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Stuber, R. v

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 provisions on lifetime anonymity for victims of sexual offences apply. Following a Crown Court trial on 10 May 2024 in The City, the Appellant was convicted of one count of rape of a child and eight other sexual offences contrary to the Sexual Offences Act 2003. On 13 September 2024 the Appellant was sentenced to a special custodial sentence of 21 years under section 278 of the Sentencing Act 2020 (20 years custody and a one year extended licence). The Appellant obtained leave to appeal against sentence.

The offences comprised a series of sexual assaults on the Complainant between 2002 and 2010 when she was a child. The Appellant, trusted by the Complainant's family, began touching the Complainant from about age 7–8, escalating over time to digital penetration and attempted penile penetration. The offences occurred on multiple occasions in the family home and included grooming and steps to deter reporting. The Appellant was convicted on all counts except one where no verdict was taken.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge was manifestly excessive on appeal.
  2. How the sentencing guideline categorisation for the lead offence (category 2A) and associated starting point/sentencing range should be applied when assessing uplift for multiple related offences and the principle of totality.
  3. Whether the judge gave appropriate weight to aggravating and mitigating features (including grooming, abuse of trust, partial penetration, attempts to deter reporting, prior convictions, and personal mitigation) in fixing a special custodial sentence.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Attorney McCarroll submitted the 21 year sentence was manifestly excessive and accepted count 10 as the appropriate lead offence categorised as 2A (starting point 13 years; range 11–17 years).
  • She submitted that the other offences, while serious, were inherently less serious than counts 9 and 10 and that the totality of the offending did not justify increasing the total determinate custodial term to 20 years.
  • She relied on the Court of Appeal decision Attorney General's Reference (R v RGX) [2023] EWCA Crim 1679 to note that an offender whose overall offending there was more serious received a lower custodial term than imposed here.
  • She accepted RGX does not establish a legal principle but argued it illustrated that the sentence in this case was comparatively excessive.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any opposing party's submissions in this appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Attorney General's Reference (R v RGX) [2023] EWCA Crim 1679 Illustration of appellate adjustment to the lead offence sentence to reflect the totality of multiple sexual offences; the court raised the custodial term for the lead offence to reflect overall seriousness. The Court noted RGX but emphasised it is fact-specific and not a binding principle; the Appellant relied on it comparatively. The Court accepted RGX did not establish a legal rule applicable here but considered its relevance when assessing totality and comparative severity.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court agreed with the sentencing judge's approach to treat count 10 as the lead offence and accepted the category 2A classification (culpability A) based on grooming and abuse of trust. The Court identified relevant aggravating features: the victim's age, vulnerability, abuse of trust, grooming, severe psychological harm, and attempts by the Appellant to deter reporting.

The Court noted an offence-specific mitigation point: the penetration was partial and the Appellant stopped when the Complainant said it was painful. The Court accepted that, standing alone, a determinate sentence at or around the guideline starting point would have been justified for count 10 (had it been sentenced without regard to the other assaults).

Because the offending continued beyond the lead offence, an uplift was required to reflect the additional offences. The Court accepted the other offences were less serious than counts 9 and 10 but aggravated by occurring in the Complainant's home and by their number (with several offences when the Complainant was aged 7–12). The Court observed there was not repeated vaginal touching on every occasion and that touching was frequently over clothing.

The Court gave limited weight to the Appellant's lack of prior sexual convictions and to personal mitigation (difficult upbringing and trauma), noting the significant pattern of offending over a long period. Central to the analysis was the principle of totality: when multiple offences are aggregated into a global sentence, the uplift for additional offences must be tempered to avoid an excessive cumulative term compared with separate standalone sentences.

Applying those principles, the Court concluded the judge had given insufficient regard to totality when fixing the global sentence, rendering the 21 year special custodial sentence manifestly excessive.

Holding and Implications

The Court allowed the appeal in part and reduced the special custodial sentence to 19 years, comprising 18 years' imprisonment and a one year extended licence period.

Consequences: the other sentences remain unamended and will run concurrently with the reduced sentence. The Sexual Harm Prevention Order imposed by the sentencing judge remains in place. The Court noted that no new legal principle was established and that this decision turns on the facts and proper application of sentencing guidelines and the principle of totality in this case.

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Stuber, R. v

Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Justice Licence v1.0.

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Stuber, R. v
(Jan 27, 2026)