Factual and Procedural Background
With leave of a single judge, the Appellant appealed against a total custodial sentence of three years imposed following his guilty pleas on 22 November 2024 to: (1) attempting to engage in sexual communication with a child (one year concurrent); (2) attempting to incite sexual activity with a child (two years concurrent); and (3) attempting to meet a child following sexual grooming (three years concurrent). Notification requirements and a Sexual Harm Prevention Order ("SHPO") of indefinite duration were also imposed. The Appellant was sentenced on 7 March 2025.
On 2 March 2024 members of a vigilante group (identified in the opinion as "Company A") detained the Appellant after he had communicated via an online platform (referred to below as "Company B") with a decoy posing as a 14‑year‑old, hereafter "Child Decoy". The communications, over about six days, contained sexually explicit exchanges, images and arrangements to meet in The City for sexual activity. The Appellant was arrested, electronic devices were seized and downloads revealed he had initiated contact, was informed the decoy was 14, and persisted with escalating sexual communications, including attempting to arrange travel and a meeting. When confronted outside his home the Appellant denied knowledge that the person was 14; he gave no comment in police interview.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the custodial sentence of three years was manifestly excessive having regard to mitigation including lack of previous convictions, psychiatric/neurological disorders and vulnerability in custody.
- Whether the SHPO should have been imposed for an indefinite period or for a limited, finite period.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The custodial sentence was manifestly excessive; the available mitigation (no previous convictions, evidence of mental disorder and vulnerability in custody) should have led to a greater reduction, potentially to a suspended sentence.
- The SHPO should not have been made for an indefinite period because there was no evidence of a high risk of re‑offending nor anything exceptional in the facts to justify an indefinite order.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| R v McLellan |
Guidance that an SHPO should not be made for an indefinite period unless the court, after careful consideration, is satisfied it is necessary. |
The Court accepted the McLellan guidance, found an SHPO was necessary on the facts, but held an indefinite duration was disproportionate and substituted a 10‑year term. |
| R v Bingley [2017] EWCA Crim 1464 |
Authority cited alongside R v McLellan concerning the approach to imposing SHPOs and their duration. |
The Court relied on the combined guidance to assess necessity and proportionality of the SHPO's duration and to limit it to a finite term. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court declined to disturb the Judge [Last Name]'s categorisation of the offences under the relevant sentencing guidelines or her use of concurrent sentences with an uplift to the lead offence (count 3) to reflect totality. The Court accepted that overlapping conduct justified concurrent sentencing and that the 12‑month uplift on the four‑year starting point for the lead offence was not susceptible to criticism.
On mitigation, the Court reviewed the pre‑sentence report ("PSR") and the psychiatric report. The psychiatric material noted bereavement, autism spectrum considerations and potential vulnerability in custody but did not establish a specific causal link between the Appellant's disorders and the offending. The PSR assessed low risk of self‑harm but medium risk of committing online/contact offences and medium risk of serious harm to female children.
The Judge [Last Name] had expressly considered the guideline on offenders with mental disorders, the Appellant's lack of previous convictions, the inchoate nature of the offences (attempts), and personal mitigation, and allowed a six‑month reduction for mitigation before applying one‑third credit for plea. The appellate Court found no error in that approach and concluded the custodial term was not manifestly excessive: the offending was serious, passed the custody threshold, and a significant term was both necessary and proportionate.
Regarding the SHPO, the Court applied the McLellan/Bingley guidance: an indefinite SHPO is justified only after careful consideration. The Judge [Last Name] had clarified at review why she considered a protective order necessary (speed and nature of engagement with a 14‑year‑old, images, encouragement to meet for penetrative sex). The PSR supported a medium risk assessment. Nevertheless, the Court found an indefinite duration disproportionate given the protective measures in the order, notification requirements, and the likelihood that terms would require updating over time. The Court concluded a 10‑year duration was proportionate and should be substituted, deemed to commence on 7 March 2025.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is allowed in part: the indefinite SHPO is quashed and substituted with an SHPO in the same terms limited to 10 years (deemed to commence on 7 March 2025). The remainder of the appeal is dismissed.
Implications: The custodial sentence of three years and the indefinite notification requirements remain in force; only the duration of the SHPO is reduced to 10 years. The Court did not set a new precedent beyond applying established guidance (R v McLellan; R v Bingley) on the necessity and proportionality of indefinite SHPOs.