| [2025] IECA 196 |
Court of Appeal ruling ordering discovery of highly confidential tender documents and endorsing a confidentiality club while refusing party representative access. |
Used to explain why discovery of confidential materials had been ordered yet confidentiality should be preserved; justified confidentiality measures in the hearing. |
| Gilchrist v Sunday Newspapers [2017] 2 IR 284 |
Permissible departure from open justice in pressing circumstances; high degree of scepticism required. |
Applied as the starting point in assessing and making a limited pro tem order restricting public access to confidential material. |
| BOC Aviation (Ireland) Ltd v Lloyds [2024] IEHC 162 |
Clarified that Gilchrist does not require proof that justice cannot be done unless held privately. |
Relied on by parties in submissions about threshold for confidentiality relief. |
| Sandoz v Bayer [2025] IEHC 500 |
Authority where the court refused post‑hearing confidentiality in a patent case. |
Distinguished by Company C in seeking confidentiality here. |
| Case C-450/06, Varec |
Characterisation of confidentiality of tender information as a substantive right protected by EU law. |
Used to support protection of Company C's commercial information from public disclosure. |
| Word Perfect Translation Services Ltd v Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform [2020] IESC 56 |
Importance of confidentiality to effective public procurement and promotion of competition. |
Quoted to support public‑policy basis for protecting tender confidentiality. |
| SIAC v Mayo County Council Case C-19/00 |
Principle of transparency in procurement and interpretation of tender documents by the RWIND tenderer. |
Adopted as foundational authority for interpreting tender documents from the perspective of a reasonably well‑informed and normally diligent tenderer. |
| Unitron Scandinavia and 3-S [1999] ECR I-8291 |
Analogy used in SIAC regarding transparency obligations. |
Referenced in discussing transparency principle embedded in SIAC. |
| Gaswise v Dublin City Council [2014] 3 IR 1, [2014] IEHC 56 |
Interpretation of tender documents is a question of law judged from the RWIND tenderer's viewpoint. |
Applied to confirm interpretive approach and that the court must adopt the RWIND perspective. |
| Clinton v Department of Employment [2012] NIQB 2 |
Descriptive guidance on characteristics of the reasonably well‑informed and normally diligent tenderer. |
Quoted to flesh out the RWIND tenderer concept used in interpretive exercise. |
| Somague v Engenharia SA v Transport Infrastructure Ireland [2016] IEHC 435 |
Affirmation of RWIND perspective and use of industry context in interpretation. |
Cited to reinforce how a tenderer from the industry would read documents. |
| Word Perfect Translation Services v Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform (No. 3) [2021] 1 IR 698 |
Emphasis that tender documents must be clear in industry context. |
Referenced on context and transparency in procurement interpretation. |
| Sanofi v Health Service Executive [2018] IEHC 566 |
Permitted use of industry evidence to show how RWIND tenderer would have understood tender criteria. |
Referenced when discussing admissibility and relevance of industry evidence to document interpretation. |
| SERE Holdings v Health Service Executive [2024] IECA 197 |
Observation on the types of industry evidence relevant to RWIND interpretation. |
Applied to note the relevance of industry evidence where appropriate. |
| Healthcare at Home Ltd v Common Services Agency [2014] UKSC 49 |
Admissibility of industry evidence does not alter the objective RWIND test. |
Adopted to caution against treating industry witness evidence as determinative of the legal test. |
| Case C-368/10, Commission v Netherlands |
Clarified that additional information/clarifications cannot change essential contractual conditions set out in the contract notice/specifications. |
Relied on in assessing whether clarifications impermissibly altered tender requirements. |
| Case C-299/08 Commission v France [2009] ECR I-11587 |
Requirement that subject‑matter and award criteria be clearly defined from the start. |
Quoted within the discussion of clarifications and transparency obligations. |
| Baxter Healthcare Ltd v HSE [2013] IEHC 413 |
Principle that time limits for procurement remedies may start before final award when sufficient facts are known. |
Applied in relation to the Remedies Regulations and time‑bar arguments. |
| Case C-406/08, Uniplex (UK) |
Guidance on when knowledge of facts triggers time limits for remedies. |
Referenced in support of objective knowledge test for timeliness. |
| Newbridge Tyre and Battery Co. Ltd v Commissioner of An Garda Siochána [2018] IEHC 365 |
Clarified objective test for date of knowledge in timeliness enquiries. |
Applied to support the objective assessment of when Company A ought to have known. |
| White Mountain Quarries Limited v Mayo County Council [2024] IEHC 259 |
Approach to redactions and confidentiality in published judgments; also cited in relation to Regulation 69 jurisprudence. |
Followed in approving limited redactions and cited in discussion of Regulation 69 obligations. |
| Dekra Eireann Teo v Minister for the Environment [2003] 2 IR 270, [2003] IESC 25 |
Importance of adherence to statutory time limits in procurement challenges. |
Used to emphasise the significance of prompt challenges under the Remedies Regulations. |
| Killaree Lighting Services Ltd v Mayo County Council [2025] IECA 7 |
Authority upholding rejection of an abnormally low tender where explanations were insufficient. |
Referenced in assessing the standard of inquiry and sufficiency of explanations in Regulation 69 contexts. |
| SRCL Ltd v The National Health Commissioning Board [2018] EWHC 1985 (TCC), [2019] PTSR 383 |
Guidance on manifest error threshold and judicial restraint in procurement evaluation. |
Relied upon in calibrating the court's review standard (manifest error) of Company B's Regulation 69 assessment. |
| SIAC Construction Ltd. v. Mayo County Council [2002] 3 I.R. 148 |
Leading Irish authority on the standard of review and transparency in procurement. |
Referenced as foundational authority for manifest error standard and RWIND perspective. |
| The State (Keegan) v. Stardust Compensation Tribunal [1986] I.R. 642 |
Domestic law irrationality test referenced in comparison with manifest error standard. |
Used in framing the discussion on manifest error and judicial review standards. |
| Agriconsulting Europe v Commission C-198/16 P |
Principle that contracting authority may adopt objective non‑discriminatory methods to identify abnormally low tenders. |
Referred to in the General Court authorities about methodology for identifying abnormally low tenders. |
| Solelec and Others v Parliament T-281/16 |
Referenced in relation to absence of a formal definition of "abnormally low tender". |
Cited in the General Court discussion summarised by the judge. |
| Veridos GMBH, Case No. 669/20 |
On identifying suspect tenders and when a contracting authority must investigate. |
Quoted to support the obligation to identify and investigate suspect tenders under Regulation 69. |
| Sopra Steria Case C-101/22 |
Two‑stage process for abnormally low tenders (prima facie identification then in‑depth assessment). |
Applied in framing the Regulation 69 process and the required assessments by Company B. |
| NTT Data Belgique Case T-161/24 |
General Court summary of principles on abnormally low tenders and review limits. |
Used to explain review scope and that the Court's role is limited to detecting manifest error. |
| Westpole Belgium v Parliament T-640/22 |
Reinforced limits of judicial review of evaluative procurement assessments. |
Cited where the judge noted the limited scope for intervention absent manifest error. |