Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion records an appeal hearing concerning an Appellant who was tried in The Court at The City. The Appellant was convicted following trial on a single count of arranging or facilitating the commission of a child sexual offence (the rape of a girl under 13) and was sentenced on 15 November 2024 to six years' imprisonment; an indefinite Sexual Harm Prevention Order was also imposed. The Appellant renewed an application for leave to appeal against conviction after a single judge refused leave on the papers; leave to appeal against sentence was granted by the single judge and proceeded to the court.
The factual basis presented at trial was that, in February 2022, the Appellant contacted an advertisement on a website offering adult sexual services and spoke with a person using an assumed name who was in fact an undercover contact. Over a series of telephone calls between 8 and 15 February 2022 the Appellant discussed procuring sexual services from underage girls, named ages including 12 and 13, agreed a price of £250 for unprotected sex with a 12 year old, and arranged a meeting location; the Appellant did not attend that location. The Appellant was interviewed by police, declined a solicitor, and gave accounts including that he was "curious", thought the offer might be from a vigilante or entrapment group, and that he was "winding up" the contact; he denied sexual interest in children. The prosecution led inferences from the recorded conversations and other indicia (number of calls, local agency, provision of car details) to show intent. The prosecution also applied to adduce evidence of a prior online contact with a woman abroad negotiating viewing of a young child; the judge allowed that bad-character evidence to be adduced to the jury. The judge rejected a no-case submission at the close of the prosecution case. The Appellant did not give evidence; character witnesses were called. The Appellant was convicted of the arranging/facilitating count and acquitted of a separate count.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether there was a case to answer on the charge of arranging or facilitating the commission of a child sexual offence — specifically, whether the evidence permitted a jury properly to infer that the Appellant intended to carry out the arranged offence.
- Whether evidence of a prior online contact (the alleged conversation with a woman in a foreign country) was admissible as bad-character evidence, both to show propensity and to rebut a claimed false impression given in interview.
- Whether the sentence of six years' imprisonment (reduced from an identified starting point) and the imposition of an indefinite Sexual Harm Prevention Order were manifestly excessive or otherwise wrong in law.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The judge erred in refusing the submission of no case to answer: the evidence did not sufficiently support an inference that the Appellant intended to go through with the arrangements; other explanations (notably fantasy or "winding up") could not be excluded.
- The judge erred in admitting the prior online contact from abroad as bad-character evidence: it was a single incident, there was no conviction, and its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, making its admission unfair.
- On sentence, the judge erred in treating a notional 12-year-old (who was not real) as a particularly vulnerable child; insufficient credit was given for mitigation (no previous convictions, good character, primary carer duties, desistance by not attending); and it was inappropriate to make the Sexual Harm Prevention Order indefinite given the circumstances.
Prosecution's Arguments
- The prosecution relied on inferences from the totality of recorded exchanges and surrounding facts to prove intent to arrange or facilitate the commission of the offence: the realistic nature of conversations (not fantasy), the local nature of the agency contacted, the volume of calls (39 calls over the period), and provision of car details and travel plans.
- The prior online contact from abroad was relevant bad-character evidence demonstrating a sexual interest in young girls (propensity) and was admissible to rebut the Appellant's interview assertion that he had no sexual interest in children.
- On sentence, the prosecution relied on the harm that would have been caused had the offence been carried out and on the applicable Sentencing Council guideline categorizations to support the sentence imposed.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| R v Hedgcock [2007] EWCA Crim 3486 |
Where internet conversations are of a fantasising character, the messages alone may be insufficient for a jury to infer intention to carry out the conduct; extraneous evidence may be required to support an inference of intent. |
The court summarised Hedgcock and emphasised that its facts were "highly unusual" (fantasy between participants). The court held Hedgcock needed to be read in full but distinguished it on the facts: the present case involved a commercial negotiation from an advertisement and other objective features that a reasonable jury could treat as indicative of intent, so Hedgcock did not require a finding of no case to answer here. |
| R v G [2012] EWCA Crim 1756 |
Internet conversations discussing sexual activity with a child do not automatically permit a jury to infer an intention to act; on particular facts the evidence may be insufficient for such an inference. |
The court noted R v G reached such a conclusion on its facts. The court treated R v G as fact-specific and held the present facts were materially different (commercial negotiation, recordings, corroborating indicia), so the reasoning in R v G did not dictate that the no-case submission should have been upheld here. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court considered the Appellant's renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction and the appeal against sentence. On the conviction point, the court analysed whether a reasonable jury, properly directed, could conclude that the Appellant intended to carry out the planned offence. The court examined the nature of the recorded communications and surrounding circumstances relied upon by the prosecution: the realistic and deliberate tone of the conversations, the fact the Appellant contacted a local agency, the pattern of 39 calls over the relevant period, and the provision of car and travel details. The court concluded these matters could support an inference of intent and that the judge was entitled to reject the suggestion that the exchanges were mere fantasy or a "wind up".
The court considered the authority of R v Hedgcock and R v G, acknowledged their principles (that in some internet conversation cases the exchanges may be purely fantasising and insufficient to prove intent absent extraneous evidence) but distinguished those authorities on the facts. The court emphasised that those cases were fact-specific and that the present case involved a commercial negotiation responding to an advertisement, which was "far removed" from fantasising between paedophiles. The recording and objective features were matters for the jury to assess, and the judge did not err in concluding there was a case to answer.
On admissibility, the court considered the application to adduce evidence of an earlier online contact abroad to show sexual interest in young girls. The court accepted the judge's view that the evidence was relevant both to propensity and to rebut a false impression created by the Appellant's interview statements that he had no sexual interest in children. The court rejected the alternative course of excluding the Appellant's interview assertions (part of what he said and relied on in character evidence) and found the impugned material admissible; again, these were matters for the jury to weigh.
On sentence, the court set out the sentencing exercise as conducted by the judge. The judge identified the notional offence if the arranged conduct had been carried out (rape of a child under 13) and the appropriate Sentencing Council guideline categories and starting points (category 2B starting point ten years, range eight to 13; category 3B lower). The judge evaluated harm (arranging for a young girl to be prostituted/exploited; particular vulnerability by reason of personal circumstances) and identified mitigating factors (no previous convictions, positive personal and employment history, primary carer responsibilities, and crucially that the Appellant did not attend the arranged meeting). The judge applied a substantial downward adjustment from the starting point and imposed six years' imprisonment. The court concluded that the judge's approach to harm and mitigation was lawful, the reduction substantial, and the resultant sentence not manifestly excessive. The judge's imposition of an indefinite Sexual Harm Prevention Order was also upheld as within judicial discretion given the circumstances of the case.
Holding and Implications
Application for leave to appeal against conviction refused.
Appeal against sentence dismissed.
Consequences: The conviction is to stand and the sentence of six years' imprisonment, together with the indefinite Sexual Harm Prevention Order, remain in force. The court distinguished the cited authorities on their facts and did not establish a new general principle beyond applying established law to the facts; the decision's immediate effect is the affirmation of the trial outcome and sentence in this case.