Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellant was remanded in custody after appearing on petition at The Court on 24 December 2024 and pled guilty to murder at a preliminary hearing on 16 October 2025. Sentence was imposed on 20 October 2025 after an agreed narrative and a plea in mitigation. The charge alleged that on 22 December 2024 at The City the Appellant repeatedly stabbed the Victim with a knife and that the offence was committed while on bail for earlier matters.
Factual narrative (agreed): the Appellant and the Victim, who did not know each other, became involved in an altercation outside a nightclub following which the Victim head-butted the Appellant, chipping a tooth. CCTV showed the Appellant agitated, threatening to fetch a knife. The Appellant returned, confronted the Victim and inflicted four stab wounds (three to the chest and one to the arm); one wound penetrated the heart and was fatal. The Appellant fled, was arrested nearby and admitted procuring a knife and stabbing the Victim. The Victim died in hospital.
Victim impact: the Victim was aged 33 and left a 10-year-old son; victim impact statements described profound emotional and financial effects on the son and the Victim's family. The Victim's partner witnessed the killing.
Appellant's background: the Appellant was 21 at the time of the offence and 22 at sentence; in full-time employment as a joiner; history of heavy alcohol use from adolescence and some drug use; multiple prior convictions including offences involving a knife and active community payback orders at the time of the offence. The sentencing judge was aware of these matters and of the Sentencing Young People guideline.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the punishment part of 18 years and 6 months imposed for murder (reduced from a 21-year starting point for guilty plea) was excessive in all the circumstances.
- Whether the sentencing judge erred in his approach to the Sentencing Young People guideline, including whether he should have called for a Justice Social Work Report (JSWR) before assessing maturity and capacity for change.
- How bail aggravation, the appellant's prior convictions and the factual features of the killing (premeditation, number and nature of wounds, presence of witness) should affect the appropriate punishment part.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The punishment part was excessive given the Appellant's age (21 at the time) and greater capacity for change and rehabilitation under the Sentencing Young People guideline.
- The sentencing judge gave insufficient weight to immaturity and made conclusions about deliberation without first obtaining a JSWR; this deprived the court of necessary information on maturity and potential mitigation.
- The fatal events were prompted by an earlier head-butt by the Victim; absent the interval the offence might have been provocation/culpable homicide rather than murder.
- Early guilty plea, remorse and employment were mitigating factors; comparison with other reported decisions supported a shorter punishment part.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Donnelly v HM Advocate [2017] HCJAC 78, 2017 SCCR 571 |
Example of a sustained punishment part of 20 years for a spontaneous knife murder by a man aged 23. |
Cited as a comparator showing that a 20-year starting point had been sustained in a spontaneous stabbing; the court considered it in assessing whether a severe sentence could be justified for a young offender. |
| HM Advocate v Boyle [2009] HCJAC 89, 2010 JC 66 |
Guidance that for murder with a knife a punishment part of at least 16 years will generally be appropriate and that sentences should discourage carrying knives. |
Used to explain general sentencing expectations for knife murders; court noted Boyle remains useful guidance but not a conclusive modern yardstick. |
| Laurie v HM Advocate [2019] HCJAC 3 |
Authority concerning a punishment part of 18 years for a prolonged and brutal murder. |
Considered but regarded as of limited assistance due to differing circumstances and procedural constraints in that case (conviction after retrial). |
| McGowan v HM Advocate [2024] HCJAC 20, 2024 JC 359 |
Example of a high punishment part (23 years) for a domestically aggravated and sustained fatal assault. |
Found to be of little assistance because of materially different and more serious domestic-aggravation circumstances. |
| Elliott v HM Advocate [2020] HCJAC 41 |
Case in which a punishment part of 18 years was reduced to 16 for a prolonged and merciless attack on a vulnerable pensioner. |
Referred to when comparing mitigating features and background; distinguished on the basis of the Appellant's different background and demonstrated remorse. |
| Kinlan v HM Advocate [2019] HCJAC 47, 2019 JC 193 |
Observation that punishment parts have increased since Boyle and that Boyle is not a conclusive yardstick. |
Used to support the proposition that modern sentencing levels may exceed earlier guidance in Boyle. |
| Mitchell v HM Advocate [2011] HCJAC 10, 2012 JC 13 |
