| WS v. Intervyuirasht organ na Darzhavna agentsia za bezhantsite pri Ministerskia savet C-621/21, ECLI:EU:C:2024:47, 16 January 2024 (W.S.) |
The CJEU's observations that gender‑based violence may constitute persecution; the Istanbul Convention and CEDAW inform interpretation; assessments must be individual and case‑by‑case using COI. |
The court considered W.S. when addressing the role of COI and the need for vigilant, individualized assessment of gender‑based violence claims; it noted the Tribunal accepted the factual basis and nexus but still had to apply state protection analysis correctly. |
| AH and FN v. Bundesamt fur Fremdenwesen und Asyl, cases C-608/22 and C-609/22, ECLI:EU:C:2024:828 |
Reiteration of the CJEU approach to gender‑based violence and applicable interpretative obligations of EU instruments. |
The court cited the case as reinforcing the principles in W.S. concerning assessment of gender‑based persecution and COI use. |
| Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie (Political opinions in the host Member State), C-151/22, EU:C:2023:688 |
Principle that assessment of well‑founded fear must be individual and case‑by‑case, made with vigilance and care. |
Referenced to support the requirement of individualised factual assessment when considering COI and fear of persecution. |
| B.C. v. IPAT [2019] IEHC 763 |
Summary of the four‑part formulation of the s.31 test and emphasis that analysis must focus on the applicant's particular circumstances. |
The Tribunal relied on B.C.'s four‑question formulation; the court noted the Tribunal correctly identified the test but failed properly to apply it when concluding protection was effective. |
| Gaidukevich v Georgia (Application No. 38650/18, 15 June 2023) |
Contextual authority on domestic/gender‑based violence and state obligations (as cited by the Applicant). |
The Applicant invoked Gaidukevich to highlight dynamics of domestic violence in assessing state protection; the court noted the citation in submissions. |
| G.K. v IPAT [2022] IEHC 204 |
Reasons need not be discursive but must engage core claims; decision‑makers must give sufficient explanation to understand reasoning. |
The court used G.K. to explain the standard for adequacy of reasons and found the Tribunal's reasons were sufficiently clear though that did not resolve correctness. |
| YY v Minister for Justice and Equality [2017] IESC 61 |
Requirement that affected persons and the court be given sufficient information to understand the decision‑maker's reasoning. |
Cited as authority for the sufficiency of reasons test; court found Tribunal provided adequate explanation. |
| Middelkamp v Minister for Justice and Equality [2023] IESC 2 |
Authority on adequate reasoning and explanation by administrative decision‑makers. |
Relied upon with YY and G.K. in assessing adequacy of the Tribunal's reasons; court held reasons adequate. |
| G.K. v Minister for Justice [2002] 2 IR 418 |
Principle that courts should accept a Tribunal's stated engagement with materials where it indicates consideration. |
Respondents relied on this line to argue the Tribunal had considered relevant materials; court considered but reached its own view on COI assessment. |
| D.V.T.S. v. The Minister for Justice [2008] 3 IR 476 |
Tribunal must recognise conflicting COI and provide rational analysis explaining preference for one source over another. |
The court reviewed D.V.T.S. to illustrate circumstances where selective treatment of COI and failure to resolve conflicts warranted quashing; used as contrast in assessing the present COI treatment. |
| D.V.T.S. v. RAT |
As above: highlighting need to identify and rationally address conflicting COI. |
Referenced in the opinion as illustrative of errors where conflicting COI was not addressed. |
| B.A. v. IPAT [2020] IEHC 589 |
A finding of effective state protection cannot rationally follow from a Tribunal's own negative summary of COI about protection and implementation. |
The court relied on B.A. to show a Tribunal cannot summarise COI as negative yet reach a positive finding of effective protection; used as a close analogue to the present case. |
| F.M. and R.M. v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Minister for Justice [2021] IEHC 817 |
s.31 requires an effective, non‑temporary system of protection; improvements alone do not establish effectiveness. |
The court applied the principle that a state's "doing its best" is insufficient; the Tribunal had erred by conflating improvements with effectiveness. |
| X.S. and J.T. v. IPAT and Minister for Justice and Equality [2022] IEHC 100 |
Tribunal may properly prefer specific, cogent COI (e.g. specialised reports) over more general material; court should not substitute its view absent legal error. |
Used as a contrast where the Tribunal's focused, reasoned approach to COI was upheld; distinguished from the present case. |
| W.P.L. and BP v. The Minister for Justice and Equality, The International Protection Appeals Tribunal Ireland and The Attorney General [2024] IEHC 184 |
Failure to complain to police may be relevant; state protection is "effective" not "perfect"; courts should not interfere with conclusions open to Tribunal. |
Cited for propositions about considering non‑reporting and the standard of "effective" (not perfect) protection; court referenced it when assessing COI analysis principles. |
| H.O. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal and Anor [2007] IEHC 299 |
Authority supporting reluctance of courts to interfere with Tribunal findings within the range of lawful conclusions. |
Referenced among authorities cautioning against substitution of the court's view for that of the Tribunal absent legal error. |
| E.G. (Albania) v. IPAT and Anor [2019] IEHC 474 |
Similar authority on deference to Tribunal findings where properly reasoned and open on COI. |
Used in the discussion on when courts should not interfere with Tribunal conclusions. |
| E.D. (a minor) v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2017] 1 IR 325 |
Authority on judicial review standards and deference to Tribunal findings. |
Placed alongside other authorities as support for restraint where Tribunal conclusions are open on the material. |
| R (Atkinson) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] all England Reports (D) 14 |
Quoted for the proposition that a state's 'doing its incompetent best' does not meet the standard of effective protection. |
Adopted by Irish authority (Ferriter J.) and relied on to emphasise that improvements alone do not satisfy s.31 requirements. |