Patel, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application by the Attorney Solicitor General for leave to refer a sentence as unduly lenient. Leave was granted. The sentence under challenge was imposed by Judge Spencer in the Crown Court at The City on 13 October 2025. The Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of indecent assault (counts 1 and 5) and was convicted by jury of two counts of rape (counts 4 and 7) and a further count of indecent assault (count 6). The aggregate sentence imposed by the sentencing judge was 9 years' imprisonment.

The underlying offending occurred between 1995 and 1997. The Plaintiff, a relative of the Defendant, was aged about 13–15 during the offending. Count 4 was a multiple-incident count of rape over a period of about six months (alleged to be once or twice a week on the Defendant's account). Count 7 alleged a single incident of rape around the Plaintiff's 15th birthday, which resulted in pregnancy and the birth of a child in November 1997; the child was later adopted. The Plaintiff disclosed to the police in summer 2023; the Defendant was arrested in November 2023, denied the allegations in interview, and was ultimately tried and convicted. A DNA test established that the Defendant was the father of the Plaintiff's son.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentence of 9 years' imprisonment was unduly lenient.
2. Whether the sentencing judge misapplied the sentencing guideline categories (in particular, whether the rapes charged on count 4 and/or count 7 should have been treated as more serious than category 2B, up to category 1 or as a campaign).
3. What the appropriate substituted sentence or aggregate sentence should be if the original sentence was unduly lenient.

Arguments of the Parties

Attorney Solicitor General's Arguments

• The sentencing judge failed to recognise that the rapes in count 4 occurred once or twice a week for approximately six months, involving tens of incidents.
• Count 4 should have been elevated beyond category 2B—close to a campaign—or to category 1 because of persistence and the Plaintiff's particular vulnerability (age and cultural factors).
• Count 7, because it resulted in pregnancy and extreme psychological harm, should have been treated as category 1 or otherwise required a significant upward adjustment from category 2B.
• The sentence did not adequately reflect identified aggravating features (location in the Plaintiff's home, presence of children, limited deterrent to reporting).
• Mitigation (lack of previous convictions and passage of time) was limited and should not have outweighed the severity of the offending.

Attorney Murray (for the Defendant)

• Emphasised the Defendant's previously good character and the long period since the offending ended; accepted limited mitigation given convictions after trial.
• Submitted the harm from pregnancy was taken into account within the sentencing category and that elevation to category 1 was not compelled by the guideline (which states such elevation may, but need not, follow).
• Argued that the judge reached the top of the category 2B range for rape and that an aggregate sentence of 9 years was just and proportionate given available mitigation.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court concluded that the sentence was unduly lenient by a large margin. The panel's analysis addressed counts 4 and 7 and the aggregate effect of all counts:

• Count 4: The court accepted that the offending comprised one or two rapes per week for roughly six months, amounting to tens of incidents. Although a single incident would fall within category 2B, the cumulative weight of repeated incidents required upward movement well beyond the upper limit of category 2B. The court regarded count 4 as "pretty close to a campaign" and concluded it should have been sentenced accordingly.
• Count 7: While pregnancy is identified in the guideline as indicating category 2 harm, the court placed significant emphasis on the actual and ongoing impact of the pregnancy and birth on the Plaintiff and her child. The court held that count 7, viewed in isolation, required a substantial upward adjustment from the category 2B starting point and alone would have required a sentence significantly longer than 9 years.
• Concurrence and additional offending: The sentencing judge was entitled to treat the rape offences as lead offences and to order concurrency, but when doing so he should have taken into account the additional criminality represented by the indecent assault counts (1, 5 and 6); there is no indication he did so.
• Totality: The court acknowledged the principle of totality but concluded that, given (a) the near-campaign nature of count 4, (b) the exceptional seriousness and separate harm of count 7, and (c) the additional criminality of the indecent assault counts, the least aggregate sentence that could reasonably have been passed was 16 years.
• Remedy: The court quashed the 9-year sentences imposed on counts 4 and 7 and substituted sentences of 16 years on each count, maintaining concurrency as before.

Holding and Implications

The court held that the sentence of 9 years was unduly lenient and quashed the sentences of 9 years imposed on counts 4 and 7, substituting sentences of 16 years on each count; all sentences remain concurrent as before.

Implications: The direct effect is an increase in the custodial term for the Defendant to reflect the near-campaign of rape and the additional trauma from the separate rape that caused pregnancy. The opinion does not identify the creation of a new legal precedent beyond its application of the existing sentencing guideline principles to the facts of this case.