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Baker & Anor, R. v

Smart Summary

Anonymized Summary of Court Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

In the early hours of 19 July 2024, Defendant A and Defendant B jointly attacked the Victim. Defendant A wielded a large machete and inflicted multiple incised wounds to the Victim, who required hospital treatment for nine wounds and lacerations. Defendant B punched and kicked the Victim, including when the Victim was on the ground. Defendant A also swung the machete at the Victim's partner while she sought to intervene. Police recovered a large machete nearby and the attack was captured on a mobile phone.

Defendant A pleaded guilty at arraignment in March 2025 to offences including wounding with intent and related counts. Defendant B was tried in July 2025 and convicted by a jury of wounding with intent. On 16 September 2025, Judge Fenn sentenced Defendant A and Defendant B: Defendant A received an effective sentence of 7 years' imprisonment (head sentence 7 years on the section 18 count, concurrent terms for other counts); Defendant B received 5 years and 3 months' imprisonment. The Solicitor General applied under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 for leave to refer both sentences as unduly lenient.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the original sentences imposed on Defendant A and Defendant B were unduly lenient within the meaning of section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
  2. Whether the harm should have been categorised as category 1 (particularly grave or life‑threatening/permanent irreversible injury) rather than category 2 under the Definitive Guideline for wounding with intent.
  3. Whether an extended determinate sentence should have been imposed on Defendant A given the court's finding of dangerousness.
  4. What adjustments to notional (trial) sentences and credit for plea were appropriate if the sentences were found unduly lenient.

Arguments of the Parties

The Solicitor General (Attorney Richardson)

  • The harm should have been placed in category 1 because (a) injuries were particularly grave, (b) injuries had substantial and long‑term effects on the Victim's daily activities and work, and (c) the court should account for intended and foreseeable harm under section 63 of the Sentencing Code.
  • Alternatively, if category 2 was correct, the offence should have been at the top end of that range; for Defendant A that would mean a notional post‑trial sentence of about 10 years for the section 18 offence alone.
  • Concurrent sentences for other offences (notably attempted section 18) warranted further uplift; the attempted offence itself was serious and the notional trial sentence for it was wrongly low.
  • In Defendant A's case, an extended determinate sentence was required given the court's finding of dangerousness; the sentencing judge's reasons for not imposing one were inadequate.
  • For Defendant B, a determinate sentence in the range of 8–10 years was appropriate given his lesser role.

Defendant A (Attorney Marshall)

  • The sentencing judge conducted a careful and balanced assessment; the sentence was within the reasonable range of discretion.
  • The harm was not shown to be life‑threatening or permanently irreversible; no medical evidence established permanent irreversible injury or a PTSD diagnosis.
  • Section 63 of the Sentencing Code has greater application to inchoate offences and was less relevant here because the offence was completed and captured on video.
  • The judge reasonably declined to impose an extended determinate sentence after properly considering risk, mitigation (including progress in custody), age and offending history.

Defendant B (Attorney Gambrill)

  • The injuries, though numerous, were not shown to be particularly grave or life‑threatening; there was no expert medical evidence of permanent injury or diagnosis.
  • Defendant B played a lesser role; categorisation as culpability B and placement in category 2 were properly open to the sentencing judge.
  • The prosecution's view that the harm was "at least category 2" supported the judge's assessment; substantial mitigation (including steps in custody and social disadvantage) justified the sentence imposed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Attorney-General's Reference (Egan) [2022] EWCA Crim 1751; [2023] 2 Cr App R(S) 16 Principles for section 36 references: trial judge best placed to weigh factors; sentences are unduly lenient only if outside reasonable range; leave granted only in exceptional/certain gross error cases. The court applied these principles in assessing whether the sentencing judge had fallen into gross error and whether intervention was justified.
Attorney-General's Reference No 132 of 2001 (Bryn Dorian Johnson) [2002] EWCA Crim 1418; [2003] 1 Cr App R(S) 41 Purpose of Attorney-General's References includes allaying public concern and preserving public confidence where a judge appears to have departed substantially from sentencing norms. The court referenced this purpose when considering whether to exercise the power to increase sentences on reference.
Attorney-General's Reference No 4 of 1989 (1990) 90 Cr App R 366 Even if a sentence is unduly lenient, the appellate court retains a discretion whether to exercise its power to increase it. The court noted its discretionary power and exercised it to vary the sentences after granting leave.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court applied established section 36 principles (see cited authorities) and examined categorisation under the Definitive Guideline for wounding with intent and the Sentencing Code, including section 63 (intent or foreseeable harm). The court accepted that the trial judge was well placed to assess the evidence but concluded that the harm was at the top of category 2 and close to category 1. Taking account of aggravating and mitigating factors and the need to reflect concurrent offences (notably the attempted section 18 count), the court calculated a notional post‑trial sentence for Defendant A of 12½ years.

The court deducted 20% credit for Defendant A's guilty pleas, producing an adjusted sentence of 10 years for the lead count. The court found the sentencing judge had erred in principle in setting the notional sentence for the attempted offence below the applicable category range; it corrected that notional sentence to 6 years and 5 months and then applied 20% credit, resulting in 5 years and 2 months for the attempted offence (to remain concurrent).

On dangerousness, the court endorsed the judge's finding that Defendant A was dangerous but held that the sentencing judge's reasons for declining an extended determinate sentence were insufficient and in part irrelevant to risk management. The appellate court therefore imposed an extended determinate sentence of 13 years (10 years custodial term + 3 years extended licence) for Defendant A.

For Defendant B, the court accepted that he played a lesser role but, having regard to the appropriate categorisation and absence of guilty plea credit, determined that a minimum sentence of 8 years was required.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: Leave is granted to refer the sentences under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the sentences are varied.

Direct consequences:

  • Defendant A: count 2 varied to an extended determinate sentence of 13 years (10 years custody + 3 years extended licence); count 3 (attempt) corrected to 5 years and 2 months (concurrent); count 4 unchanged.
  • Defendant B: sentence varied to 8 years' imprisonment.

The decision corrects what the court found to be error in the original sentence calculations and the inadequate explanation for not imposing an extended determinate sentence in Defendant A's case. The opinion does not purport to establish a novel legal principle beyond applying established authorities on section 36 referrals and sentencing discretions; its effect is the alteration of the individual sentences described above.

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Baker & Anor, R. v

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Baker & Anor, R. v
(Feb 3, 2026)