Warning that comparisons with other sentences give limited guidance. |
Relied on to caution against direct comparison between disparate cases when assessing excessiveness. |
| Rauf v HM Advocate [2019] HCJAC 72, 2020 SCCR 47 |
Observation that it is rare for two cases to be so similar that a direct comparison is appropriate. |
Applied to underscore the limited value of direct comparisons with other reported cases. |
| Keel v HM Advocate [2025] HCJAC 47, 2026 JC 69 |
Similar observation about difficulties in direct comparison of cases. |
Cited to reinforce the court's approach to comparing sentences. |
| Huynh v HM Advocate [2026] HCJAC 6, 2026 SCCR 156 |
Clarification that the Sentencing Young People guideline requires individualised assessment of maturity and not reliance solely on age. |
Adopted to support the proposition that age alone should not determine mitigation; courts should assess individual maturity. |
| Owens v HM Advocate [2022] HCJAC 29, 2022 SCCR 246 |
Illustration of the individualised approach to sentencing young people. |
Referenced as an example of applying the Sentencing Young People guideline in practice. |
| Beveridge v HM Advocate [2025] HCJAC 23 |
Authority stating that youth affects culpability but does not mitigate the level of harm caused. |
Cited to explain that while youth bears on culpability, it does not reduce the factual harm of murder. |
| Dunn v HM Advocate [2023] HCJAC 34, 2024 JC 51 |
Authority on the interplay of youth and assessment of culpability/harm. |
Used to confirm that youth does not mitigate harm and supports an individual assessment of maturity. |
| Rizzo v HM Advocate [2020] HCJAC 40, 2020 SCCR 397 |
Example of a sustained high punishment part (22 years) for a domestically aggravated murder by a young adult. |
Referred to as demonstrating that substantial punishment parts for young adults are not unprecedented. |
| Campbell v HM Advocate [2019] HCJAC 58, 2020 JC 47 |
Case where a very long punishment part was reduced on appeal after full account was taken of youth and background. |
Cited to show the court's prior approach to taking full account of youth where relevant background features exist. |
| Kelly v HM Advocate [2025] HCJAC 6, 2025 JC 269 |
Recent prosecution illustrating differing punishment parts for co-accused of historical murder according to age/role. |
Used to illustrate how differing ages and roles affected punishment parts; the sentence for those aged under 18 was not regarded as excessive. |
| Ferguson v HM Advocate 2010 SCCR 399 |
Procedural constraint leading to a fixed punishment part in a retrial context (cited in Laurie). |
Referred to when explaining why Laurie offered limited assistance due to procedural constraints. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by assessing culpability and harm (Sentencing Process guideline). It rejected the Appellant's contention that the head-butt and the interval meant the offence would have been culpable homicide; the court found the infliction of four stab wounds, one penetrating the heart with considerable force, grossly disproportionate to the initial head-butt and incompatible with provocation even if instantaneous retaliation had occurred.
The court examined relevant authorities and noted the continuing utility of Boyle (knife murders commonly warrant at least 16 years) but accepted that sentencing levels have risen since Boyle and that direct comparisons are of limited value. The sentencing judge had increased his notional starting point by six months to reflect bail aggravation, producing a notional starting point of 20 years and 6 months before discount for the guilty plea to 18 years and 6 months; the court considered that approach correct.
On the question of youth and maturity, the court emphasised the Sentencing Young People guideline's requirement for an individualised assessment rather than reliance on age alone. Because of the Note of Appeal, the court called for a JSWR and concluded from that report that there was no indication the Appellant was unusually immature or that his culpability was particularly impaired. The court treated alcohol intoxication as not mitigating.
The court weighed aggravating features (premeditation shown by going home to fetch a knife and threats, multiple and forceful stabbings, presence of a witness and bail status) and the mitigating factor of an early guilty plea. Considering all circumstances and authorities, the court held that while the sentence was severe it was justifiable and not excessive.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL REFUSED
Holding: the court refused the appeal against sentence and upheld the punishment part of 18 years and 6 months. The court found no miscarriage of justice.
Implications: the sentence as imposed remains in force. The decision does not establish a new sentencing principle; it applies existing guidelines and authorities to conclude that, given premeditation, the nature and number of wounds, bail aggravation and the absence of evidence of unusual immaturity, a severe punishment part was justified in this case.