Summary of Judgment
Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellant pleaded guilty on 22 May 2025 in the Crown Court at The City to stalking under section 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and to contempt of court. The sentencing judge (Judge [Last Name]) imposed 4 years 6 months' imprisonment for the stalking offence and a consecutive 4 months for contempt, a total of 4 years 10 months. The Appellant appealed by leave.
The offending occurred over approximately nine months between June 2023 and February 2024. The Complainant was the Appellant's ex-partner. The Appellant sent numerous threatening and abusive messages, published derogatory social media posts, attended the Complainant's home and stables, sent three funeral packs by post, and sent messages threatening the Complainant's family. Incidents included a petrol can left on a driveway and discovery of missing wheel nuts on the Complainant's car. The Appellant also sent a message suggesting self-harm and later denied intending the messages to be harassing. The Complainant reported significant anxiety, loss of sleep, lifestyle restrictions and other impacts in victim personal statements. The Appellant had been on police bail with no-contact conditions during part of the offending period.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the overall sentence for the stalking offence (after uplift from the guideline starting point) was manifestly excessive.
- Whether the sentence for contempt of court should have run concurrently with, rather than consecutively to, the sentence for the index offence.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The uplift from the starting point for the stalking offence took the sentence unnecessarily above the top of the guideline range and was therefore excessive.
- The additional sentence imposed for contempt should have run concurrently with the sentence for the stalking offence rather than consecutively.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court accepted the Appellant's submission, advanced by Attorney [Last Name], that the Appellant's prior firearms conviction was not recent and differed in nature from the present offending. Nevertheless, the Court found that the stalking conduct displayed multiple culpability B and harm 1 features: persistence over a prolonged period, conduct intended to maximise fear or distress, and a high degree of planning. The sentencing judge was entitled to adjust upwards from the guideline starting point and further upwards for multiple aggravating factors.
The sentencing judge had categorised the offence as culpability B and harm 1, identified a B1 starting point (2 years 6 months with a range of 1–4 years), and determined that aggravating factors combined to justify a sentence above the guideline range. The specific aggravating factors identified were a previous relevant firearms conviction, the domestic context of the offending, impact on others (including vulnerable family members), intoxication, and that the Appellant was on bail during the offending. The judge fixed a notional term of 60 months before allowing 10% credit for a late guilty plea, resulting in 4½ years for the stalking offence.
On the contempt charge, the Court acknowledged the contempt was an offensive attack on the administration of justice but observed the outburst was very short, did not interfere with the sentencing exercise (which had been completed), and the Appellant immediately admitted and apologised for the contempt. Applying the principle of totality and having regard to proportionality, the Court concluded the 4-month consecutive term for contempt was manifestly excessive.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED IN PART
Holding: The Court reduced the sentence for contempt from 4 months to 1 month, to run consecutively. The total sentence was reduced from 4 years 10 months to 4 years 7 months' imprisonment.
Implications: The reduction reflects the Court's application of the principle of totality and proportionality to a brief contempt outburst that did not disrupt the sentencing hearing, while upholding the substantive uplift on the stalking sentence based on culpability B, harm 1 and specified aggravating factors. The opinion does not purport to establish any new precedent beyond the application of established sentencing principles; the direct effect is a one-month reduction of the consecutive contempt sentence and a revised total term for the Appellant.