Anonymised Summary of Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant was extradited from abroad and, having pleaded guilty on 6 December 2024 to a single count of conspiracy to defraud, was sentenced on 5 February 2025 at the Crown Court to 6 years 9 months' imprisonment for that offence, with a concurrent 6-month sentence for failure to surrender contrary to section 6(1) of the Bail Act 1976. The court had not specified in open court the number of days the Appellant was held in custody awaiting extradition as required by section 327(3) of the Sentencing Act 2020; following enquiries the court specified that period as 69 days.

The offending arose from fraudulent used-car brokerage businesses operated by the Appellant. He first operated at scale as Company A, conduct that led to a sentence imposed in February 2018 in the Crown Court at The City for similar offending. Later the Appellant operated as Company B, the subject of the index conviction, by taking cars on sale-or-return terms and misappropriating sale proceeds to fund an extravagant lifestyle and to make payments to some clients by using other clients' monies (a Ponzi element). The prosecution identified numerous victims and substantial financial loss and risk of loss. The Appellant pleaded guilty in the proceedings leading to the February 2025 sentence.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the uplift from the category 1A starting point of 7 years to a notional 9-year sentence was manifestly excessive.
2. Whether the sentence should have been reduced for totality because the index offence pre-dated, and was similar to, an earlier sentence of 4 years 8 months imposed in February 2018 for related offending.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Judge Baker accepted that the Mansouri (Company B) offending fell within category 1A of the fraud sentencing guideline, with a starting point of 7 years and a guideline range of 5–8 years. The sentencing judge had applied a 2-year uplift to reach 9 years for aggravating features, then allowed 15% credit for the guilty plea and a reduction for delay to reach the final sentence imposed. The appellate court analysed the following points:

• The nature and seriousness of the Company B fraud: large-scale, sophisticated, sustained offending with many victims, actual financial loss of £720,000 and a total risked value of about £1.4m; six of seven high-culpability factors in the guideline were present; aggravation from the Appellant's earlier Company A fraud and from committing further offending while under investigation.
• The sentencing judge's uplift of up to 2 years from the 7-year starting point was understandable given the facts, and a notional trial sentence slightly above the guideline top (effectively 8 years 2 months after the judge's allowance for delay) was not, on its face, manifestly excessive.
• The judge erred in procedure on how he applied the reduction for delay and credit for plea: the delay reduction should have been applied before calculating credit for the guilty plea. Correcting that ordering affects the notional trial sentence and the resulting calculation after plea credit.
• On totality, the sentencing guideline section "Structuring consecutive sentences" (including the non-exhaustive factors (a)–(h)) governs how to take an earlier sentence into account. The court examined each relevant factor: (e), (f) and (g) did not arise; (c) and (d) pointed against a substantial reduction (no overlap of time and an earlier opportunity to "clean the slate"); but (a), (b) and (h) favoured making a meaningful reduction (the earlier sentence was many years before, the offending was very similar, and a joint sentencing would likely have required downward adjustment to achieve a proportionate total sentence).
• The sentencing judge dealt with totality briefly and gave insufficient weight to the totality guideline. The appellate court concluded that some real allowance should have been made for totality despite factors limiting the reduction, and therefore the judge erred in principle by not making an adequate adjustment.
• Applying the correct sequencing and making a totality allowance, the appellate court recalculated the sentence: start at 9 years (as the judge had), less 10 months for delay (applied before plea credit) = 8 years 2 months; less 15% for the guilty plea = 83 months (6 years 11 months); less a further downward adjustment for totality to reflect the earlier sentence = final term of 6 years' imprisonment. The court also specified the 69 days custody awaiting extradition under s.327(3) of the Sentencing Act 2020.

Holding and Implications

The appeal against sentence is allowed to the extent of substituting a reduced custodial term.

Holding: The court quashed the sentence of 6 years 9 months and substituted a sentence of 6 years' imprisonment. The court also specified that the Appellant was held in custody for 69 days awaiting extradition.

Implications: The direct effect is a reduced custodial sentence for the Appellant and specification of extradition custody days. The opinion corrects the sentencing judge's procedural error in applying delay and plea credit and identifies an error of principle in relation to totality, but it does not purport to establish new legal precedent beyond application of existing statutory and guideline principles.