Titan Wealth Holdings Ltd & Ors v Okunola

Factual and Procedural Background

Company A (the Appellant) comprises four claimants, including two corporate members of the Titan Wealth Group ("Company A") and two employees of Company A. Company A was represented by Company B (a law firm). Company A brought proceedings against the Defendant for breach of contract, breach of confidence and harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. The Defendant had earlier been engaged by Company A as a consultant and briefly employed by Company A. The Defendant brought unsuccessful employment claims against Company A and thereafter sent hundreds of abusive communications to numerous recipients, including Company B and its staff.

An interim pre-action injunction restraining harassment of the employees was granted in April 2024. A suspended prison sentence for breach of that injunction was imposed in June 2024 and later activated in February 2025. Company A applied in September 2024 for a further injunction prohibiting the Defendant from publishing abusive communications to or about Company B and persons acting for them (the further injunction application). The trial judge (Judge Hill) heard the further injunction application concurrently with Company A's substantive trial, dismissed the further injunction application for want of a sound jurisdictional basis, and gave a substantive trial judgment. Company A appeals on the single ground that the judge was wrong to conclude she lacked jurisdiction to grant the further injunction; Company A also seeks, in amended form, a narrower injunction framed in the language of the Malicious Communications Act 1988.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the trial judge was correct to dismiss the claimants' application on the ground that there was no "sound jurisdictional basis" to grant an injunction restraining the Defendant from abusing the claimants' legal team where that conduct interfered with the conduct of proceedings.
2. Whether the court has power (including inherent common law jurisdiction) to grant such an injunction in the absence of a cause of action and, if so, under what principles.
3. The relevance of the law of contempt to the availability of injunctive relief of this kind.
4. How the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 and section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 should be taken into account when considering such injunctive relief.
5. The scope and effect of the immunity from defamation and other proceedings attaching to statements made in the course of litigation on this type of injunction.
6. The appropriate procedural route (e.g. CPR Part 23 vs originating proceedings) for seeking such relief and the impact of that choice.
7. How the court should exercise its discretion when considering such an injunction (including whether relief should be tailored, whether third parties have alternative remedies, and whether relief should be interim or final).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Company A)

• The cause of action rule no longer prevents equitable injunctive relief of this kind; the court has an inherent jurisdiction to protect its process and grant the injunction in the interests of justice (relying on Convoy Collateral and Wolverhampton).
• The immunity for statements made in litigation does not prevent injunctive protection against "irrelevant and gratuitous libels" and the court can check improper conduct to protect proceedings (relying on Iqbal and Munster v. Lamb).
• Some of the Defendant's communications amounted to mere vulgar abuse falling outside Article 10 protection and therefore Article 10 should not bar the injunction (relying on Casserly).
• Proposed a four-stage test for injunctive applications: (i) material risk of interference with the course of justice, (ii) seriousness justifying intervention, (iii) whether relief would address the interference, (iv) balancing seriousness against countervailing interests and necessity in the interests of justice.

Advocate's Arguments (Supporting Company A)

• The inherent jurisdiction is available but (i) it is engaged only where the conduct could found a criminal contempt if repeated, and (ii) Article 10 and immunity do not preclude injunctions to restrain threatened contempt.
• Proposed a three-stage threshold test: (i) could the conduct found a contempt if repeated, (ii) is there a substantial risk of repetition, (iii) is it just and convenient to grant relief.
• Suggested non-exhaustive discretionary factors: severity, workability, utility, strategic use, alternative means, and contextual factors (including defendant's mental health).
• Contended that the injunction now sought on appeal should not be granted because there were no ongoing proceedings to protect and the conduct had not recurred since the Defendant's release from prison.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the single central issue: whether the trial judge correctly concluded she lacked jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining the Defendant's abusive communications to Company B that interfered with proceedings. The court held that the trial judge erred in treating the cause of action rule (The Siskina) as still limiting the grant of equitable relief after Convoy Collateral and Wolverhampton. The court concluded the High Court has an inherent common law jurisdiction to protect the integrity of its process and proceedings in the interests of justice and that this power can, in theory, be exercised whether or not criminal contempt is alleged.

The court analysed the role of contempt: where conduct reaches the threshold of a criminal contempt (a "serious interference with the administration of justice" or a "substantial risk" under the Contempt of Court Act 1981), Article 10 and the litigation immunity would not bar relief; but the court could not itself find contempt on the existing record because contempt had not been alleged, the Defendant had not had an opportunity to answer such a case, and the necessary evidential analysis had not been conducted.

Where contempt is not established, the court must consider Article 10 and section 12 and the immunity from suit for statements made in the course of litigation. The court explained the structured Article 10 approach from Abbasi (interference, legitimate aim, necessity/striking a fair balance) and noted that some communications (pure vulgar abuse) may fall outside Article 10 protection (Casserly). The court summarised the Iqbal/Warby J authorities on immunity, applying the Smeaton test that communications are privileged unless they have "no reference at all" to the subject matter, while noting exclusions (per Iqbal 2) for extraneous and gratuitous libels and that immunity does not apply to contempt or perjury.

The court addressed procedure: applications under CPR Part 23 can be used to seek such injunctive relief, but the court must be careful whether the relief sought is interim or final and be aware that relief under the court's inherent jurisdiction normally protects the proceedings themselves and should not ordinarily outlast them. Section 12(3) is engaged where interim relief might affect Article 10 rights unless the applicant is likely to establish that publication should not be allowed (or the interference is a contempt proved to the criminal standard).

On discretion, even accepting the jurisdictional threshold was met, the court identified four reasons why the trial judge should not have granted the broad injunction Company A sought: (i) the injunction was too broad and overbroad relative to protecting the proceedings, (ii) absence of a detailed examination of the defendant's communications made assessment of contempt, Article 10 and immunity difficult, (iii) Company B had an alternative statutory remedy under the PfHA and could have brought its own proceedings, and (iv) the proceedings were near conclusion and other, less intrusive measures might have sufficed. The court emphasised that any injunction must be tailored, necessary, and proportionate.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Holding: The court held that Judge Hill was incorrect to conclude she lacked jurisdiction to grant an injunction; the court affirmed that the High Court has an inherent common law power to protect the integrity of its process and proceedings in the interests of justice and that such power can, in theory, be exercised whether or not contempt is alleged. Nevertheless, the court exercised its supervisory review to dismiss the appeal because, as a matter of discretion, no injunction (including the amended narrower form sought on appeal) should be granted.

Implications: The decision clarifies that (i) the cause of action rule no longer bars the grant of equitable injunctive relief in all cases, (ii) the inherent common law jurisdiction permits injunctions to protect court process but such relief must be tailored and necessary, (iii) where misconduct would amount to contempt, Article 10 and litigation immunity are unlikely to bar relief, and (iv) where contempt is not alleged the court must carefully assess Article 10, section 12 and the immunity applicable to litigation communications. The direct effect is that Company A's further injunction application (as amended) is refused and no new injunction is granted; no new precedent beyond the stated principles was created concerning the exercise of discretion in individual cases.