan objectives (including ET 13-14 and ET 13-21) and environmental assessments; no legal error or failure of reasons was established by the Applicants.

Company A's Arguments (Notice Party)

• The site was not subject to an express Agriculture (AG) zoning objective; the Planning Authority's mapped AG zoning relates to lands adjacent to settlements and does not equate to agricultural use across all rural lands.
• The inspector recommended approval and the Respondent followed that recommendation; references to prior permissions and the dual-consent context were relevant and lawful.
• Even if an error were arguable, the Respondent's decision should be upheld on discretionary grounds given the project's contribution to renewable energy objectives and national climate policy.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by reference to established principles governing judicial review and planning law, applying those principles to the facts without inventing obligations not found in statute or caselaw.

On zoning (Core Ground 1) the court construed the Development Plan text purposively and practically. The court held that the Plan's ZU 18-4 operates to create a residual or deemed zoning based on existing authorised use distinct from the express Agriculture (AG) zoning that is specifically labelled and mapped. The court regarded a minor typographical error in the Plan text as such and read the Plan in a workable manner. The court concluded the Respondent did not misinterpret the Plan, had regard to the Plan and that the Applicants had not discharged the onus to show any legal error arising from the Plan's treatment. The court also noted the factual context that the proposed works included grid connections along roads and that the solar farm's design allowed for continued grazing, reducing the Applicants' case that the substation was fundamentally inconsistent with agricultural use.

On prematurity and consent-in-parts (Core Ground 2) the court reaffirmed that parts of an overall development can be consented separately (relying on Treascon). The Respondent was entitled to determine the s.182A application notwithstanding the pending planning authority process for the solar farm. The court found that the inspector had recommended approval and merely asked that the Respondent "consider the status" of the solar farm application; the Respondent was aware of and had regard to that status. The Applicants did not prove a legal requirement to defer determination pending a separate application, and the court rejected an asserted bright-line rule requiring "reasonable certainty" of other stages before consenting any part.

On misapplication of Development Plan objectives (Core Ground 3) the court found that the Respondent properly considered the relevant pro-renewables policies (ET 13-14 and ET 13-21) and environmental safeguards; the Applicants had not shown legal error in the Respondent's use of those objectives. The court treated the Applicants' challenge largely as a merits disagreement rather than a point of law and held Applicants had not met the evidential onus to show a legal misapplication.

On general evidential and remedial principles the court reiterated that the onus of proof lies with the Applicant in judicial review, that mere assertion does not suffice to create scientific doubt in AA/EIA contexts, and that even if a technical or procedural error had been shown, the court's discretion could justify refusal to quash, particularly given the public-law importance of renewable infrastructure and relevant EU and domestic climate obligations.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED

Holding: The court dismissed the proceedings and refused the reliefs sought by the Applicants. The court concluded there was no legal error in the Respondent's interpretation of the Development Plan, no obligation to defer determination of the s.182A application pending the solar farm application, and no misapplication of the cited Development Plan objectives.

Implications: The direct effect is that the Respondent's order granting approval for the substation and grid connection remains in force subject to the conditions set out in that order; the Applicants' certiorari claim failed and (absent any contrary application within the procedural window) no order as to costs was to be made. The judgment applies established principles on plan interpretation, the onus of proof in environmental challenges, consent-in-parts permissibility and the discretionary nature of judicial review; it did not purport to set novel precedent beyond applying those principles to the facts before the court.