Summary of Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

In June 2024 the Applicant was arrested for alleged breaches of a non-molestation order made by the Family Court on 5 May 2023 (which confirmed an ex parte order of 3 April 2023). The Family Court order prohibited the Applicant from using or threatening violence against the Complainant, or intimidating, harassing or pestering her, and remained in force until 3 April 2024. The alleged criminal charge was that, in May 2023, the Applicant repeatedly contacted the Complainant in breach of that Family Court order. The Applicant denied the allegations, elected Crown Court trial and was granted conditional bail, including conditions that he not attend the Complainant's address save for child contact and not contact the Complainant except via solicitors or via the communication app used for child contact ("the App").

The case was listed for trial on 7 April 2025. No prosecution trial counsel was initially available and an adjournment application was refused; the matter was listed for mention on 10 April 2025 by CVP. On 10 April 2025 the Prosecution offered no evidence and the Applicant was formally acquitted in his absence. After the acquittal the Judge invited submissions about a post-acquittal restraining order. The Complainant requested such an order; Defence counsel opposed it and sought to develop submissions about context and evidence. The Judge proceeded, without adjourning to obtain further evidence or allow the Applicant to attend, to make a five-year restraining order under section 5A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 prohibiting the Applicant from contacting the Complainant save via solicitors or the App in relation to the children.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the procedure adopted when imposing a post-acquittal restraining order complied with the procedural requirements (including Part 31 Criminal Procedure Rules 2020 and principles of natural justice).
2. Whether, on the available evidence, the statutory criteria for making a post-acquittal restraining order under section 5A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 were satisfied.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

• The imposition of the restraining order was procedurally improper: the Applicant had no prior notice, was not present at the hearing, and the Judge did not allow time for evidence to be led or for Defence counsel to develop submissions.
• The restraining order did not meet the statutory criteria: there was no evidential basis of future risk, important contextual evidence (including relationship history and permitted contact) meant the conduct did not justify the order, and alternative protective measures were available to the Complainant.

Prosecution's Submissions

• The Prosecution conceded the hearing was conducted improperly: the Judge failed to adjourn to allow evidence to be adduced and did not have a proper evidential matrix; the order therefore did not comply with CrimPR Part 31.2.
• However, the Prosecution submitted that a post-acquittal restraining order could properly have been made on the evidence if the correct procedure had been followed, noting the domestic context, prior non-molestation order, the Complainant's willingness to give evidence and her stated desire for protection.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court found that the post-acquittal restraining order was made at a hearing where the Applicant (with the court's leave) was not present and where no prior notice had been given that such an order might be sought. The Prosecution had not indicated an intention to apply and prosecutors attending had no instructions. Both counsel attended by CVP, which hindered addressing matters raised by the Complainant in court.

Because the necessity for a restraining order was contested, the Judge could only determine the issue on evidence and, if making an order, had to explain his reasons (Brough; Baldwin). The correct course—dictated by Part 31 CrimPR and authorities such as Davinder K—was to adjourn consideration, give directions to secure compliance with Part 31 (service of notices, witness statements, hearsay compliance), and provide the Applicant with proper notice and an opportunity to adduce evidence and make representations. The Judge did not do so, curtailed Defence submissions and proceeded without identifying a proper evidential basis or giving reasoned explanations. Those procedural failures denied the Applicant a fair process.

The Prosecution conceded these procedural defects and accepted the order did not comply with CrimPR Part 31.2. The court accepted that, on the material available, an order might properly have been made had the correct procedure been followed (Major; Davinder K), but the procedural unfairness meant the existing order could not stand.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; SECTION 5A RESTRAINING ORDER QUASHED.

Direct effect: the five-year post-acquittal restraining order made on 10 April 2025 is quashed. The Court of Appeal declined to make a substitute restraining order because there was no proper evidential basis before it. The Prosecution is not precluded from making a fresh application under section 5A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997; if it does so it must give notice of its application to the Applicant and to the Crown Court within 28 days (as directed by the court). No new legal principle beyond the application of established authorities and CrimPR Part 31 was established; the decision's practical consequence is to enforce the procedural protections and evidential requirements identified in the cited authorities.