Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellees and the Appellant entered a tenancy agreement dated 23 January 2023 for a dwelling (the property). The written agreement created a six-month rolling tenancy with one month's notice and, under the heading "Rent", obliged the Appellant to provide "Minimum of 2 days work on the estate with hours from 9:00 to 17:00. Breaks to be agreed." The parties understood this to mean two days' work per week; it was later varied to four half days.
On 26 May 2023 the Appellees gave notice to terminate the tenancy effective 22 July 2023. The Appellant did not vacate. The Appellees served a further notice to quit on 27 September 2023 requiring possession on 31 October 2023. Proceedings for possession were commenced on 14 December 2023. The Appellees did not rely on any of the statutory grounds in Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1988 or on section 21.
At first instance Judge Chambers (District Judge) granted possession by order dated 12 January 2024. That decision was upheld on appeal by Judge Venn on 8 January 2025. The Appellant appealed to the court whose opinion is summarized here.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a tenancy that requires the tenant to provide services to which no monetary value is expressly attributed is "a tenancy under which for the time being no rent is payable" within paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 to the Housing Act 1988.
- Whether, if the services' value could be assessed by a court, that capacity to quantify suffices to make those services "rent" under the 1988 Act (such that the tenancy would be an assured tenancy).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Attorney Colville submitted that "rent" in the 1988 Act should follow the common law and the Law of Property Act 1925 definition (money or money's worth), so that money's worth should count as rent if its value is capable of being established by a court, not only when expressly monetised by the parties.
- The Appellant argued this construction was necessary to protect vulnerable tenants from exploitation and to prevent the 1988 Act being evaded by agreements that convert monetary rent into services whose value is not expressly recorded.
Appellees' Position
- The Appellees relied on the approach adopted in the courts below: that for the purposes of the statutory regime following the Rent Acts, provision of services only constitutes "rent" if the parties have attributed a monetary value to them or agreed a method of quantification. They also treated the tenancy as intended to be short-term and sought possession on that basis.
- The Appellees did not rely on grounds in Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1988 or section 21.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Hornsby v Maynard [1925] 1 KB 514 |
Held under the 1920 Act that "rent" referred only to money for the purposes of the Rent Acts; goods or services without agreed monetary valuation did not count as rent under those Acts. |
Used as a primary authority establishing that, for the Rent Acts, provision of services is not "rent" unless the parties have attributed a monetary value; the court treated this decision as binding in substance for interpreting "rent" in the 1988 Act. |
| Montagu v Browning [1954] 1 WLR 1039 |
Considered the effect of a change from monetary rent to payment in services and addressed aspects of Hornsby v Maynard; some judges in that case expressed views that cast doubt on parts of Hornsby. |
Referred to as having doubted aspects of Hornsby but not overruling it; the court noted Montagu's different analyses and treated its outcome as not displacing Hornsby. |
| Barnes v Barratt [1970] 2 QB 657 |
Affirmed the approach in Hornsby v Maynard and applied it to hold that agreements providing services without monetary valuation did not bring the tenancy within the Rent Acts. |
Relied on as confirming the continued applicability of Hornsby; treated as authoritative and followed in construing the 1988 Act. |
| Bostock v Bryant (1990) 22 HLR 449 |
Applied and followed Barnes v Barratt. |
Cited to show that Barnes v Barratt had been followed and applied by this court, reinforcing the line of authority limiting "rent" under the Rent Acts to monetary rent or agreed money's worth. |
| McDonald v McDonald [2016] UKSC 28, [2017] AC 273 |
Explained the purpose of the Housing Act 1988: to increase supply and quality in the private rented sector and to create assured tenancies/ASTs as part of that reform. |
Used to summarise the legislative purpose and historical context against which "rent" in the 1988 Act should be interpreted. |
| R (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] UKHL 13, [2003] 2 AC 687 |
Cited for principles of statutory interpretation (context and purpose). |
Invoked as authority for the method of interpreting statutory words in light of context, purpose and historical background. |
| R (O) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 3, [2023] AC 255 |
Cited for principles of statutory interpretation. |
Referred to in support of the approach to construing statutory language in context. |
| Barras v Aberdeen Steam Trawling and Fishing Co Ltd [1933] AC 402 |
Source of the "Barras principle"—previous judicial interpretation of a term in earlier legislation is a strong indicator of intended meaning in later similar legislation. |
Applied to infer Parliament intended "rent" in the 1988 Act to bear the same meaning as in the Rent Acts. |
| Sidney Trading Co Ltd v Finsbury Borough Council [1952] 1 All ER 460 |
Applied the test that the "rent" for Rent Restriction Acts includes the total monetary payment to be made by the tenant to the landlord (including sums expressed to be payable for rates etc.). |
Cited by Appellant in relation to whether payments for council tax, utilities, etc. could count as monetary payments; the court considered later statutory provision (Schedule 1, para 2(2)) which excludes such sums from "rent" unless not regarded by the parties as sums for those purposes. |
| Tennant v Smith [1892] AC 150 |
Historical example discussed in the opinion in relation to payment in kind being recognisable at common law. |
Mentioned as illustrative material; the court did not derive a decisive new principle from it for the 1988 Act. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined (i) the common law position that rent may be money or money's worth, (ii) the Rent Acts' established interpretation (Hornsby v Maynard and subsequent authorities) that, for the operation of those statutes, "rent" meant money or goods/services to which the parties had attributed an agreed monetary value, and (iii) the text, structure and purpose of the Housing Act 1988.
Applying the Barras principle, the court concluded Parliament intended the term "rent" in the 1988 Act to bear the same meaning as in the Rent Acts: the 1988 Act used similar language, had as one of its purposes the amendment of the Rent Act 1977, and contained numerous provisions (e.g. provisions assessing and comparing rent, limits expressed in monetary terms) which presuppose monetary quantification of rent.
The court rejected the Appellant's submission that the capacity of a court to quantify the value of services suffices to make them "rent" under the 1988 Act. The reasoning was that the line of authority requires an agreed monetary attribution (or agreed method of quantification) by the parties; piecemeal post-hoc quantification by a court does not transform unquantified services into statutory "rent".
The court also observed Parliament's contemporaneous enactment of section 3A of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977 (distinguishing tenancies granted otherwise than for money or money's worth), which indicated awareness of tenancies granted for money's worth and a deliberate choice not to extend assured-tenancy protection to unquantified money's worth within the 1988 Act.
The court considered, but declined to permit, a further argument about whether sums expressly payable for council tax, utilities and similar items should count as monetary rent, noting Schedule 1 para 2(2) excludes such sums unless they could not have been regarded by the parties as payable for those specific purposes.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED
Holding: The court held that a tenancy requiring the provision of services to which no monetary value has been attributed is a "tenancy under which for the time being no rent is payable" within paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 to the Housing Act 1988, and therefore is not an assured tenancy under the 1988 Act.
Implications: The direct effect is that the tenancy in question fell outside the scope of the Housing Act 1988 and the Appellees were entitled to an order for possession. The decision confirms and applies the established line of Rent Acts authority to the interpretation of "rent" in the 1988 Act; the court did not purport to announce a novel principle beyond that established approach.