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Vencatachellun, R. v

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 29 August 2025 the Appellant pleaded guilty on re-arraignment at the Magistrates' Court and was committed for sentence to the Crown Court in respect of one offence of breaching a restraining order contrary to section 363 of the Sentencing Act 2020. On 9 January 2026 the Appellant was sentenced to 20 months' imprisonment by Judge Dein at the Crown Court. The restraining order had been made on 26 September 2024 under section 360 of the Sentencing Act 2020 to protect the Victim and two family members and prohibited direct or indirect contact for five years; it was made when the Appellant was convicted of criminal damage and using threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour towards the Victim.

The breach consisted of 70 telephone calls from the Appellant to the Victim between 23 October 2024 and 15 July 2025 (the record also shows 67 calls from the Victim). There was no evidence before the court as to the detailed content of those calls except the Victim's witness statement. The Appellant had been living in a flat owned by the Victim and had refused to leave.

A basis of plea accepted that the Appellant made the calls, describing them as largely about shared bills and the shared flat and occasionally attempts to reconcile; the Appellant denied using insulting or threatening language or causing the Victim to be in fear. A Newton hearing was directed but the Victim did not attend and the prosecution proceeded without it. Pre-sentence material recorded prior convictions (battery, criminal damage, possession of a blade, s.47 assault, and threatening behaviour) and assessed the Appellant as medium risk of reconviction and high risk of emotional/psychological harm to the Victim; the probation officer noted an entrenched pattern of offending related to domestic abuse.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sentencing judge erred in categorising harm under the Sentencing Guideline (placing the offence in harm category 2A) rather than in category 3A given the Appellant's basis of plea denying insulting or threatening conduct and denying that the Victim was in fear.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The offence should have been placed in harm category 3A because, under the basis of plea, the Appellant denied that the calls contained insulting or threatening language or caused the Victim to be in fear; it was improper for the judge to infer more than "little or no harm or distress."

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the prosecution's discrete sentencing arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the matter against the Sentencing Guideline and observed substantial overlap between categories 1A, 2A and 3A and that the guideline is not compartmentalised into watertight boxes. The judge had categorised culpability as A because of persistent breaches and placed harm in category 2 (category 2A), selecting a sentence at the top of that range (two years) before discounts.

The court held that denials in the basis of plea did not preclude drawing permissible inferences from the evidence properly before the court. Although the Appellant denied insulting or threatening language, he accepted that the calls concerned the Victim's flat — a sensitive subject given that the Appellant had been living in the Victim's property and refused to leave. The background to the restraining order (criminal damage to the Victim's car and abusive behaviour in June 2024), together with the calls starting shortly after the order and continuing persistently for nearly nine months, provided adequate material for the judge to infer harm or distress more than "little."

The court concluded that, viewed overall, there was sufficient basis for the judge's assessment of harm and for placing the offence in category 2A. While the 20‑month sentence might be considered severe, it was not wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive.

The court additionally observed that the guidelines require mitigation deductions to be applied before credit for a guilty plea and that the sentencing judge had reversed that sequence, but that in this case the mathematical effect was not material given the small adjustments involved.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED

Holding: The appeal against sentence was dismissed and the sentence of 20 months' imprisonment imposed by the Crown Court stands.

Implications: The court affirmed that, where there is admissible material before the court (including background offending, the subject matter of contact and persistence of breaches), a sentencing judge may permissibly infer harm beyond "little or no" despite a defendant's denials in a basis of plea. No new legal precedent was established beyond application of the existing Sentencing Guideline to the facts; the only procedural irregularity noted (reversed sequencing of mitigation and guilty-plea credit) had no material effect on the outcome.

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Vencatachellun, R. v

Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Justice Licence v1.0.

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Comments

Vencatachellun, R. v
(Mar 31, 2026)