Akram v Residential Tenancies Board (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an ex tempore judgment of Judge O'Higgins on a contested leave application. The Applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review to quash Company A's decision dated 7 February 2025 (issued 26 February 2025) refusing the Applicant's appeal from an adjudication under s.97 of the Residential Tenancies Act 2004. The tenancy tribunal heard the appeal over three hearing days (31 May, 25 September and 14 November 2024) and issued a 28‑page determination (signed by Judge Quirke) which, under the statutory scheme, became the order of Company A. The tribunal made five determinations, including that a notice of termination served 29 June 2023 was valid and that the Applicant's claims of unlawful termination, breaches of landlord obligations, and penalisation were not upheld.

The Applicant issued proceedings on 13 March 2025. Directions were given by Judge Bolger and Judge Gearty, including joinder of the landlords as notice parties. Company A filed an affidavit (Attorney McGoldrick) but no statement of opposition was filed. The Applicant appeared as a litigant in person; Company A was represented by Attorney Harmon instructed by a solicitor firm.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Applicant should be granted leave to apply for judicial review of Company A's decision refusing the tenancy appeal.
2. Whether the grounds pleaded (bias/unfair procedures; unequal access to proceedings; enhancement of the landlords' evidence; alleged findings outside jurisdiction/ultra vires) are statable and arguable for the purposes of leave under the test in G. v. DPP.
3. Whether judicial review is the appropriate or only effective remedy on the pleaded facts.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

• Two primary grounds in the statement of grounds: (1) unequal access to proceedings (hybrid hearing arrangements on 31 May 2024 advantaged the landlords and disadvantaged the tenants); (2) bias—alleging tribunal displayed a clear bias against the tenants, with five further particularised effects (determination outside jurisdiction; omissions; procedural inconsistencies; enhancing landlords' evidence; material inaccuracies in findings).
• Further particulars included an allegation that the tribunal enhanced the landlords' evidence (ground (iv), sub‑paras (a)–(f)) and that certain findings (coercion, statements in 'General') were ultra vires.

Company A's Arguments

• Company A did not contest delay or standing and contended that the Applicant had not met criteria (b), (c) and (e) of the G. v. DPP test—i.e. no statable ground, no arguable case on the facts, and judicial review not the only or appropriate remedy.
• Company A placed material facts before the court in Attorney McGoldrick's affidavit (paras. 14–18) tending to question the materiality of the remote link/unequal access complaint.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court acknowledged the low-but-real threshold from G. v. DPP, as clarified by O'Doherty and Waters, and proceeded to assess whether the Applicant's affidavit and statement of grounds met that threshold. The court read the tribunal decision (including extensive quoted passages under 'General') and the core documents. It analysed the pleaded grounds and concluded that:

• Most allegations of "bias" were misconceived and amounted to dissatisfaction with merits-based rulings rather than evidence of subjective or objective impartiality; no evidential foundation for a bias claim was identified.
• The Applicant, a litigant in person, was afforded some latitude: the court treated pleaded bias points as including possible breaches of fair procedure and treated assertions of findings outside jurisdiction as potential certiorari pleas.
• After careful review the court found only three discrete grounds reached the low threshold: (i) the fair procedure ground labelled "Enhancing Landlords' Evidence" (ground (iv), sub‑paras (a)–(f) on page 6 of the statement of grounds); (ii) the "Unequal access to proceedings" ground (ground 1 on page 1 concerning hybrid hearing arrangements and late provision of the remote link on 31 May 2024); and (iii) a vires/jurisdictional challenge to finding 7.2 and the 'General' findings (alleged ultra vires by reason of strident personal findings of coercion).
• The court declined leave on the balance of grounds because they were either merits complaints or lacked the necessary pith and evidential basis to be arguable at leave stage.

Holding and Implications

LEAVE GRANTED IN PART

Holding: The court granted leave to apply for judicial review only on the following limited grounds:

1. Ground (iv) on page 6 of the statement of grounds ("Enhancing Landlords' Evidence") as further particularised at sub‑paras (a)–(f) (leave refused for paras. (g) and (h)).
2. Ground 1 on page 1 ("Unequal access to proceedings") concerning the hybrid hearing arrangements on 31 May 2024.
3. A vires/jurisdictional challenge to finding 7.2 (page 22) and the findings under 'General' (pages 27–28) as being ultra vires the tribunal's powers.

Implications: The Applicant may proceed to the substantive judicial review on those three specified grounds only. All other pleaded grounds were refused at leave stage as not statable or arguable. The decision confines the scope of any subsequent substantive hearing and does not purport to establish new legal precedent beyond applying established leave principles.