O'Shaughnessy, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a renewed application by the Appellant for leave to appeal her conviction at Liverpool Crown Court for the murder of the Deceased and for permission to adduce fresh evidence under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. The Deceased died from a single horizontal knife wound to the lower right back inflicted with a kitchen carving knife. It was accepted that the Appellant stabbed the Deceased during an argument in the early hours of 7 December 2014. At trial the Appellant's primary defence was self-defence and her secondary defence was absence of the necessary intent for murder; the trial judge (Judge [Last Name]) left the partial defence of loss of control to the jury. The Appellant was convicted on 16 June 2015.

The renewed application seeks leave to adduce nearly 900 pages of Social Services records and a psychiatric report from Psychiatrist [Forrester], contending a diagnosis of PTSD/complex PTSD (CPTSD) that would bear on the qualifying trigger for loss of control. The Court granted an extension of time and directed the Respondent to obtain its own psychiatric report (Psychiatrist [Cumming]) and for the experts to prepare a joint statement; both experts agreed the Appellant suffered from PTSD/CPTSD and that that diagnosis could elevate her perception of threat. The Court considered admissibility under s.23 and whether the evidence would render the conviction unsafe.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether leave should be granted to adduce fresh evidence (Social Services records and Psychiatrist [Forrester]'s report) under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968.
2. Whether the fresh psychiatric evidence (CPTSD diagnosis) could properly be admitted and, if admitted, whether it would render the Appellant's murder conviction unsafe.
3. How the law on the partial defence of loss of control (s.54 Coroners and Justice Act 2009) and the limited role of psychiatric evidence in assessing the gravity of the qualifying trigger applies to these facts.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The fresh evidence (Psychiatrist [Forrester]'s report and Social Services records) demonstrates that the Appellant suffered from PTSD/CPTSD at the time of the offence, which heightened her perception of threat and could support the partial defence of loss of control, making the conviction unsafe.
• The Social Services records corroborate a long history of abuse that the Appellant had not fully disclosed at trial and which supports the new psychiatric diagnosis.

Respondent's Arguments

• The psychiatric evidence is admissible only for the limited purpose of explaining how a mental health condition may affect the perceived gravity of a qualifying trigger; it cannot alter the statutory exclusion regarding general capacity for tolerance and self-restraint.
• The Social Services records and the psychiatric diagnosis were available or could have been obtained at trial; trial counsel made reasonable tactical decisions not to run loss of control and not to adduce expert evidence that would have undermined the primary self-defence case.
• Even if admitted, the fresh evidence would not have produced a different verdict and therefore does not render the conviction unsafe.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court applied section 23(1)(c) Criminal Appeal Act 1968 and considered whether admitting the fresh evidence is necessary or expedient in the interests of justice, having regard to s.23(2) factors. It found the psychiatric report and Social Services records to be credible and contemporaneous but noted that, except for the CPTSD label (not available in 2015), the material was largely available at trial.

The Court emphasised the limited admissible role of psychiatric evidence for loss of control: it can inform the gravity of the qualifying trigger but not the hypothetical person's general tolerance/self-restraint (citing R v Rejmanski and R v Sargeant). The Court analysed trial preparedness and tactical choices: experts originally instructed (Psychologist [Richardson] and Psychiatrist [Verstreken]) did not diagnose PTSD/CPTSD and did not support loss of control; trial counsel reasonably chose to pursue self-defence and not to adduce expert evidence or Social Services records that might undermine that primary defence.

The Court found the Social Services records added little significant new material and that the Appellant's more detailed adult relationship accounts underpinning the new diagnosis were largely uncorroborated and could have been given at trial. The evidence, even if admitted, would only support a defence the Appellant did not run at trial; the Court applied the principle against using appeal to advance a different defence where it could have been run at trial (R v Erskine).

On the facts, the Court concluded that (i) the Appellant consistently asserted self-defence from the outset and never asserted loss of control, (ii) the single controlled blow and other trial evidence were inimical to a loss-of-control finding, and (iii) expert evidence about heightened perception of threat would have added little given the Appellant's account of being in close, choking-type danger—circumstances the jury could assess without psychiatric assistance. The experts' joint position did not change this outcome. The Court therefore determined the fresh evidence would not have made the conviction unsafe.

Holding and Implications

Applications refused.

Holding: The Court refused the application to adduce the fresh evidence and refused the renewed application for leave to appeal, concluding the conviction is safe.

Implications: The direct effect is that the Appellant's murder conviction is upheld and no retrial or substitution of verdict will follow. The Court noted no new legal principle was established; the decision applies established authorities on the limited role of psychiatric evidence in loss of control and on the inadmissibility of fresh evidence that merely advances a defence that could and should have been run at trial.