Anonymised Summary of Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal against sentence heard with leave granted by a single judge. The Appellant was convicted at trial on 29 November 2024 at the Crown Court of: (i) arranging or facilitating the commission of a child sexual offence contrary to section 14(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003; and (ii) two counts of making indecent photographs of a child. The Appellant had earlier pleaded guilty to possession of small quantities of cannabis and heroin.

On 28 February 2025 the Appellant (aged 47 at the time) was sentenced to a total of 12 years' imprisonment, comprising 11 years 6 months for the section 14 offence, with other counts resulting in consecutive and/or concurrent terms. A sexual harm prevention order and indefinite notification requirements were imposed; statutory surcharge and forfeiture/destruction of devices were ordered.

The factual basis found at trial was that the Appellant engaged in highly sexualised online conversations seeking to pay for live-streamed penetrative sexual abuse of an 8-year-old child and made arrangements for such abuse. The trial judge found the communications were not decoy conversations but envisaged a real child and real activity and that the Appellant believed he would see a real child being raped.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the overall sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.
2. Whether the sentencing judge failed adequately to discount the sentence to account for the absence of actual harm, contrary to the approach in R v Privett [2020] EWCA Crim 557.
3. Whether the harm should have been assessed as category 3 rather than category 2 under the relevant sentencing guideline given uncertainty about whether real children were involved.
4. Whether certain mitigating factors (no previous sexual convictions, diagnoses of ADHD and probable ASD, drug addiction history and recent abstinence) were insufficiently reflected in sentence.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The overall sentence was manifestly excessive.
• The sentencing judge failed adequately to give credit for the absence of actual harm; reliance should have been placed on the approach in R v Privett, and uncertainties about whether a real child was involved should have been resolved in the Appellant's favour.
• The appropriate harm classification under the guideline should have been category 3 rather than category 2 because interactions did not develop into actual arrangements to abuse and there was uncertainty as to whether real children were involved.
• Mitigating factors (no prior sexual convictions, diagnosed ADHD, probable ASD, Class A drug addiction at the time and subsequent abstinence) were not given sufficient weight.

Prosecution's Submissions

• The prosecution pointed to the guideline for rape of a child under 13 and identified a starting point of 13 years with a range of 11–17 years for the comparable sexual offence; this was relied on as relevant to the appropriate assessment of harm and starting point.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate court reviewed (a) the trial judge's factual findings about the nature and content of the communications; (b) the sentencing judge's assessment of harm and culpability; and (c) the principles set out in R v Privett.

Key factual findings by the sentencing judge (which the appellate court accepted) were that the Appellant had engaged in highly sexualised conversations with multiple people seeking to pay for viewing adults having penetrative sex with children as young as eight and four, that the conversations envisaged a real child and real activity, and that the Appellant intended the offence would occur. The sentencing judge therefore assessed the matter by reference to the guideline for rape of a child under 13 with a starting point of 13 years and a range of 11 to 17 years, subject to the statutory maximum of 14 years for the section 14 offence.

Applying Privett, the court noted two relevant principles: (i) a section 14 offence can be complete without a real victim and absence of a real victim does not automatically reduce culpability; and (ii) nevertheless, where the arranged offence did not actually occur a sentencing judge should make an adjustment within the applicable category range so the sentence is commensurate with the starting point and range identified.

The appellate court found that, although the sentencing judge properly identified the applicable guideline category and starting point, he made no reference to the Privett obligation to adjust the sentence to reflect the absence of actual harm, nor did he indicate how he had achieved a sentence commensurate with that obligation. The appellate court concluded that some adjustment was required but absent from the reasoning and that, accordingly, the original sentence was manifestly excessive.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal against sentence is ALLOWED. The sentence of 11 years 6 months' imprisonment on the count of arranging or facilitating the commission of a child sex offence is quashed and substituted with a sentence of 9 years 6 months' imprisonment. The sentences on the remaining counts and the ancillary orders made by the Crown Court are unaffected. The total custodial sentence is recalculated to 10 years' imprisonment.

Implications: The court applied the guidance in R v Privett to require an express and proportionate reduction within the chosen category range where the intended sexual offence did not actually occur. The decision directly affects the Appellant's sentence but does not purport to set a new precedent beyond applying existing Privett principles; no broader novel legal rule was announced in this opinion.

Prepared from the anonymised contents of the provided opinion. Judge referenced as "Judge Cheema-Grubb" and counsel or other persons anonymised as "Attorney [Last Name]".