Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
See more information ...
Click here to read the full judgment
Start Mortgages Designated Activity Company and Anor v Corr and Anor (Approved)
Smart Summary
Summary of Judgment
Factual and Procedural Background
The proceedings concern an order for possession of a dwelling (the Property at The City, Folio 62152L DN). An original possession order was made on 20 February 2015 in favour of Company C. Leave to execute that original order was granted on 5 November 2018. Company C's loan and underlying mortgage were sold to Company A, which was substituted as Plaintiff on 19 December 2019. Company A was permitted to execute in part; subsequent transfer of the loan and business from Company A to Company B was said to have occurred and Company B sought substitution as plaintiff and leave to execute the original order for possession. Judge O'Connor granted leave in the Circuit Court on 20 February 2024 and on 3 March 2025 substituted Company B as plaintiff and granted it leave to execute; those Circuit Court orders are the subject of this appeal to the High Court heard by Judge Gearty on 12 February 2026. The Appellant appeared in person and remains in occupation of the Property. The second named Defendant did not participate in the proceedings. The High Court proceeded de novo and considered whether Company B had proven title to the loan and was entitled to adduce additional evidence addressing previously redacted documents.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Company B should be substituted as plaintiff and granted leave to execute the original possession order.
- Whether Company B has established, on the balance of probabilities, that the loan and security were validly transferred to it despite redactions in exhibited documents.
- Whether the Court should permit Company B to adduce new evidence explaining redactions in transfer documentation.
- Whether delay in enforcing the original order justifies denying relief or affects entitlement to execution.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Appellant contends that Company B has not proven a valid transfer of the loan and so is not entitled to possession.
- The Appellant relied on remaining redactions in exhibited documents and submitted those redactions prevent meaningful examination and proof.
- The Appellant pointed to the continued appearance of Company C on the folio and asserted that the original order for possession had never been renewed.
Respondent's Arguments (Company B)
- Company B relied on exhibited documents (including a Global Deed of Transfer, transfer agreement and deed of amendment) and the affidavit of Attorney McCarthy explaining the redactions and asserting that core operative clauses and the loan account are identifiable.
- Company B submitted that the folio entries and documentary evidence show transfer to Company B (with a folio transfer dated 7 August 2024) and that notices to the mortgagor were sent; the last mortgage payment recorded was €83 in 2017.
- Company B sought leave to adduce further evidence to explain remaining redactions and relied on prior authorities for the applicable standard of proof and approach to redactions.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Bank of Ireland Mortgage Bank v. Cody [2021] IESC 26, [2021] 2 I.R. 381 |
Test for summary possession proceedings and recognition that many cases fall between clear entitlement and established defence; where affidavit evidence leaves doubt a plenary hearing may be required. |
The Court applied this framework to recognise the need to assess whether the Respondent had established entitlement on the evidence or whether further inquiry was necessary. |
| Start Mortgages DAC v McDaid [2025] IEHC 634 |
Standard of proof for substitution and execution applications should be on the balance of probabilities (not merely a prima facie standard). |
The Court adopted the balance of probabilities standard used in McDaid to assess whether Company B proved the transfer of the loan and its entitlement to execute. |
| Bank of Scotland v. McDermott [2019] IECA 142 |
Supports the higher standard of proof in possession/execution contexts as applied by the Court of Appeal. |
Referred to in support of applying balance of probabilities standard. |
| Start Mortgages DAC v. Ramseyer [2024] IEHC 329 |
Addressed issues with extensive redactions in transfer documentation. |
The Court distinguished Ramseyer on the basis that, in the present case, redactions were less extensive, explained and did not affect operative clauses. |
| Pepper Finance Corporation (Ireland) DAC v O'Reilly [2026] IEHC 16 |
Considered whether heavy redactions prevent the court from being satisfied as to the legal effect of transfer documents. |
The Court noted O'Reilly favoured the Appellant's argument in principle but found it distinguishable because the present exhibits had identifiable operative clauses and explanations for redactions. |
| Compagnie Financiere et Commerciale du Pacifique v. Peruvian Guano (1882) 11 Q.B.D. 55 |
Principle of relevance: disclose parts of documents relevant to the matter in question; distinguishes relevant from irrelevant material. |
Used as an organising metaphor ("Peruvian Guano") to assess whether redacted material related to the issues before the Court. |
| GE Capital Corporate Finance Group Limited v. Bankers Trust Co. [1995] 1 WLR 172 |
Obligation to disclose relevant parts of documents but not irrelevant parts; the court will respect an oath that concealed parts are irrelevant unless misleading. |
Quoted to support the approach that redactions can be acceptable where explained and not misleading. |
| Farrell v Everyday Finance DAC [2024] IECA 16 |
Warnings against excessive redactions; courts may require fuller disclosure if redactions prove misleading. |
Relied on to assess proportionality of redactions and need for explanation; supported the Court's approach to require explanations rather than refuse all evidence. |
| Gormley v. Ireland [1993] 2 IR 75 |
Limitation on the use of disclosed documents to litigation purposes. |
Referred to in discussion of confidentiality and the permissible scope of disclosed documents. |
| Courtney v. OCM Emru Debtco DAC [2019] IEHC 160 |
Requirement to explain basis of redactions, not merely assert privilege; courts should scrutinise redactions. |
Quotations from Courtney supported the requirement that parties identify precisely the basis for redactions where necessary. |
| Smyth v. Tunney [2004] IESC 24 |
Approach to delay: need to explain delay and balance rights and prejudice; exceptional reasons not required but explanation is needed before denying relief for delay. |
Applied to assess delay in enforcing the 2015 order; Court found delay largely explained by appeals and insolvency attempts and did not bar relief. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court reviewed the matter de novo and began from the proposition that Company B must prove entitlement to execute the original possession order. The Court applied the summary possession jurisprudence set out in Bank of Ireland v. Cody, recognising that where affidavit evidence leaves doubt a plenary hearing may be necessary. The Court adopted the balance of probabilities standard for determining entitlement, following Start Mortgages v. McDaid and related appellate authority.
The Court examined the exhibited documentation: a Global Deed of Transfer (largely unredacted save for unrelated borrowers' names), a Transfer Agreement and a Deed of Amendment (which contained commercial redactions). Attorney McCarthy's affidavit explained the scope and reasons for redactions (confidentiality of unrelated borrowers, transfer of employees and non-core contractual matters). The folio entries and the pleaded materials identified the loan account and recorded a transfer entry dated 7 August 2024.
The Court distinguished authorities where redactions were "heavy" and prevented linkage of transfer documents to a specific loan (notably O'Reilly and Ramseyer). Here the Court found that core operative clauses were apparent and the loan/account could be identified. There was no evidence that redactions were misleading or so extensive as to prevent the Court from determining the legal effect of the deeds. Given the explanations and the deponent's sworn statements (not seriously contested), the Court concluded Company B had, on the balance of probabilities, succeeded to Company A's interest in the Appellant's loan and mortgage and was entitled to substitution under the relevant rules permitting assignment substitution and execution by assignees.
The Court considered delay under Smyth v. Tunney, noting substantial delay since 2015 but observing that the delay was largely explained by appeals and the Appellant's insolvency process. Balancing the parties' interests and the Appellant's health circumstances, the Court nonetheless held that Company B was entitled to execution, while tempering the immediacy of eviction by granting a limited stay.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED; SUBSTITUTION AFFIRMED; RESPONDENT (COMPANY B) ENTITLED TO EXECUTE ORIGINAL POSSESSION ORDER
Implications:
- Direct effect: The High Court dismissed the appeal, affirmed the Circuit Court's substitution of Company B as plaintiff and confirmed Company B's entitlement to execute the 2015 possession order.
- Execution stay: Execution of the possession order is stayed for six months from 12 February 2026 to permit re-housing considerations and in light of the Appellant's health; after that period Company B may proceed to execute.
- Costs: The Court made no order as to the costs of the appeal.
- Precedential effect: The decision applies established principles on redactions, standard of proof and substitution in the context of mortgage-transfer possession applications; the Court did not purport to establish a new legal test beyond applying existing authorities.
Click here to read the full judgment